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ABSTRACT 
The personal road transport sector is one of the largest and fastest growing sources of CO2 
emissions in the world. The application of a cap and trade system in the transport sector is 
being discussed as a policy measure to reduce carbon emissions. However, current discussions 
focus on applying these to the upstream sector, e. g. the car manufacturers. Allocation of 
permits among individuals has not been studied in the academic literature, yet individual 
allocation of permits could be an effective and efficient policy tool to combat carbon 
emissions. Any policy to reduce carbon emissions from vehicles will likely have an equity 
effect; both fuel taxes and tradable permit systems have different distributional effects on 
various socio-economic groups. Numerous studies have found gasoline taxes to be regressive 
in nature in that lower income groups with vehicles bear an above average burden from the tax. 
However, many previous studies do not consider the natural behavioural response of a 
consumer facing an increased price. This response may vary among different segments of the 
population, depending on their travel needs, which in turn is contingent upon their income, 
location of residence and other factors, such as levels of vehicle ownership. 
This dissertation investigates the equity effects of a personal tradable carbon permit policy for 
households' fuel consumption. This research examines whether different socio-economic 
groups truly have different demand responses using an econometric analysis of US consumer 
expenditure survey data. Both aggregate time-series and disaggregate household level data are 
used in this analysis. In addition to regular parametric estimation, a flexible functional form 
has also been estimated for gasoline demand. There is strong evidence that the price elasticity 
of petrol varies with household characteristics and location. Utilising these price elasticities, 
the distributional burden on different groups is determined for a hypothetical reduction in 
carbon emissions in the road transport sector. Different permit allocation strategies are 
considered and compared, as well as sensitivity analysis for other reduction quantities. In 
addition to determining the distribution of welfare changes among different income groups 
(vertical equity), the distribution within each group (horizontal equity) has also been 
investigated using disaggregate data. 
Separate estimates of relative changes in welfare are provided for households with and without 
vehicles. An equal allocation of permits to every adult makes the policy the most progressive 
among vehicle-owning as well as all households. On the other hand, an allocation on the basis 
of vehicle ownership makes the policy fairly proportional. Also, the same allocation strategy 
may not be the best at delivering both horizontal and vertical equity. Two major limitations of 
the analysis was that the transactions costs of tradable permits and effects on secondary 
markets were not included, which can be avenues of further research. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Climate change is probably the greatest long-term challenge facing the human race. 
-Blair (2006) 
While the sentiments of the former British Prime Minister, and those of European nations more 
generally, may not have been shared as enthusiastically by the US or Australian heads of 
governments, the notion that the earth's climate is warming has been stated unequivocally by 
the most recent Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC 2007a). IPCC (2007a, 2007b) concludes that it is very likely' that greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions from human activities, of which carbon dioxide (C02) is a major element, 
have caused most of the observed increases in globally averaged temperatures since the middle 
of the 20th century. 2 One of the major policy goals to contain the extent of global warming, 
therefore, is to mitigate the CO2 or carbon3 emissions from different sectors of the economy at 
a low cost. 
The personal road transport sector is a major source of rising CO2 emissions worldwide. This 
dissertation examines one policy solutions to reduce CO2 emissions from personal road 
transport: tradable carbon permits. Under this policy every individual is allocated a specific 
number of carbon emission permits for their road travel, which they can trade amongst 
themselves. The choice of the policy tool is governed by the interest in academic and 
government circles (especially in the UK) for personal carbon permits as an effective long term 
policy option to mitigate carbon emissions from households on a large scale (Miliband 2006, 
Fleming 1997, Hillman and Fawcett 2004, Fawcett 2004). The approach of using personal 
tradable carbon permits for road transport easily fits within a broader climate change context of 
household level permits for energy use and carbon emissions. The major focus of the 
1 In IPCC (2007a, 2007b) terminology, very likely refers to greater than 90% probability. 
2 The greenhouse gases are C02, Methane, Nitrous Oxide, Hydrofluorocarbons, Perfluorocarbons, and 
Sulphur Hexafluoride. 
3 Carbon and CO2 are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation. 
dissertation is on the distribution of the economic burden from such a policy on households 
from different socio-economic groups. 4 
The objective of this introductory chapter is to provide a context for the research in relation to 
some general issues regarding carbon emissions and climate change effects from the transport 
sector. The contribution of the personal road transport sector to emissions of CO2 is then 
discussed in section 1.3 with special reference to the USA. Policy approaches to curtail 
emissions from personal road transport is then very briefly reviewed with the motivation for 
the investigation into tradable permits explained in section 1.4. Section 1.5 describes research 
objectives, followed by the structure of the thesis in section 1.6. 
1.2 Climate Change, CO2 Emissions and Transportation 
There is a large body of scientific evidence that has emphasized climate change as a serious 
and urgent issue (Stern 2007). The general consensus among the scientific community is that 
human-induced emissions of the greenhouse gases have increased the atmospheric 
concentration of such gases, which alters the natural process of heat (radiation) exchange 
between the earth and its atmosphere and leads to an increase in the temperature of the earth's 
atmosphere, with associated negative impacts worldwide. 5 Even at the current concentration of 
430 ppm C02-e 6 in the atmosphere, a temperature rise of around 2°c cannot be avoided (Stern 
2007). Stabilizing the C02-e concentration in the atmosphere at 450 ppm would require a 70% 
reduction in the GHG emissions from the present level of emissions by the year 2050 (Stern 
2007). On the other hand, the earth's annual capacity to absorb C02-e emissions is 80% below 
the current level of emissions, meaning that an 80% reduction is required to ultimately stabilize 
the climate system (Stern 2007). This scientific finding, however, should be understood against 
a backdrop of an increase of greenhouse gas emissions in the past decades (IPCC 2007c). The 
emissions of C02, which alone represents 77% of all anthropogenic GHG emissions, have 
grown by 80% between 1970 and 2004 globally and by 28% between 1990 and 2004 (IPCC 
2007c). This gives a clear indication of the enormity of the challenge for policy makers. 
One of the major drivers of growth in the emissions of greenhouse gases, both in developed 
and developing countries, is the growth in transport activities. Since the transport sector is 
almost entirely reliant on petroleum, a major source of carbon emissions, those from transport 
are also increasing. Transport represents 14% of global GHG emissions, when emissions from 
4 Although carbon taxes could be an efficient tool to reduce emissions, it may not be effective and could 
have adverse distributional effects. See Chapter 2. 
5 See IPCC (2007a) for an elaborate explanation of the science behind the greenhouse effect. 
6 The current (year 2005) concentration of CO2 alone is 379 ppm (IPCC 2007b). 430 ppm C02-e results 
when the warming potential of other GHG's are converted to a C02-equivalent scale, and added to the 
CO2 concentration. (Stern 2007). 
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land use changes and agriculture are included (World Resources Institute 2006). Considering 
emissions related to energy use, transport represented 23% of global carbon emissions in 2004 
(International Energy Agency, IEA 2006). In the OECD7 countries, transportation was the 
fastest growing source of GHG's between 1990 and 2002 with an increase of 25%. In the non- 
OECD countries also, transport emissions increased by 36% during the same period, making it 
the second fastest growing sector (Stern 2007). Transport activities are, therefore, a major 
source of carbon emissions and any significant reduction would require cutting emissions from 
the transportation sector. 
In an attempt to combat global climate change, the Kyoto protocol, an international agreement 
on curtailing GHG's came into effect in 2005 for the signatory countries (United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC 1998). The protocol stipulates 
reduction targets for developed countries (Annex I countries, in the Protocol terminology). ' 
Many developed countries also independently adopted policies to reduce carbon (and GHG) 
emissions. While significant progress has been made in reducing carbon emissions from 
different sectors of the economy, transport still remains a pariah. For example, total GHG 
emissions from the UK declined by 10% between 1990 and 2002, yet transport emissions were 
47% higher in 2002 than in 1990 (Office for National Statistics 2007). Road transport alone 
increased its share of total GHG emissions from 14% in 1990 to 18% in 2002. Similarly, 
Germany has reduced its total emissions by 17% from 1990 but transport emissions still 
increased by 8.2%. The proportion of transport carbon emissions rose from below 16% in 1990 
to 19% in 2004. In the USA, the transport sector also increased its share of total emissions 
during the same period (Davies and Diegel 2007). This increasing trend is predicted to 
continue by the Business-As-Usual scenario of the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD 2004), IEA (2004) and by the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA 2006). These three examples and future projections illustrate the importance of mitigating 
carbon emissions from the transport sector if overall greenhouse gas emissions are to be 
reduced. 
1.3 Personal Road Transport and Carbon Emissions 
Within the transport sector, the contribution of road transport is the largest, at 76% globally 
(WBCSD 2004). In the EU279 and the North American 10 countries, personal vehicles are 
responsible for the largest share of total road transport emissions, at around 60% (Greene 2007, 
OECD refers to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, a coalition of 30 
developed countries. 
8 For some countries, e. g. Australia, Iceland and Norway, an increase is allowed. 
9 EU27: 27 countries in the European Union including the recently included East European countries. 
lo USA and Canada 
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European Federation for Transport and Environment, T&E 2007). With projected economic 
growth of the under-motorized developing countries, the growth of personal vehicles and thus 
emissions from them are expected to be much higher in developing countries (WBCSD 2004). 
Mitigating emissions from the growing stock of personal vehicles therefore is an enormous 
challenge. 
Among the developed countries, the personal road transport sector registered a 6% increase in 
emissions between 1990 and 2002 in the UK. In the EU 15" countries, the number of passenger 
cars increased by 27% between 1990 and 2002 with an associated increase in carbon 
emissions, 22% between 1990 and 2001 (Kägeson 2005). Light duty personal vehicles were 
responsible for 61% of all carbon emissions from mobile sources in the USA in 2005 and 
increased by 25.4% between 1990 and 2005 (Fig 1.1, US Environmental Protection Agency, 
USEPA 2007). At present, personal vehicles in the USA alone are responsible for 11.1 % of 
global carbon emissions from petroleum use (Davies and Diegel 2007). As a sector, the US 
light duty vehicle fleet emits more carbon than any other country in the world, except China 
(Greene and Schäfer 2003). At the same time, transport emissions are projected to increase by 
37% by 2030 over that of 2005 in the USA, with an accompanying increase in emissions from 
personal vehicles as well (EIA 2007). Any policy proposal that seeks to reduce carbon 
emissions from the USA, therefore must address the reduction possibilities from light duty 
vehicles, which are primarily used for personal transportation. 
Fig. 1.1 Share of carbon emissions for different vehicle types in the USA, personal vehicles 
consist of light trucks and passenger cars [source: USEPA 2007] 
11 EU 15: the original 15 European Union countries 
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1.4 Policy Approaches to Curtail Emissions and Motivation for Research 
While the Kyoto Protocol attempts to generate a national target for carbon emissions from each 
country, the amount of reduction and policies to achieve it from different sectors of the 
economy remains the responsibility of individual countries. As a result, policy approaches to 
mitigate carbon emissions from road transportation varies from country to country. Carbon 
emissions from transport can be expressed through the following identity (lEA 2000): 
'Emissions = Travel activity x Mode share x Mode carbon intensity 1.1 
Various policies address different elements of the right hand side of Eq. 1.1 to bring about a 
reduction in carbon emissions from the vehicles. Therefore, there are different policies that can 
directly or indirectly contribute to reduce carbon emissions from personal vehicles. Examples 
include fuel taxes, carbon taxes, road pricing, parking charges, traffic calming, speed limits, 
traffic management, expansion of public transit networks and frequencies, fees for vehicle 
acquisition, fee bates, fuel economy or carbon emission standards, policies involving land use 
and media campaigns (IEA 2000). Many of these policies affect carbon emissions indirectly 
(e. g. road pricing and parking charges discourage use of vehicles, and thus can lower 
emissions; traffic management, traffic calming and speed limits reduce emission rates during 
driving; expansion of public transport encourages mode switching etc. ). The policy approaches 
that primarily aim to reduce carbon emissions directly are fuel or carbon taxes and vehicle fuel 
economy or carbon emission standards. 
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The principal approach in controlling gasoline consumption from vehicles in the USA 
is the 
regulatory approach, put into action when the Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
(CAFE) 
program was launched in the 1970's because of concerns for oil security. 
In the CAFE 
program, vehicle manufacturers are given an average target level of 
fuel economy (National 
Research Council, NRC 2002). 13 In the European Union, the corresponding policy is a 
voluntary agreement between vehicle manufacturers and governments to regulate carbon 
efficiency of new vehicles (T&E 2007). 
14 Although regulatory approaches reduce carbon 
emissions from new vehicles, and eventually the existing vehicle 
fleet over a longer period of 
time through replacement, such policies still do not provide an absolute cap on the emissions 
from personal vehicles. Fuel or carbon economy regulations of vehicles address modal carbon 
12 Although road charging also has a significant influence on reducing travel activity and 
therefore 
carbon emissions, its primary purpose is to control congestion or 
finance highway construction. Road 
charging with differentiated rates for fuel economy of vehicles, 
however can address carbon emissions 
directly. 
13 Fuel tax in the USA is a source for raising revenue and is not designed to reduce 
fuel consumption. In 
some European countries, however, fuel tax 
has been increased with the goal to control travel and fuel 
consumption. 
14 The vehicle manufacturers have failed to achieve the target reduction. 
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intensity (Eq. 1.1) yet other external pressures which can increase travel activity or vehicle 
modal share, can still increase the emissions from a base case. These other factors clearly 
dominated in the USA, resulting in the increase in emissions, as mentioned in §1.3. The 
increase is a result of a combination of factors: an increased demand for travel because of 
higher income and lower prices, growth in the share of larger, less fuel efficient vehicles on the 
road, growth in population and urban sprawl etc. (USEPA 2007). Forcing vehicle 
manufacturers to produce a target emission standard could also be economically inefficient, 
since the reduction may not be carried out at the least cost to the economy (Stavins 1998, 
Congressional Budget Office, CBO 2002). 
The other approach, which uses market forces to control emissions, is increasing fuel taxes, an 
approach implemented in many countries. In the USA, however, federal fuel taxes have been 
stagnant in nominal terms for the past 10 years, which, along with an increase in income over 
the same period actually translates into a lower effective tax rate. Even in the presence of high 
fuel taxes on motor gasoline which would discourage consumption, other factors (e. g. higher 
income, urban sprawl, population growth) would still cause total emissions to increase, and 
raising gasoline taxes in the USA is a contentious issue (Hammar et. al. 2004, Nordhaus and 
Danish 2003). 
Another approach to curtailing emissions is the tradable permit approach (Tietenberg 2001). 
This approach has been applied successfully to reduce SO2 emissions from US power plants or 
phasing out lead from gasoline. This is also the internationally advocated policy approach to 
reducing CO2 emissions through the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC 1998). The application of 
tradable permits for household energy use or the road transport sector has been suggested 
(Fleming 1997, Verhoef et. al. 1997, Fawcett 2004, Hillman and Fawcett 2004, Raux and 
Marlot 2005). Such a policy, in addition to being effective in generating an absolute emission 
reduction even in the presence of other growth factors, is deemed to be beneficial to 
low 
income groups, directly addressing equity concerns (Raux and Marlot 2005). Because of the 
positive impact on lower income groups, it is assumed that such a policy would 
be more 
acceptable to the public than very high levels of gasoline tax (Starkey and 
Anderson 2005). 
Literature on the application of tradable permits to the personal road transport sector 
however 
is sparse. This dissertation focuses on the application of such a policy to reduce carbon 
emissions from the personal road transport sector through an analysis of 
US data. The US is 
chosen simply because of the sheer volume of carbon emissions 
it produces from the personal 
road transport sector. This sector has also shown a strong growth 
in emissions during the past 
decade (§1.3). In addition to investigating possible advantages and disadvantages of the 
tradable permits approach, the dissertation also focuses on the distribution of the economic 
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burden among different households as a result of the policy. The focus of this dissertation is on 
distributional burdens since the public acceptability of a policy may critically hinge on its 
distributional consequences (Mayeres and Proost 2004, Santos and Rojey 2005). The next 
section defines the specific objectives of the thesis. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
This dissertation contributes to the study of the current policy issues related to reducing carbon 
emissions from road transportation. The thesis begins with reviewing the literature on market 
based carbon emissions control policies, compare the tradable permit policy with these and 
identify key issues associated with a tradable permit policy and its application to the personal 
road transport sector. Since the tradable permit policy may have significant distributional 
consequences, the literature on welfare economics and tax incidence are also reviewed in order 
to develop a model to determine the distribution of burdens of a tradable permit policy on 
different socio economic groups. This is followed by a review of the literature on gasoline 
demand models to identify the consumption response of households to an increase in the price 
of gasoline. The specific objectives of the research are: 
1. To understand the responses of different socio economic groups to an increase in price 
of gasoline as a result of a tradable permit policy, especially to model the effect of 
different demographic variables on the responses 
2. To understand how a tradable permit policy would affect different socio-economic 
groups and to accommodate different responses of different groups or households in 
modelling the distribution of burden 
3. To understand how different permit allocation strategies would affect the distribution 
of burden 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into nine chapters, focusing on nine different topics. Each of the 
chapters begins with an overview of the chapter, followed by a number of subsections. 
Each 
chapter also ends with a summary of findings. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
The first chapter presents the overall context of the research, describes the objectives and 
provides a roadmap for the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Tradable Permits: A Review of Theory and Practice 
This chapter reviews various policy options to reduce pollution and carbon emissions in 
particular. The economic principle of tradable emission permits is briefly discussed. Tradable 
permits are then compared with other policy options especially in the context of emissions of 
carbon in personal road transport. Issues with the allocation of the permits are then discussed 
with special reference to distributional concerns. 
Chapter 3: A Review of Methods for Equity Measurement 
This chapter sets the context for the distributional analysis. It defines the different equity 
concepts used in the welfare economics literature. It then goes on to describe various indexes 
to measure a distribution or change in distribution, followed by measures to calculate the 
change in welfare, arising from a policy induced price change. Finally the chapter identifies the 
measures that can be used in the context of this research. 
Chapter 4: A Review of the Literature on Fuel Demand Modelling 
This chapter follows from a finding in chapter 3 that the response of different socioeconomic 
groups could be important in measuring changes in welfare. It reviews the vast literature on 
econometric estimation techniques of modelling gasoline demand and identifies key literature 
that describes the consumption behaviour of different socioeconomic groups in response to a 
change in gasoline price. The chapter identifies the limitations of such studies in the present 
context and describes the need for further analysis of gasoline demand behaviour for different 
socio-economic groups. 
Chapter 5: Modelling Gasoline Demand using Aggregate Data 
This is the first chapter with analysis and some results. The chapter presents a gasoline demand 
model using an aggregate time series econometric model for five income quintiles in the USA. 
The model uses annual data for 20 years. Another model for urban and rural areas is estimated 
as well. Such a model however is limited by the assumption of representative households, i. e. 
one average household represents the households in one group. 
Chapter 6: Modelling Gasoline Demand using Disaggregate Data 
The chapter employs disaggregate modelling techniques, dropping the representative 
household assumption. This chapter uses household level gasoline demand data from the USA. 
The demand model utilizes various interaction terms between explanatory factors to determine 
different responses for different households. 
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Chapter 7: Semiparametric Modelling of Gasoline Demand 
This chapter investigates disaggregate modelling techniques further by non parametric 
estimation techniques. This method allows more flexibility in the specification of the demand 
model than was possible in Chapter 6. Since semiparametric modelling is not a common 
approach in modelling gasoline demand, a brief description of the method is provided. This 
chapter basically acts as a verification of the model specification in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 8: Welfare Analysis 
This chapter utilizes the information of previous chapters on gasoline demand modelling and 
analyzes the distributional burden of a tradable permit policy. The chapter has three major 
subsections. The first reports the welfare analysis using the aggregate representative household 
model. The second subsection utilizes the disaggregate gasoline demand model to determine 
the distribution of burden among individual households. Different permit allocation strategies 
are considered. The last subsection carries out some sensitivity analysis with regard to different 
target reduction quantities, revenue neutrality of the government and non-participation in the 
market. 
Chapter 9: Conclusions 
The final chapter of the dissertation draws conclusions from the gasoline demand models and 
distributional analysis. The chapter states the limitations of the present analysis and suggests 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADABLE PERMITS: A REVIEW OF 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
2.1 Introduction 
Transport remains a critical avenue in the attempt to reduce carbon emissions and any 
significant effort to reduce emissions from the US economy therefore will need to address 
personal road transport (Greene and Schäfer 2003). This chapter focuses on tradable carbon 
permits for personal road transport as a means to achieve reductions in carbon emissions. The 
chapter begins with a brief overview of the two types of policy options for emissions reduction 
and quickly moves to discuss the market based policy approaches. Section 2.3 discusses two 
market based policies, emission taxes and tradable permits, and compares and contrasts them. 
Section 2.4 discusses the allocation of permits in a tradable permit policy to reduce emissions 
from the personal road transport. The downstream or household or individual level permit 
allocation is then discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 briefly summarizes the findings of the 
chapter. 
2.2 Policy Options 
Nearly all policies for emissions control and environmental preservation consist of two distinct 
components: identification of the goal and the means to achieve the goal; and these two 
components are often linked within the political process (Stavins 1998). The goal to 
significantly reduce CO2 emissions to combat climate change is widely acknowledged (Stern 
2007, IPCC 2007a). In determining the means to achieving this goal, it is important to 
emphasize at least three distinct components of the policy effects: efficiency, effectiveness and 
equity (Nordhaus and Danish 2003). Formulating a policy that incorporates all three 
components is not always feasible: emphasizing one may undermine another. Therefore, 
compromises often become necessary in policymaking (Stavins 1998). 
Direct emission control mechanisms can be broadly classified into two distinct sets of 
instruments (Stavins 1998). The first, `command and control', sets uniform emission limits for 
the emitting units (e. g. firms, vehicles, households, individuals) through technology or 
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performance based standards. Regulations are put in place to force the emitting units to 
shoulder a similar share of pollution control responsibility. This is by far the most widespread 
method for controlling harmful emissions. Examples in the transport sector include emissions 
standards that have been successfully used to control the pollution of local air pollutants (e. g. 
CO, NOx, HC, PM). 15 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards in the USA (NRC 
2002) are another regulatory approach that has increased fuel economy (and thus lowered 
carbon emissions). 16 The cost of controlling emissions, however, may vary greatly among the 
emitting units, and therefore setting the same target of emission reduction for all units can be 
unfairly expensive for some, and in general expensive as a whole. The policy does not follow 
the economic principle that the marginal cost of abatement should be equalised among the 
emitting units to reduce pollution or emissions at the least cost to the economy (Stavins 1998, 
CBO 2002, Portney et. al. 2003) and the policy is therefore not efficient. " Also, as mentioned 
in §1.4, fuel economy standards alone cannot ensure an absolute reduction in road transport 
emissions will be achieved. 
The concern for economic inefficiency in the way emissions are controlled through standards 
and regulations paved the way for the second set of instruments, known as the price or market 
-based methods. Economists argue that pollution is an externality to the polluters, since the 
cost of pollution is not borne by the polluters directly (Varian 2006, Stern 2007). The efficient 
policy solution is thus to force the polluters to internalize the externalities i. e. to ensure that the 
cost of pollution is borne by the polluters (Jaffe et. al. 2005). Thus, an appropriate price signal 
(reflecting the cost of pollution) from the policy makers can help the production sector adjust 
its structure to abate emissions at the least cost, resulting in a more economically efficient 
means of reducing pollutants as compared to command and control policies. Although such 
policies were advocated in the academic literature as early as the 1920s by Pigou (1932), it was 
implemented in practice much later. Market-based policies are clearly the most popular method 
among economists working in this area because it equalizes the marginal cost of reducing 
pollution among the emitting units, rather than equalizing their level of emissions (Stavins 
1998), which ensures that the total cost of abatement is minimized. Two of the most commonly 
used market based instruments are: 
15 CO: Carbon Monoxide, NOx: Oxides of Nitrogen, HC: Hydrocarbons, PM: Particulate Matters 
16 Voluntary regulatory approaches include the voluntary carbon emissions standard in Europe (T&E 
2007) or the voluntary new light vehicle fuel consumption targets in Australia (Federal Chambers of 
Automotive Industries 2003). 
17 e. g. Lave and Glazer (1996) quotes Leone and Parkinson (1990) to mention that a tax would have 
reduced fuel consumption by as much as CAFE at one-seventh the social cost; Lutter and Kravitz (2003) 
find that the external costs associated with fuel economy improvements counteracts the benefits. 
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0 Emission taxes, in principle, the Pigouvian tax (Pigou 1932)18 
" Cap and trade systems, based on the Coase theorem (Coase 1960), 19 later extended by 
Baumol and Oates (1971) and Montgomery (1972) 
The corresponding policy instruments for carbon reduction in the personal road transport 
sector translates into a carbon tax for motor fuel (gasoline or diesel) in the Pigouvian tax 
system or a tradable fuel or carbon permits in the cap and trade system. Both policies will 
result in an increase in the price of fuels, thus imparting a differential effect on various 
consumers. This is where the third `E'-equity considerations become important to policy 
makers. An equally allocated tradable carbon permit appears to be an attractive approach in 
this regard, especially from the distributive justice point of view (Starkey and Anderson 2005). 
2.3 Emission Taxes and Tradable Permits 
2.3.1 Equivalence of Taxes and Permits 
The Pigouvian emission taxes discourage emission by imposing a tax on it. As long as all the 
emitting units are facing the same tax rate, they will reduce their emissions until the cost of 
reducing per unit of emission is lower than or equal to the tax rate. If the cost of abatement is 
more than the tax rate, then all of the units will prefer to pay the tax, thus their marginal cost of 
reducing the emissions will be equal to the tax rate. On the other hand, in the cap and trade 
program (also known as tradable permit, tradable quota) an upper limit (cap) is placed on the 
total emission of the pollutant. Total allowed emissions are then divided and allocated to the 
emitting units in the form of permits (or quotas or allowances), which can be traded amongst 
the units. As long as the traded price of the permits is higher than the abatement cost, the 
emitting units will reduce their emissions. When abatement costs become higher they will start 
buying permits from the market to cover extra emissions. The marginal abatement cost for all 
firms are then the price of the permits. Thus, both the policies basically increase the 
opportunity cost of pollution. 
Fig. 2.1 explains the equivalence of taxes and tradable permits in a partial equilibrium setting, 
where only the carbon emissions market is considered? ° The figure depicts the demand for 
carbon emissions (or gasoline consumption, since carbon emissions are directly proportional to 
gasoline consumption) at different prices. Q1 is the current consumption of carbon at price P1. 
A tax t will raise the price to P2, and therefore the consumption will be reduced to Q2. On the 
18 Pigou (1932) suggests imposition of a tax equal to marginal damage to the society resulting from the 
pollution. 
19 The theorem states that any allocations of property right (permits) are equally efficient since interested 
parties will bargain privately to correct an externality. 
20 More on partial and general equilibrium in §3.2. 
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other hand, a quota of Q2 can be imposed on carbon consumption (equivalent to carbon 
emissions). If these permits are allowed to be traded in the market, the market price of the 
permits, (P2-PI), will equal the tax rate t. A tax policy thus fixes the price of pollution, and the 
pollution level adjusts itself, whereas in a tradable permit policy the pollution level is fixed and 
the price of pollution is determined by the market (Ekins and Barker 2001) 
aý 
U 
A-4 
P2 
P1 
Quantity demanded 
Fig 2.1 Carbon emissions (or Gasoline) demand curve, equivalence of price and quota system 
In an ideal economic setting, emissions taxes and tradable permits both are able to cut 
emissions at the lowest cost, provided an appropriate tax level is precisely known for the tax 
system or the cost of permit trading is zero (Weitzman 1974, Pezzey 1992). If the emissions 
taxes or the tradable permit system can be properly implemented without any pilferage, then 
both systems can be effective to reduce emissions to a target level. The most significant 
drawback of the tax system is that the cost of reducing emissions is not known to the policy 
maker a priori, and therefore setting an appropriate level of tax for a target reduction could 
prove to be difficult. On the other hand, for tradable permits, the effectiveness is assured in 
practice even in the absence of any knowledge about the cost of abatement, and therefore the 
tradable permit approach is becoming popular (Stavins 1995). International agreements, e. g. 
the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCC 1998) also suggests the use of tradable carbon permits as the 
market based instrument to reduce CO2 emissions. Accordingly, the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme utilizes a tradable permits system to reduce CO2 emissions from industries 
(European Commission 2005). 
Studies based on economic cost-benefit analysis argue that a carbon tax is better suited to 
reduce carbon emissions from firms, since the damage of an additional unit of CO2 emissions 
is not high (Pizer 1999). 21 In this work, however, the focus is not to carry out a cost-benefit 
analysis of curtailing carbon emissions. The premise of this study is that carbon emissions 
21 CO2 is known as a stock pollutant. This means, the cumulative emission to the atmosphere matters. 
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from road transport needs to be reduced effectively, efficiently and equitably. Therefore, the 
cost-benefit literature on carbon abatement from industries is not reviewed here. 
2.3.2 Asymmetry in Taxes and Permits 
The theoretical equivalence of taxes and permits may not be applicable in practice (Pezzey 
1992), and there could be significant differences between the two systems in application 
(Tietenberg 2002). A carbon tax on emitting firms naturally raises revenues for the 
government. Parry (1995,1997), Goulder (1995a, 1995b, 1998) and Bovenberg and Goulder 
(1996) all studied revenue neutral environmental policies where the raised revenue is returned 
to the households to reduce the loss in welfare such that the government's fiscal balance 
remains the same. While recycling the revenue, it is possible to reduce existing income taxes, 
instead of returning it lump sum, thus increasing the efficiency of the tax system and therefore 
increasing welfare. 22 This is known as the revenue recycling effect (Goulder 1995a). Since 
pollution taxes benefit society by reducing pollution and at the same time increase welfare 
through the revenue recycling effect, pollution taxes are said to generate a double dividend 
(Pearce 1991, Goulder 1995a). However, the increase in the price of carbon intensive goods 
from a tax or a tradable permit policy would imply that the real wage is decreased, and this 
may induce some substitution out of employment into leisure. 23 Since there is a pre-existing 
labour tax, this substitution also has efficiency implications, which acts in the opposite 
direction of the revenue recycling effect (Bovenberg and Goulder 1996, Parry 1995,1997, 
Goulder 1998). The presence of the revenue recycling and tax interaction effect implies that 
revenue raising environmental policies can potentially increase welfare more than non-revenue 
raising policies (Parry 1997,2003). 
A pollution or emission tax would automatically raise revenues and thus could potentially 
increase welfare through recycling the revenues. This, however, may not be the case for 
tradable permits since permits can be allocated freely or be sold to the emitting units through 
an auction. Studies argue in favour of allocation through auction (Cramton and Kerr 1999, 
2002) such that the revenue can be recycled to increase the overall efficiency of the policy. 
There is, however, one potentially significant barrier to revenue raising policies. While 
discussing emissions reduction from firms, Pizer (1999) argues that carbon taxes will face stiff 
political resistance in the United States, both from the firms themselves, as it increases the 
costs of production and transfers the revenue to the government, and also among 
environmentalists, since it does not guarantee a particular emissions reduction target (§2.3.1). 
22 Welfare is defined formally in Chapter 3. 
23 This assumes that leisure and the carbon intensive goods are substitutes, and that labour supply 
increases with higher wages. See Varian (2006, pp. 177) for details of labour supply decisions. 
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US experience also indicates that taxes as an instrument of energy and environmental policy 
have not been accepted by the public or the Congress in the USA (Nordhaus and Danish 2003). 
Auctioned permits also have the same disadvantage of transferring revenue to the government 
and businesses paying the full cost of pollution, Bovenberg et. al. (2005) observe that many 
pollution intensive industries have strong political power to block policies that would harm 
their profits (taxes or auctioned permits). Tietenberg (2001) sums up the general attitude: the 
historical answer (to the question of implementing revenue raising policies) is clearly "No ". 
Tietenberg (2001) also argues that a theoretically superior policy that cannot be implemented is 
not desirable in practice. Thus, a carbon tax or an auctioned permit system may have 
significantly lower public acceptance (Crals et. al. 2003). 
Freely allocated permits, on the other hand, trigger less political opposition from industry than 
carbon taxes (Baumol and Oates 1988, Jensen and Rasmussen 2000, Bovenberg et. al. 2005). 
This is because firms hope to gain at least a proportion of their required permits for free, 
enabling them to recover a portion of the costs associated with the reduction in emissions. Free 
allocation of permits, generally based on the emissions history of firms, is therefore, by far, the 
most common approach to tradable permit programs (Tietenberg 2003). Examples include SO2 
emissions trading among utilities generating electricity (Joskow et. al. 1998, Schmalensee et. 
al. 1998, Stavins 1998b, Carlson et. al. 2000), Fox river pollution permits (Hahn and Hester 
1989) and lead phase down from gasoline (Kerr and Mare 1999). Such grandfathering or free 
allocation on the basis of past emissions thus precludes the possibility of further welfare gain 
through the revenue recycling effect unlike emission taxes or auctioned permits. 
2.3.3 Applicability to Road Transport 
All the discussions in the literature on carbon tax and tradable permits mainly focus on the 
reduction of CO2 emissions from firms. The argument for political resistance against a carbon 
tax is none-the-less valid in the road transport sector as well. Goel and Nelson (1999) analysed 
a panel data set from 1960-94 for various US states and report that gasoline taxes are clearly 
motivated by political considerations. Hammar et. al. (2004) also observes that increasing 
motor fuel tax is politically very difficult to implement, especially in countries with low prices 
and high demand, such as the USA. There is significant public opposition to raising fuel taxes 
in Europe as well, where the existing fuel taxes are already high (e. g. in the UK the gasoline 
tax is seven times higher than that in the USA, Parry and Small 2005). There is a limit to 
increasing fuel taxes further, as evident by the tax revolt in some of the European countries in 
2000 (Lyons and Chatterjee 2002, Raux 2004). In addition, as Nordhaus and Danish (2003) 
argue `the major problem with a GHG tax is that it is a tax. ' Watters et. al. (2006) report that 
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consumers in the UK prefer a tradable permit approach where individuals are allocated permits 
freely, to a fuel price increase through increased taxes. 
The political motivation for not increasing the gasoline tax is often justified by equity or 
distributional burden issues. Several studies in the United States (Casler and Rafiqui 1993, 
Sevigny 1998) have confirmed that a gasoline tax disproportionately burdens impoverished 
households (i. e. is regressive), as they spend a larger portion of their income on gasoline than 
wealthier households. It is possible to recycle gasoline tax revenues back to the poorer segment 
of the population to reduce the regressivity, but Bureau of Transport and Communication 
Economics (BTCE 1998) reports that recycling large revenues back to individual transport 
users through general government services and expenditures may not be optimal, a view shared 
by Starkey and Anderson (2005) as well. 
Studies on gasoline demand by households (Graham and Glaister 2002a, Goodwin et. al. 2004, 
Sterner and Dahl 1992, Dahl and Sterner 1991, Dahl 1995, Basso and Oum 2007) indicate that 
a rise in the price of gasoline would reduce the consumption of gasoline and thus emissions of 
C02, although the reduction may not be very high. It is therefore possible to reduce gasoline 
consumption and carbon emissions from personal road transport through imposition of a 
further tax on fuel in the form of carbon taxes. In addition to public acceptance issues 
mentioned above, the disadvantage with gasoline taxes is that there are other factors that 
increase households' travel by road transport and thus consumption of gasoline and emissions 
of CO2. One of these is increasing income, which has resulted in more driving and higher 
emissions (Graham and Glaister 2002a, USEPA 2007). Although a tax may, in theory, be able 
to reduce emissions, increases in income would always push emissions to increase. An increase 
in population or vehicle ownership will also increase the consumption of gasoline and emission 
24 of carbon from vehicles. 
National Research Council (2002) argues that a price signal (i. e. tax) does not address the 
market failure since consumers do not base their vehicle purchase decision on life-time fuel 
savings from the vehicles. Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP 1998) also share the same view 
that that price signals may not provide the motivation for consumers to implement energy and 
thus carbon saving measures. Thus, a fuel tax may not be able to generate a cap on carbon 
emissions with certainty. A tradable permit policy, on the other hand, ensures that the emission 
cap (target emission by the policy maker) is always maintained, in spite of increases in income, 
population, or vehicle ownership. Any upward push in the demand for more gasoline would 
simply increase the price of permits by keeping the total consumption constant (Tietenberg 
24 A tax, however, will reduce the growth rate. 
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2002). 25 Crals et. al. (2003) also argue the road users are more sensitive to a quantity signal of 
a tradable permit policy than to a price signal as in a tax policy. 
A tax policy to reduce carbon emissions from road transports is susceptible to world oil prices. 
The pre- tax price of gasoline could collapse severely, as seen after the oil price increases in 
1999-2000, which would wipe out any benefit from a tax policy (Raux 2004). A fall in the 
world oil price and thus pre-tax price of gasoline would reduce the market price of gasoline, 
despite the tax, rendering the optimum price to ensure the target reduction unattainable. Fig. 
2.2 explains the fall in world oil price and its effect on the effectiveness of a gasoline tax 
policy through a demand curve. In the absence of any taxes, the retail price borne by the 
consumer is the world crude oil price (and refinery and transport costs, which remain the same 
to keep it simple) CP1. The quantity demanded at this price (CPI) is Ql. t1 is the tax rate 
required to bring down the consumption to Q2, the policymaker's target reduction. Because of 
the theoretical symmetry of taxes and permits (§2.3.1) the price of the permits is also t, and the 
price faced by the consumer is MPI for both policies. If the world price of crude oil and thus 
the pre-tax price of gasoline falls to CP2, the market price for the tax policy is MP2, which is 
the sum of CP2 and t1, the tax rate. The demand for gasoline is Q3, which is clearly less than 
the policymaker's intended reduction of Q2. A tax policy would therefore fail to fulfil its most 
important objective: to effectively reduce gasoline consumption and CO2 emissions from 
vehicles. 26 
MP3 
MP I 
MP2 
CP3 
CPI 
CP2 
Quantity demanded 
Fig. 2.2 World oil price and price faced by the consumers in permit and tax scheme 
t, 
25 To some extent, this can be compared with the fuel tax escalator in the UK, where the tax on 
fuel 
increased every year till 2002 by the rate of inflation such that the effective tax rate remains the same. 
In 
the USA, on the other hand, the nominal federal tax rate has been constant since 1993 
(Parry 2002). 
Since income has been rising, the effective tax rate is in fact declining in the USA. 
26 This simplified diagram, however, does not consider that the price of crude oil may change 
in 
response to lower demand resulting from a tax or permit policy. 
Throughout the dissertation, the 
possible change in the price of crude oil because of the policy-induced shift 
in demand is not considered. 
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A permit system where permits are allocated directly to consumers may also allow another 
significant advantage over a gasoline tax through providing a buffer between domestic 
gasoline prices and international prices of crude oil. 27 If the world oil price increases, the price 
of the permits would fall, since the demand for gasoline at the increased price would be less. 
Thus the total amount (price of pre-tax gasoline + price of permits) paid by the consumer 
would remain the same. In Fig 2.2, if the world price of oil and thus retail price of gasoline 
rises to CP3, the price of a permit falls to t2, while the total gasoline price faced by consumers 
is still MPJ, which is now the sum of CP3 and t2. On the other hand, if a gasoline tax were 
enacted, the total price would be MP3, which is the sum of CP3 and tj, the initial tax rate. 
Thus, a tax would exactly follow the price of oil in the world market, and keep the retail 
market volatile, whereas a tradable permit would provide a buffer to consumers. A tax policy 
also would make the target reduction more stringent (Q4) than necessary (Q2) when the price 
of oil rises in the world market 
It is important to note here that there are other policy proposals that investigate ways to reduce 
CO2 emissions from the transportation sector as a whole (CBO 2002, Greene and Schäfer 
2003). Vehicle fuel economy standards and fee bates for vehicle manufacturers, pay-as-you- 
drive insurance, taxes on buying less fuel efficient vehicles (e. g. the gas-guzzler tax in the 
USA, USEPA 2006)28, reduced tax or subsidy on biofuels are some of them (Greene and 
Schäfer 2003). None of these policies, however, address the decision to consume gasoline 
directly: fuel economy standards and fee bates are targeted at vehicle manufacturers, pay-as- 
you-drive insurance schemes primary focus is on reducing distance driven rather than reducing 
carbon emissions and gas-guzzler taxes discourage selling lower fuel economy vehicles 
without ensuring an absolute cap on emissions. It is indeed possible to include such policies, 
and it may actually be necessary to have a combination of policies, to reduce emissions from 
personal road transport (Greene and Schäfer 2003). However, the focus of this dissertation is 
on tradable permits since it encourages an absolute cap to be placed on emissions. 
2.4 Allocation of Permits 
2.4.1 Upstream vs. Downstream 
The tradable permit policy within the transportation system can be implemented at various 
levels of the vehicle or fuel life cycle. At the most upstream level, the trading process can be 
Z' The buffer advantage of tradable carbon permits is mentioned in an online discussion forum for 
personal carbon trading <http: //leiterreports. typepad. com/blog/20060/07/personalcarbon. html> 
28 Surprisingly, there is no gas-guzzler tax on light duty trucks and Sports Utility Vehicles (SUV) in the 
USA, although more than 50% of new vehicles sold in the USA are light duty trucks or SUVs (Greene 
and Schäfer 2003). 
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used to control the total sales of individual fuel refineries or producers to the transportation 
system. Refineries or producers would have to possess adequate carbon permits to cover their 
total sales. Any extra sales permit has to be obtained through the permit market. Carbon 
emissions trading among producers or refineries, however, is different from the SO2 trading in 
the electricity industry. SO2 trading schemes provided direct incentive to the plants to reduce 
SO2 emissions while producing their primary output, electricity. In regulating the upstream 
industries of petroleum fuel, no such incentive is created within the industry to reduce carbon 
emissions, since transport CO2 emissions do not occur at the refinery level. 29 In addition, as 
Grubb (1990) has argued, the carbon content of the fuel cannot be reduced in the refineries, 
and thus they do not have any option for reducing CO2 emissions other than curtailing their 
output. 30 Reducing output from the refineries would increase the price of fuel to downstream 
transport users due to supply constraints, and would act as a disguised fuel tax, with associated 
disadvantages of a fuel tax (Feldstein 2003). The presence of a small number of large upstream 
producers can also create a market where these few may exercise their market power to 
manipulate the prices (Hahn 1984). 
The attractiveness of an upstream system lies in the fact that there is much less monitoring to 
be done. Winkleman et al. (2000) reports that monitoring roughly 1250 facilities in the USA 
should suffice in such a system. Such an upstream implementation will require even less 
monitoring if the tradable permit system is implemented throughout the economy, since all of 
the producers' sales will end up emitting carbon in the end. In the case of a tradable permit 
system enforced in the personal transport sector alone, however, monitoring will be 
significantly different. Since the products of refineries are used in not only transport, but other 
petrochemical and power industries as well, the regulator needs to keep track of what portion 
of the sales of which firm is used in the transport sector. The advantage of ease of monitoring 
offered by an upstream system may be significantly reduced in that case. The problem can be 
overcome if the monitoring process is implemented at the retailing level, which is much larger 
than the production or refining industry. An allocation in the retail level is possible, but once 
again retailers do not have options to reduce carbon emissions from fuel and may have to cut 
back on sales, passing on the extra cost directly to the consumers (Winkleman et. al. 2000). On 
the other hand, if monitoring is done at the retail level, it may also be possible to implement 
downstream allocation and trading. 
29 Some C02 emissions occur at the refinery level, but the amount is negligible as compared to emissions 
from combustion in vehicles. 
30 At the upstream level, it could be possible to blend fossil fuel with renewable bio-fuels. Thus 
producers can increase the share of renewable fuels in their product to reduce overall carbon content of 
their fuel and such a system could be workable. 
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Winkleman et. al. (2000) and Austin and Rogers (2005) also consider an upstream option 
involving vehicle manufacturers. Manufacturers are not part of the fuel chain, and do not emit 
CO2 themselves. 31 Yet they could play a vital role in emission reduction by incorporating 
technological improvements in vehicles that would lead to emission reductions through higher 
fuel economy. The direction of research and development in vehicle manufacturing is shaped 
by consumer preference, which may be shaped by the downstream incentives such as fuel 
taxes. The National Research Council (NRC 2002) however observes that consumers do not 
consider life time fuel cost savings when buying new vehicles and thus there is a market failure 
for fuel economy in vehicles. As a result, manufacturers focus more on improving vehicle 
power and other vehicle characteristics, instead of improving fuel economy (Greene and 
Schäfer 2003). Therefore, providing a direct incentive for manufacturers to innovate and 
incorporate fuel efficient technologies could be a viable option. This approach still has the 
uncertainty regarding the emission cap, since the trading takes place among manufacturers in 
average fuel economy standards, carbon emission standards or projected emissions, not on 
actual emissions from each vehicle. 
All the upstream allocations fail to recognise the decision making units in road travel and thus 
carbon emissions decisions. The underlying principle in a tradable permit or tax policy is to 
provide an incentive to the consumer to change their behaviour. For the successful SO2 trading 
program, it was the electric utilities making the decision, and they had direct incentive through 
the trading system to reduce their pollution. In personal road transport, the ultimate decision of 
how much to drive and how much carbon is emitted is a decision made by an individual 
household. Therefore, it is more logical and appropriate to provide households with a direct 
incentive, which can only be generated by a downstream trading system (Ahlheim and 
Schneider 2002). Raux and Marlot (2005) also report that economic incentive instruments 
achieve their maximum efficiency when operating at the most decentralized level. 
In the downstream approach to the tradable permits, permits will be allocated directly to the 
vehicle users, individuals or households, thus affecting their behaviour directly through market 
based incentives. There is no theoretical barrier to implementing a tradable permit system in 
the personal road transport sector. However, BTCE (1998) observes that the personal road 
transport sector could be different from other industries where a similar cap and trade approach 
has been implemented because of the following reasons: 
" Personal transport is a widely decentralised activity. In the USA, there will be 117 million 
households or 292 million people in the market (US Department of Labor 2007a). This 
31 ignoring any emission during the manufacturing process. 
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high number of potential participants would make the implementation and administration 
of the program more difficult. 
" Emission sources are mobile and it would make the monitoring difficult. 
" There are other externalities related to the transport sector: congestion in urban areas, local 
pollution and accidents being the major ones. 
" The services generated from driving in one country may not be produced in another 
country, thus the possibility of carbon leakage is minimal. Some substitution from car 
travel to air travel may occur, although air travel can be brought under the scheme as well. 
The mobility of the transport sector may not impede the monitoring process, since the distance 
travelled by each vehicle need not be monitored. Carbon permits accumulated by the gasoline 
retailer can be a control point, since a retailer cannot essentially sell fuel without a transfer of 
permits from a car user to its account. The large number of households and thus traders in the 
market may actually be beneficial since it would reduce some of the transaction costs, 
discussed below. 
2.4.2 Transaction costs 
The choice between upstream and downstream allocation often manifests itself into the 
evaluation of transaction costs. In a market for environmental pollution, transaction costs arise 
from the transfer of the permits from one emitting unit to another because the potential trading 
units have to find each other, exchange information, validate authenticity and negotiate or 
agree on contract terms (Colby 1990). Stavins (1995) reports that the transaction costs can 
arise in the tradable permit market because of the following three possible activities: 32 
1. Searching and collecting information 
2. Bargaining and decision making 
3. Monitoring and enforcement 
While the first two of these are direct costs to the entities trading the permit (costs of trading), 
the third one is typically borne by the government authorities (Stavins 1995, Woerdman 2001). 
As such, the costs that affect the direct decision of the polluting units are search and 
information collection related costs and bargaining and decision making costs. The presence of 
transaction costs reduces revenue received by the seller and increases the price for the buyers, 
32 The institutional analysis of transaction costs also involves the political process e. g. lobbying process 
for negotiating an allocation strategy (Woerdman 2001). Stavins (1995) and Nentjes et. al. (1995) 
however utilize the neoclassical definition of transactions costs where the direct costs of trading is the 
main focus. 
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thus suppressing a potentially beneficial volume of trading that would have happened if there 
were no transaction costs (Stavins 1995 
Empirically, Colby (1990), McCann and Easter (1999), Gangadharan (2000) and Kerr and 
Mare (1999) have studied environmental markets in water allocation, phosphorus pollution in 
water, SO2 emissions from electricity generation plants and lead phase down from gasoline 
respectively and concluded that transactions costs were a significant factor in determining the 
attractiveness and effectiveness of the pollution market. Hahn and Hester (1989) report that the 
Fox River water-pollutant trading failed because of high transaction costs. Kerr and Mare 
(1999), on the other hand, notice that the lead phase down program was successful because of 
familiarity of the trading parties with each other reducing the trading costs. All these studies 
analyze upstream permit markets and determine the transaction costs after the policy was 
implemented since it is difficult to predict them ex ante. 
The search, information, bargain and decision making costs could be significant in an upstream 
trading system since the number of firms trading is reasonably small (Woerdman 2001). It 
could be difficult to find a trading partner and the market prices may not be readily available. 
In addition to that, the accounting of individual plants has to be verified for the authenticity of 
permit availability. Also, since the true structure of production is not known to the regulators, 
the verification process takes time and resources and involves uncertainty regarding 
government approval (Montero 1997), increasing trading costs. 
On the other hand, the costs of trading decrease as the number of traders in the market 
increases (Nentjes 1995, Stavins 1995). The level of these costs critically depends on the ease 
of availability of low cost information and trading partners. The costs of finding a trading 
partner decreases as the number of participants in the market increases. It would also lead to 
frequent transactions, reducing uncertainty about the prices. A market of 117 million 
households or 292 million people would also have prices publicly available. All these factors 
would potentially lower the total transaction costs associated with downstream trading. 
It is important to note that, while the search, information, bargain and decision costs of a 
downstream tradable permit system would possibly be much lower than an upstream system, 
the monitoring, administrative and enforcement costs could be significantly higher, resulting in 
a higher total transaction cost. However, the monitoring of downstream carbon trading could 
be easier than the monitoring of other emissions (e. g. SO2), since fuel usage can be monitored 
instead of carbon emissions. Also, enforcement and monitoring can be simplified if gasoline 
retail stations are allowed to sell fuel to permit holders only (Verhoef et. al. 1997). Since there 
are more gasoline retailers than producers and refineries, there would be many points of 
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control and this may still be expensive. The overall cost to the economy could be high for 
downstream trading because of higher government expenditure involved. This is where the 
trade off between environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and distributional equity 
becomes central to the policy debate. 
2.4.3 Distributional Concerns 
As mentioned earlier (§2.3.3), one of the arguments against increasing gasoline taxes is that it 
would affect poorer households in a disproportionate way. Santos and Rojey (2004) mention 
that an efficient and effective policy may still be undesirable due to concerns about the 
distributional effects of the policy, especially the effect on the poor. Mayeres and Proost 
(2002) also argue that the policy maker may prefer to sacrifice some efficiency in order to 
obtain a more even distribution of welfare or policy induced burdens. 33 Distributional effects 
may often dictate the public acceptance of a policy and may sometimes serve as a proxy for 
public acceptance as well (Mayeres and Proost 2004). It is also argued that the failure to 
impose the BTU (British Thermal Unit) tax in the USA by the Clinton administration was due 
to unfair burdens on selected industries or households (Morgenstern 2002). Distributional or 
equity concerns of a policy therefore constitute an important consideration. 
In the case of an upstream allocation of permits to firms, grandfathering appears to be the only 
politically acceptable option for allocating permits (§2.3.2). If the initially allocated permits are 
grandfathered, then there is significant windfall gain to the upstream producers or refineries. 
The free allocation is reflected in the higher asset price of the firms and shall be enjoyed by the 
shareholders of the firms (Bovenberg and Goulder 2000, Parry 2004). In this regard, 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2000), Goulder (2002), Burtraw et. al. (2002) and Jensen and 
Rasmussen (2000) have all reported that freely allocated upstream permits would over 
compensate the fossil fuel industry. 34 Since the shareholders of the firms are from among the 
richer section of the community, much of the benefits of the free allocation will be directed 
toward them (Parry 2004, Parry et. al. 2005). Dinan and Rogers (2002) found that if 
grandfathered permits are allocated to industries to reduce CO2 emissions overall, the real 
income of the lowest income quintile will be reduced, while that of the richest quintile will 
increase. Such an unequal distribution may not be desirable from a policy maker's perspective 
when designing a carbon reduction policy for personal road transport. 
A tradable permit system involving the vehicle manufacturers is slightly different. Such an 
emissions trading policy would depend on imputed emissions for the manufacturer instead of 
33 High labour taxes are a good example of such a tradeoff. They are a major source of economic 
inefficiency, yet they find their justification in equity concerns (Mayeres and Proost 2004). 
34 These studies focus on a carbon cap on all industries. The argument is valid for personal transport too. 
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real emissions (Winkleman et. al. 2000). The imputed emissions will be a function of the 
number of each type of vehicle sold, mileage travelled by each type of those vehicles over its 
life, fuel efficiency of the sold vehicles and fuel carbon content for the fuel they run on. This 
requires the regulator to know beforehand how many of each of the vehicles would be sold by 
a manufacturer, how much they would tend to travel and how they would be used (e. g. speed, 
maintenance), which are difficult to predict. The extra cost incurred by the producer to develop 
the fuel efficient vehicles or to buy the emissions permits for their vehicles will generally be 
passed on to consumers, and every consumer of the new fuel efficient vehicles will have to 
bear equal burden in terms of the increased vehicle price of the new vehicles. This implies that 
drivers who will be driving a new vehicle less and thus polluting less would be subsidising 
those driving more. Alternatively, emissions could be calculated based on past sales and travel 
patterns. Under both approaches to calculating emissions, users of older, less fuel-efficient 
vehicles will continue to pay nothing despite possibly polluting more than the new vehicle 
owners. New, more fuel-efficient vehicle buyers would therefore be subsidising the emissions 
from the users of old vehicles through higher vehicle prices. This is in direct violation of the 
polluter pays principle (OECD 1975)35 which is widely followed in designing environmental 
policy. Thus, a permit trading policy among vehicle manufacturers has distributional 
consequences that may not be acceptable as a social norm. 
A downstream policy where permits are allocated to households or individuals provides direct 
incentives to vehicle users to alter their emissions behaviour. The gain or loss from such a 
downstream allocation is directly proportional to the emissions and such an allocation upholds 
the polluter pays principle as well. There is also strong philosophical justification in favour of 
a per capita allocation of carbon permits, which is a downstream allocation strategy (Starkey 
and Anderson 2005). 
2.5. Downstream Tradable Permits 
In the literature on reduction of carbon emissions, the application of tradable permits almost 
entirely focuses on upstream allocations and trading among firms (Parry 2003, Bovenberg and 
Goulder 2000, Burtraw et. al. 2001,2002, Dinan and Rogers 2002, Cramton and Kerr 2002 
etc. ). Also, in other applications in the environment sector, the polluting entities were firms 
and therefore permits were distributed to firms. A downstream allocation strategy has not been 
not discussed until recently, presumably because it would involve a large number of allocation 
units, households or individuals and it was deemed impossible to administer. The first proposal 
of a downstream trading was by Fleming (1996,1997) through what he called Domestic 
35 The principle states that the costs of environmental damage should be borne by the polluters (OECD 
1975). 
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Tradable Quotas (DTQs). Since then, a few variants of this proposal have been suggested in 
the policy research community, e. g. the per capita allocation (Ayres 1997, Baer et. al. 2000), 
Personal Carbon Allowances (PCA, Fawcett 2004,2005), Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQ, 
Fleming 2005), carbon rate all products and services (RAPS, Starkey and Anderson 2005) and 
the sky trust scheme (Barnes 2001). Some of these proposals focus on all carbon emissions 
from the households (e. g. Ayres 1997, RAPS), 36 whereas others consider carbon emissions 
resulting directly from the energy used in homes and from transport (DTQ, TEQ, PCA, sky 
trust). 37 Ahlheim and Schneider (2002) discuss the possibility of household level trading, 
suggesting such a policy provides direct incentives to polluters to reduce emissions. The UK 
government also has stated its intentions of investigating personal level carbon trading as a 
serious long term proposal to reduce carbon emissions (Miliband 2006). Starkey and Anderson 
(2005) and Roberts and Thumim (2006) have investigated policy design and other 
implementation issues associated with a per capita carbon trading scheme in the UK. 
The government of the UK argues that a downstream policy would also empower the people 
more than an upstream policy through providing them with a direct choice in reducing 
emissions (Miliband 2006). This is because, in an upstream policy, households do not have any 
direct influence the behaviour of the upstream producers, since the producers are directly given 
the emission target. On the other hand, in a downstream policy, environmentally conscious 
households or individuals can also withhold their permits from the market or sell their permits 
to environmental NGO's (who would then retire them), thus reducing the availability of 
permits and further reducing the total emissions (Ahlheim and Schneider 2002 call it the warm 
glow effect). This way, individuals may have more influence in setting the emissions target. 
Anderson and Starkey (2005) also argue that households can trade amongst only the people 
they want to, again giving them more choice. 
In the road transport sector, the use of tradable permits was first discussed in Verhoef et. al. 
(1997). They discuss various schemes for downstream trading strategies to reduce externalities 
associated with road transport, and suggest that tradable fuel permits are amongst the most 
promising options. 38 Subsequently a few more studies appeared, e. g. BTCE (1998), Dobes 
(1999), Crals et. al. (2003), Raux and Marlot (2005) and Wafters et. al. (2006). In the USA, 
Feldstein's (2006) proposal of tradable gasoline vouchers is also similar to the tradable permit 
proposal for personal road transport. Watters et. al. (2006) investigated tradable carbon permits 
in the road transport sector in the UK and carried out a survey on a small sample to report that 
36 RAPS envisages that every consumable product will have a carbon rating, which depends on carbon 
emissions in producing and transporting the product. 
37 Detailed descriptions can be found in individual references. A brief overview of individual proposals 
is available in Starkey and Anderson (2005). 
38 Note that Verhoef et. al. (1997) consider all externalities, not only climate change externalities. 
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people were more receptive to a tradable permit approach in transport than gasoline taxes. 39 
Although most of the research on personal level tradable permits argue in favour of the policy 
on the grounds of distributive justice, the distributional burden from such a policy on different 
socio economic groups is not well studied. Only Raux and Marlot (2005) quantify the direct 
financial impacts on urban and rural populations in France, whereas Dresner and Ekins (2004) 
focus on different income groups in the UK. There is therefore a need for further investigation 
of the distributional issues associated with such a policy before it can be implemented. The 
USA could be especially different in this aspect, since the transportation system in the USA is 
more emissions intensive because of its higher automobile dependence than in Europe. 
2.5.1 Policy Design in Personal Road Transport 
Raux and Marlot's (2005) proposal for a carbon permit trading system for the personal road 
transport sector includes allocating a specific number of permits to the public, which are 
surrendered when purchasing fuel. The permit credits would be deducted from the buyers 
account held on a permit debit card electronically, in proportion to the carbon content of the 
fuel bought, at the time of purchase. People can buy or sell permits depending on whether their 
demand is above or below the allocated amount. Such transactions can be held through a 
centralized agency like the government, stock exchange or banks, but through many outlets 
like automatic teller machines (ATMs), top-up shops, gasoline retailers and the internet. 40 The 
price of the permits will depend on the total number of permits available in the market and the 
demand for them. Thus, anyone for whom the cost of not driving is more than the market price 
will buy permits, whereas, others who feel that the market price of permits is higher than their 
cost of foregone travel, will have an incentive to sell. The extra price of the permits will 
increase the real price of gasoline and will be an incentive to users to be less emission intensive 
in their travel patterns. Raux and Marlot (2005) however suggest issuing permits to only 
vehicle-owning households and a parallel carbon tax regime for other users who may use 
motor fuel occasionally. Such a parallel system may increase administrative costs even further, 
and Verhoef et. al. (1997) and Crals et. al. (2003) suggest permits be allocated to all users. The 
focus here is on a system where the tradable permits system is implemented only for personal 
road transport. 
39 In the website of the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs in the UK, there were 
110 comments posted by the members of public in reaction to the personal carbon trading policy 
proposal, of which 47 were in favour of the policy (42.7%). See <http: //www. davidMiliband. 
defra. 
gov. uk/blogs/ministerial_blog/archive/2006/07/19/1557. aspx>. Accessed June 30,2007. 
40 For businesses, such trading floors are already available e. g. the European emission trading scheme, 
the Chicago climate exchange (http: //www. chicagoclimateex. com) etc. 
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Fig. 2.3 explains the working principle of such a downstream tradable permit system. The 
demand curve for a household's gasoline consumption is AB. Equilibrium quantity at current 
price P1 is Q1. Household gasoline usage permit, based on an appropriate allocation 
philosophy, is Q. Because the initial consumption and consumption response to a price 
increase will differ by household, trade will take place between them. In panel (a) the quota Q 
is more than the reduced demand of the household Q2, resulting in an excess permit of Q2-Q 
available for sale in the market. The household in panel (b), on the other hand, will buy Q2-Q 
amount of permits from the market. The household in panel (a) benefits from selling its extra 
credits, whereas the household in panel (b) values its travel more than the cost of extra permits. 
A 
P2 
U 
P1 
Quantity demanded 
U 
.- 
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P2 
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Quantity demanded 
Fig. 2.3 Tradable permits in work: households or individuals in panel (a) sell their extra carbon 
permits (Q-Q2), those in panel (b) buy additional permits (Q2-Q) 
2.5.2 Allocation Philosophy 
Most proposals for downstream tradable permits have placed an emphasis on a per capita 
based allocation. The philosophy behind the allocation of the permits is an important 
issue, 
especially in terms of perceived fairness of the policy to the public, and therefore warrants 
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some discussion. If allocated free, permits are seen as property rights (Pezzey 2002): everyone 
has the right to the environment and thus the permits are given to everyone whether they drive 
a vehicle or not. Alternatively, if they are seen as subsidies, they can be redeemed only if fuel 
is used. The right to emit in this case lies with vehicle owners only. Besides these two free 
allocation philosophies, permits can be sold through auction or a predetermined price (which is 
similar to a tax). Both these options also would grant the right to emit and thus the right to the 
environment to those who can afford them, the wealthier households. For the reasons 
mentioned above (§2.3.2 and §2.3.3), it may be difficult to implement such a tax or an 
auctioned permits policy, and the focus in this study is on free allocation of the permits only. 
In discussing downstream allocation strategies, BTCE (1998) suggests grandfathering the 
permits on the basis of past vehicle usage (vehicle miles travelled, VMT). This requires prior 
knowledge by the regulator about each vehicle usage, which could be difficult to obtain. If 
permits are reallocated every year, there will also remain an incentive for the individual to 
drive more in order to secure more free permits for the next year. A VMT based allocation also 
ignores the fact that there could be significant differences in the emissions profile of two 
individuals driving the same distance but with different vehicles. The owner of a gas-guzzler 
would benefit at the expense of the owner of a more fuel efficient vehicle. The allocation 
therefore may not be equitable from the distributive justice point of view (Dobes 1999). The 
right to emit in this allocation strategy lies with the current emitters, and larger emitters are in 
fact rewarded for their emission intensive driving behaviour. 
Another option to allocate permits downstream is on the basis of existing vehicle ownership 
(Verhoef et. al. 1997). The policy may encourage people into buying more vehicles than 
necessary, and possibly cheap, old and polluting vehicles, in order to obtain more free permits 
(BTCE 1998). Also, the allocation strategy does not take into account that a small car would 
possibly be more fuel efficient and thus less polluting than a large SUV. Such an allocation 
based simply on vehicle ownership therefore benefits owners of a vehicle that emits more, 
violating the polluters pay principle. Once again, there is no direct incentive to the drivers to 
emit less carbon (Verhoef et. al. 1997). Dobes (1999) also mentions that an allocation based on 
vehicle ownership may not be equitable. A per vehicle allocation, however could be much 
easier to monitor, since permits can be allocated during annual registration. Such a policy may 
also be politically less difficult to implement. Because of these practical advantages in 
implementation, keep this option is retained as a plausible allocation strategy. 
Allocating permits based on existing ownership or past miles travelled also results in an entry 
barrier for existing non-vehicle users to buy new vehicles (BTCE 1998). The entry barrier 
arises because the total amount of permits available is fixed and used up by the existing users 
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and therefore a new user has to buy every unit of permit from the market (Crals et. gal. 2003). This would significantly increase the cost of fuel and thus the cost of travelling for non-vehicle 
owners more than the existing vehicle owners, who receive their initial allocation permits 
free. 41 While an entry barrier does not have any adverse effect on the effectiveness of the 
policy as a whole (since total emissions are still capped), existing low emitters are constrained 
by the policy, which is contrary to the polluters pay principle. 
The third option is to allocate an equal amount of permits to each individual or household, the 
basis of DTQ, PCA, TEQ and such downstream based approaches mentioned above (§2.5.1). 
Such an allocation strategy ensures that everyone has equal rights to the environment and thus 
an equal right to emit. Equal allocation is also based on direct emissions, thus there are clear 
incentives for individuals to reduce carbon emissions. A traveller will be paying for exactly the 
amount he is emitting, upholding the polluters pay principle as well. People will also benefit 
from their less carbon intensive travel patterns for such an allocation strategy through the sale 
of any unused permits. The House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2005) in the 
UK also observes `it is difficult to argue with the fundamental principle of equal per capita 
emissions. ' Therefore, the distributional consequences of such an allocation are also evaluated. 
Allocating permits on a per capita basis will result in a windfall gain to the people who do not 
own or use a vehicle on a regular basis. This may induce significant political opposition from 
vehicle owners. In this case, providing the permits as subsidies could be an interesting middle- 
of-the-road option, as it will prevent the accumulation of windfall gains to non-vehicle users. If 
permits are seen as subsidies, the permit allocation calculation is based on the total population, 
but permits are distributed to only those owning a vehicle, still on a per capita basis, and the 
government retaining the remaining of the permits. A new vehicle buyer will have priority over 
the government held share of the permits and can claim his share of permits for free, thus 
reducing his entry barrier. The unused permits held by the government can be sold through the 
market, thus earning revenue, which can be used toward covering the cost of administration. 
The different allocation strategies arising from different philosophical approaches are 
presented in Table 2.1. 
2.5.3 Allocation Units 
Within the principle of equal allocation for all, there could still be different allocation units. At 
the downstream level, the allocating units can be households as well as individuals. Allocating 
equal permits to each household could be easier to administer. Yet, households vary in size and 
41 This is similar to the SO2 emissions trading program in the USA where a new firm has to buy the 
required permits from the market. 
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Table 2.1 Different allocation strategies and allocation units considered 
St. No. ' Allocation strategies Denominator in calculating a 
unit of permit 
I Permits are distributed to all, on a per-capita basis Total population 
II Permits are calculated on a per-capita basis, but they Total population 
are distributed only to vehicle-owners, non-vehicle 
owners' permits are retained by the government 
III Permits are distributed to vehicle owners only, on a Sum of all individuals in 
per-capita basis vehicle- owning households 
IV Permits are distributed to only vehicle owners, on a Total vehicle stock 
per-vehicle basis 
V Permits are distributed to all adults Total adults 
VI Permits are distributed to all, but children get half of Sum of total adults and half of 
adults' allocation total children 
a These serial numbers are cited later for a quick reference to the allocation strategies. 
therefore equal permits to each household may not result in an equal burden for each 
household. For example, a household with five members may have much greater travel needs 
and thus a much higher emissions profile than a household with one person. Giving both 
households an equal number of permits results in disproportionate rights to pollute. 
An equal distribution to each individual will result in a different number of permits for each 
household, depending upon the number of members. Per capita allocation also may have minor 
pitfalls in equity terms. Firstly, each person may not have the same travel need. Someone in a 
rural region may need to travel more in a personal vehicle than someone in an urban 
environment because of the higher distances to be travelled and the lack of public 
transportation in rural regions. This drawback, however, is common to a household based 
allocation, as well as any tax regime. Secondly, a multiple person household may have more 
flexibility at its disposal than a single person household in changing its travel pattern and can 
use the total number of permits more efficiently. Thus, a single person household could be in a 
disadvantageous position. 
Another question to be addressed in terms of allocation units is the treatment of children. 
Children themselves may not drive, but the travel needs of a family could increase because of 
the presence of children. Allocating permits to adults only will leave households with children 
in a disadvantageous position. On the other hand allocating permits to all will put them 
in a 
more comfortable position since children's travel needs may not be the same as adults. Again, 
a middle-of-the-road solution is to provide each child a proportion of the adult allocation. 
This 
credit could be transferred to the guardian or parent of the child. The needs of households with 
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multiple persons or children is further discussed in §3.3.6. In this dissertation, equal allocation 
strategy for three types of units are investigated: every individual gets equal permits, every 
adult gets equal permits and children get half what the adults get (Table 2.1). 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature on tradable permit approaches to reduce emissions. The 
similarities and dissimilarities of an emission tax or a tradable permit policy to control 
environmental pollution were discussed. In the personal road transport sector, a tradable permit 
approach ensures effective reduction in carbon emissions compared to emission taxes that may 
fail to reduce emissions to a target level. The attractiveness of the emissions cap approach is 
the certainty in achieving the target reduction even when other factors such as growths in 
income, population or vehicle ownership push up gasoline consumption and carbon emissions. 
A tradable permit approach at the personal or household level would also allow a buffer zone 
to stabilize the market if the price of oil increases in the world oil market. 
There is a lack of literature on tradable permits as applied to individuals or households. Such a 
downstream allocation strategy upholds the polluter pays principle, a widely used norm in the 
environmental policy literature. Thus from a distributive justice perspective personal tradable 
carbon permits appear more acceptable than a grandfathered allocation. Since the distributional 
effect of a policy may critically affect its political acceptability, and thus implementation in 
practice, this research focuses on the equity effects or the distribution of burden from a 
tradable permit policy at the downstream level. In the absence of opinion surveys on the 
acceptability of such a policy, such equity effects may act as a proxy for public acceptability. 
Various allocation strategies however, may give rise to different distributional patterns. The 
effect of different downstream allocations on the distribution of burden has not been addressed 
in the literature as well. Therefore, different plausible allocation strategies (Table 2.1) are 
discussed for further investigation in this dissertation. In doing so, the transaction costs 
associated with such a policy are excluded from the calculation of the burdens. 
42 With this 
background, Chapter 3 will review the literature on the measurement of equity. 
42 As mentioned previously, there is no literature on ex-ante determination of transaction costs in the 
tradable permit policies. The determination of transaction costs is left for future research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A REVIEW OF METHODS FOR EQUITY MEASUREMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The policies of carbon tax or tradable carbon permits, reviewed in Chapter 2, are intended to 
internalize the cost of carbon emissions into fuel use decisions by individuals or households. 
These policies increase the perceived price of fuel. A gasoline tax does it directly, where the 
tax is paid at the time of purchasing fuel. A tradable permit policy achieves the same goal by 
increasing the opportunity cost of using fuel. Since both these policies increase the effective 
price of fuel, and different households use different amount of transport fuels, the increase in 
price has differential effect on various households. Also, it has been argued in the literature 
that the biggest advantage of a downstream tradable carbon permit policy is its positive impact 
on the distribution of burden. The acceptability of such a policy may also be dictated by the 
distribution of burdens. The distribution of burden or equity effect associated with such a 
policy therefore is a very important issue. This chapter reviews key concepts in welfare 
economics, tax incidence and the measurement of welfare. 43 The purpose of the chapter is to 
identify suitable methods to measure the distribution of economic burdens associated with 
carbon trading. 
This chapter begins with the definition of different types of equity, followed by a description 
of the indexes to measure the inequality in a distribution. Section 3.3 discusses the 
measurement of burden or welfare, and the treatment of time, income, equivalence of 
households and other issues associated in the measurement of equity. The chapter concludes 
with a summary that explains the choice of measures that will be followed in this work and the 
motivation for studying gasoline demand in the next chapters. 
3.2 Equity 
3.2.1 Measuring Equity 
Equity of a policy refers to the distribution of the benefits and the costs of the policy to 
different socio-economic groups in a society. It has a descriptive side, in 
describing the 
43 Welfare is defined in 3.3.1. 
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distribution of the impacts of the policy, as well as a normative side which determines whether 
the distribution is better or worse. Horizontal equity (also known as fairness, egalitarianism or 
equality) refers to the distribution of the impacts among those households with similar wealth 
and ability (Lee 1987, Lambert and Yitzhaki 1995, Musgrave 1990, Levinson 2002, Hammar 
and Jagers 2007). The principle of horizontal equity advocates that equals should be treated 
equally and a policy is equitable, when similar households or individuals share a similar share 
of the costs or benefits (Boadway and Bruce 1984, Plotnick 1981, Slesnick 1989, Lambert and 
Ramos 1997, Duclos et. a!. 2003). Vertical equity, often known as social justice, refers to the 
distribution of the impacts on groups differing in their abilities and needs (Litman 2006, 
Lambert and Yitzhaki 1995). This principle aims to appropriately differentiate among those 
who are unequal (Musgrave 1990) and reduce the welfare gaps between unequal groups 
(Duclos et. al. 2003). The widely accepted polluter pays principle (§2.4.3) in the 
environmental justice literature is basically an implementation of vertical equity concerns, 
where people who pollute more are asked to share more responsibility to reduce their pollution 
(Hammar and Jagers 2007). 
There are various streams of literature that study the issue of equity in the distribution of 
welfare, wealth, income, or tax burden. Since this research does not focus on the measurement 
of existing inequality in the distribution of wealth in society, which is the principal focus of 
theoretical and applied welfare economics, that literature is not reviewed here. A tradable 
permit policy is similar to a fuel tax in its effect on raising the price of fuel, therefore the 
equity literature on tax policies is more relevant to the present case. It is however important to 
note that the literature on the equity of taxation is also firmly grounded in the principles of 
welfare economics. 
In the tax literature, the principal research interest is vertical equity, especially the distribution 
of impact among different income groups (Musgrave 1990). Two different types of indexes are 
found in the literature to determine the impact of a tax on different households. The first, 
known as structural indexes, are a function of relationship between the amount of income and 
the amount of tax imposed on that income (Kiefer 1984). 44 These measures, however, are not 
capable of describing the tax burden for the whole society, but refer to specific groups of 
income or income ranges only (Musgrave and Thin 1948). The second index, referred to as 
distributive indexes, by Keifer (1984), considers the distribution of income on which the tax 
policy is applied. These measures have found application in recent literature on equity analysis 
(e. g. Duclos and Tabi 1996, Keifer 1984, Kakwani 1976, Khetan and Podder 1976, Suits 1977, 
Walls and Hanson 1999, Slesnick 1998) and are briefly reviewed here. 
44 Musgrave and Thin (1948) contains a description of the measures. 
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3.?. 2 Measuring Inequality of a Distribution 
The distributive indexes are based on other indexes to measure the inequality of a distribution, 
and uses the changes in such measures of distribution. It is therefore pertinent to start with 
measures of distribution, before proceeding to the measures of distribution of benefits or costs 
induced by a policy. In the. early literature on this type, statistical indices such as variance, 
coefficient of variation, mean logarithmic deviation, standard deviation of logarithms have 
been used to describe an income distribution (Sen 1973). However, most measures of 
progressivity or regressivity are based on the Gini coefficient (Sen 1973) to measure the 
underlying distribution. The Gini index is a widely used index to measure inequality in income 
distribution among households (or individuals) in a given population. Statistically, it is known 
as the relative mean difference (Sen 1973). The mean difference is obtained from the 
arithmetic average of the absolute differences between all possible pairs of income. Dividing 
the mean difference by twice the mean income gives the scale invariant relative mean 
difference or the Gini index. Mathematically, 
nn 
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where n is the number of individuals, y; and yk income of the jth and kth person respectively 
and ,u the arithmetic average of all incomes. Ricci (1916) has shown that the Gini index can be 
explained in terms of the area under the Lorenz curve for income distribution. A Lorenz curve 
for income is a type of concentration curve, graphically representing accumulated income as a 
function of accumulated number of earners. In Fig. 3.1, Line OEA is a line of equality, where p 
percent of the population, ranked in an increasing order of income, earns ap percent of total 
income in an economy. The actual income distribution is however different, and the poorest p 
percent of population earns less than p percent of the total income. Thus the real income 
concentration curve lies below the line of equality, and this line is the Lorenz curve (Line 
OYA). The area OYAEO thus measures the deviation of the Lorenz curve from the line of 
equality; the further the line is, the greater is the area OYAEO and the larger the measure of 
inequality. The ratio of area OYAEO to OEABO is equal to the Gini index. Since a larger 
deviation of the Lorenz curve from the line of equality results in a larger OYAEO, while 
OEABO remains fixed, a larger Gini index represents a larger inequality. 
The Gini index has been the most popular index to measure the distribution of income in the 
applied economics literature. However, Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta, Sen and Starret (1973) and 
Sen (1973) criticised the appropriateness of the Gini index as a measure to describe inequality 
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of a distribution on the ground of some theoretical limitations. The practical effect of this 
limitation is that the Gini index is more responsive to changes in income of the middle income 
group than among the rich or the poor (Allison 1978). Also, the relative sensitivity of the Gini 
index to transfers among the rich and poor does not depend on the income level, rather the 
ranking of population, which does not go along with the social welfare view that a transfer 
from rich to less rich should count for less than a transfer from poor to more poor (Sen 1973). 
Also, when the Lorenz curves before and after the implementation of a policy intersect, the 
Gini index fails to rank the two distributions. 
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These limitations of the Gini index suggest that a better approach to measuring progressivity 
may be based on an inequality measure that is more firmly grounded in the social welfare 
theory, which is what Atkinson (1970), Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), and Slesnick (1986) 
propose. Another measure, derived from the notion of entropy in information theory, is the 
Theil index (Theil 1967). 45 Some economists also argue that the inequality between the rich 
and the poor is more important and suggest indexes that define the distribution through 
differences in income between the poor and the rich (Nelson 1984). Despite the presence of 
these alternate indexes, the Gini index continues to be a popular measure in determining the 
equality of a distribution and the majority of distributive indexes utilize the Gini index in 
determining the distribution of tax burden on the population. 
as As Sen (1973) puts it: it is an arbitrary formula and...... is not a measure that is exactly overflowing 
with intuitive sense. 
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3.2.3 Measuring Vertical Inequity 
Among the distributive indexes, two predominant approaches exist in the literature for 
measuring the progressivity or regressivitiy of a tax policy (Duclos and Tabi 1996). In the first 
one, progressivity or regressivity is defined as the deviation of the tax system from 
proportionality. A flat or proportional tax is one, in which people share the burden in 
proportion to their burden sharing capability, which is generally expressed through their 
income. 46 A policy would be progressive (regressive) if successively higher income groups 
bear an increasingly higher (lower) relative burden. These measures capture the ability to bear 
the tax burden. Khetan and Podder (1976), Kakwani (1976), Suits (1977), Stroup (2005) follow 
this path, which are known as local progression measures. The other approach, initiated much 
earlier by Musgrave and Thin (1948) defines progressivity on the basis of the redistributive 
effect: how much the distribution of individual welfare is equalized as a result of the proposed 
tax policy. 
The earlier proponents of the redistributive index (Musgrave and Thin 1948, Pechman and 
Okner 1974 and Reynolds and Smolensky 1977) adapted the Gini index directly as a measure 
of inequality, and simply compare the indexes before and after the policy. Blackorby and 
Donaldson (1984) and Keifer (1984), on the other hand, compare the Atkinson's measure 
before and after the tax implementation. 
The redistributive indexes, however, define progressivity on the basis of how well equality is 
achieved after the implementation of a policy. The indexes are a function of the pre-existing 
income distribution and a proposed tax schedule, which together forms the distribution of tax 
burden, as well as the total amount of tax yield (or the average effective tax rate). 47 Khetan and 
Podder (1976) and Kakwani (1976) criticized this dependence on tax rate and argued that the 
distribution of post-policy burden with respect to pre-policy income is a more accurate 
measure of tax progressivity. Kakwani (1976) reasoned that doubling of the tax rate for all 
income groups increases the progressivity as measured by any of the redistribution indexes, 
whereas, doubling of the tax rate for everyone does not have any effect on the relative shares 
of burden with respect to income and thus the regressivity of the tax burden itself. He suggests 
that the relative burden shared by different individuals or households is a better measure to 
describe the distribution of burden resulting from a policy, which follows the principle of 
ability to pay (Musgrave, cited by Mitra and Ok 1997). Slesnick (1986) calls these relative 
burden distribution measures as local progression measures. 
46 Often total expenditure, rather than income, is used to determine the ability to bear a burden (§3.3.3) 
47 A higher effective tax rate results in more revenue collection, which can be distributed to low income 
groups to achieve greater equality. 
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The local progression measures also make use of Lorenz like tax concentration curve for the 
definition of the indexes. A tax concentration curve plots the cumulative share of tax burden 
faced by cumulative share of population, ranked in ascending order of income (OTA in Fig. 
3.2). OTA thus measures the deviation of tax burden from the line of equal burden sharing, 
defined by OEA. Similar to the Gini index, burden concentration index Ct can be devised as 
the ratio of area OTAEO to OEABO. Kakwani's (1976) index is based on the tax concentration 
curve and is defined as, 
K=C, -Gib 3.9 
Graphically the measure is equivalent to the area bounded within the Lorenz curve for income 
and tax concentration curve (area OYATO) expressed as a proportion of area OEABO (Fig. 
3.2). Similar measures have been proposed by Khetan and Podder (1976) and Stroup (2005). 
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Suits (1977) proposed to plot the tax burden concentration curve with respect to increasing 
income, instead of increasingly wealthier people. Thus, in Fig. 3.3, the curved line OTA 
is a 
new representation of the tax concentration curve and depicts the cumulative 
liability with 
respect to cumulative income. Straight line OEA shows that the equal 
distribution of liability 
according to the ability to pay (income). 
Suits (1977) index is the ratio of the area between the burden concentration curve and the flat 
tax straight line and the area of the bottom right triangle, area OTAEO/OEABO 
(Fig. 3.3). The 
most progressive tax is rated as +1 in the Suits index (S). However, 
if there is negative burden 
(benefit) among the lower income, Suits index may not be bounded by the +1 at the upper end. 
It is also unclear how the Suits index will behave in the presence of such 
benefits. 
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Casler and Rafiqui (1993) follow a method proposed by Pietra (1948, cited by Kondor 1971) 
and Schutz (1951) to determine progressivity of carbon tax. Schutz (1951) suggests plotting 
the burden to income ratio for households sorted in an ascending order of income. The area 
between this curve and an average burden to income ratio is the Schutz index or Pietra ratio. 
The method, however, has the limitation that it does not follow the Pigou-Dalton condition that 
any transfer of burden from a poorer household to a richer household should reduce the 
measure of inequality (Dalton 1920, Sen 1973). All these indexes are associated with a unique 
definition of progressivity and results of studies using different indexes are not directly 
comparable (Keifer 1984). 
In the context of tradable permits for fuel use or a fuel tax, the overall changes in income or 
wealth may not be large enough to be picked up by the redistributive indexes. Therefore, local 
progression measures are more appropriate. Although both the Kakwani (1976) and the Suits 
(1977) index have found wider application in the tax burden literature, there are cases when 
they may fail to give an appropriate picture of the distribution, e. g. if the tax is progressive at 
low income and regressive at higher income, or vice versa (Suits 1977). Therefore the burden 
concentration curves or charts are often more helpful to describe the distribution than a 
summary index. In addition, the summary indexes have been derived assuming a non-negative 
burden (no benefit) to any households. In a tradable permit policy, however, there are some 
households who will benefit from the policy. Since these households may spread over different 
income groups, the burden concentration curve could have a wiggly distribution, and any 
summary index described here may not be capable of capturing the subtlety in the 
distributional effect. West and Williams (2004) also mention that Suits index can produce 
misleading results where the tax revenue is recycled back to the consumers. Therefore, instead 
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of making inferences based on the summary indexes, the average changes in welfare of 
different socio-economic groups and the distribution of welfare changes within similar groups 
are presented graphically in this work. 
3.2.4 Horizontal Equity 
Horizontal equity deals with the concept of fairness that people with similar capabilities should 
share the same burden. Although the tax incidence literature has been primarily concerned with 
vertical equity, which aims to reduce the welfare gaps between different income groups, the 
horizontal equity aspect has gained some attention recently (Stewart et. al. 2007). The attention 
is due to the concern that a tax (or a tradable permit policy) which does not treat equals equally 
may create resentment and even social unrest (Duclos et. al. 2003, Stewart et. al. 2005). It has 
also been argued that the horizontal equity is a more robust and less controversial principle 
than vertical equity since it is derived from the fundamental moral principle of equal worth of 
human beings (Musgrave 1990, Duclos et. al. 2003). 48 
There are two different streams of literature available that have derived measures of horizontal 
equity. The classical approach defines equal groups and determines the distribution of income 
within each group, and aggregates group wise indexes to get a single index. The re-ranking 
approach (Plotnick 1981, King 1980), on the other hand, suggests that households should 
preserve the same ranking in the distribution of income or welfare before and after the policy is 
implemented. 49 The re-ranking approach may not be able to pick up any changes in the ranking 
of the households since only fuel tax is the focus here. Therefore, the classical approach to 
describe horizontal equity is followed here. 
Horizontal equity or inequality can be seen as a component of vertical equity, since vertical 
inequality can be decomposed into within group (horizontal inequality) and between group 
inequality (Lambert and Ramos 1997, Stewart et. al. 2005). Therefore, in the income tax 
literature, horizontal equity is sometimes related to vertical equity and redistribution (Duclos 
et. al. 2003, Lambert and Ramos 1997). In this work, however, Musgrave's (1990) argument 
that horizontal equity in itself is an important criteria in determining the distributional effect of 
a tax (or tradable permit) policy is followed and the horizontal equity is measured in addition 
to the vertical equity. 
In measuring the horizontal inequality, it is a common practice to capture the 
inequality within 
groups through some indices and then aggregating it for all the groups. 
Aronson et. al. (1994), 
48 Kaplow (2000), however, argues that the pursuit of horizontal equity conflicts with the foundations of 
welfare economics. 
49 The reranking approach is also known as the no-ranking approach (Bordingnon et. al. 
2005). 
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Lambert and Ramos (1997), Duclos and Lambert (2000) and Stewart et. al. (2005) all follow 
this procedure. 50 These four studies utilize the Gini index, the mean logarithmic deviation, the 
Atkinson index and the coefficient of variation and the Gini index respectively to determine 
the local dispersion of income and then aggregate the group-wise dispersion measures for the 
whole population 
The measurement of horizontal equity is still fraught with controversies. While it may be 
possible to identify small socio-economic or ethnic groups which can be deemed as equal, 
there could still be a wide variation in capabilities of different households in such groups as 
expressed through different incomes of different households. Lambert and Ramos (1997) 
attempt to generate pseudo-equal households, and ended up with 293 income-based pseuo- 
equal groups for their simulated micro-dataset of 30,000 households. Their goal, however, was 
to link horizontal equity with the redistribution effect of an income tax system, and required 
them to have such a high number of groups. 
All the horizontal equity measures generate one single number to determine overall horizontal 
equity, which may obscure the differences in various similar groups. Also, the values of the 
indexes and indexes themselves are not well established in the literature and, unlike the Gini 
index, are difficult to interpret intuitively (Stewart et. al. 2005). Therefore no single summary 
measure is chosen to infer horizontal equity, rather the local horizontal dispersion measures for 
groups which contain similar households will be presented. Histograms and the widely used 
statistical measure of coefficient of variation and standard deviation will be used in this regard. 
3.3 Issues with Measuring Economic Burden 
The measurement of welfare has various issues that require attention. These range from the 
choice of the measure itself to the treatment of income and time. It is also important to identify 
whether direct or indirect effects are to be measured and whether behavioural responses are 
included or not. In addition, the units on which the burden is measured and the effect of 
different household sizes on the measurement of well-being are also important. This section 
briefly explains these issues and describes the choices that are used in this dissertation. 
3.3.1 Measures of Burden 
The regressivity indexes described above measure the distribution of the burden resulting from 
a policy intervention. Determining this distribution requires knowledge about the burden 
between different households, individuals or socio-economic groups. Since a tradable permit 
50 This is known as the local-to-global approach. 
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policy will have both positive and negative effects on different types of households, there will 
be a mixture of benefits and burdens accruing to different types of households. Analysis of the 
change in welfare is therefore a more appropriate way to express the impact of policy on 
different households, where welfare refers to an existing state of well-being of a household or 
individual. In microeconomics, this state of well-being is measured through an abstract 
concept, utility. It is assumed that an individual or household derives utility by consuming 
goods, and a rational household will maximize its utility by optimizing its consumption of 
various goods (Varian 2006). At equilibrium, a household has achieved a state of welfare by 
choosing its bundle of consumption goods which delivers the household the maximum possible 
utility within the constraints of its income or resources (Boadway and Bruce 1984, Johansson 
1991, Varian 2006). 
The direct changes in welfare after implementing a policy that changes the price of gasoline 
can be determined from the Marshallian or ordinary demand curve for gasoline (Varian 2006). 
An ordinary demand curve expresses the quantity of a good demanded as a function of the 
price of the good, holding the income of the household constant. Consumer surplus (CS) is the 
most commonly used welfare measure (Slesnick 1998), which is defined as the area under the 
demand curve up to the equilibrium price (Fig. 3.4). This area represents the amount a 
household is willing to pay to consume the good, yet it does not have to at the given market 
price of the good. An increase in equilibrium price because of external interference in the form 
of a tradable permit or tax policy reduces this area of consumer surplus, and the 
loss of the 
surplus (ACS, PIECP2 in Fig. 3.4) is taken as a measure of a loss in welfare. (P2-P1)Q 
is the 
tax receipt to the government for a tax policy, or the total redistribution among 
different 
consumers for a tradable quota policy (Fig. 3.4). The triangle CDE 
is totally lost because of the 
implementation of the policy, and is known as the dead weight loss (Harberger 1964). 
The 
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Fig. 3.4 Changes in consumer surplus due to a permit price of (P2-PI) 
is area P1 ECP2 
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dead weight loss is also used as a measure of efficiency of a policy, it expresses how much it 
costs the economy to implement the policy (West and Williams 2004). The loss of consumer 
surplus, however, includes the deadweight loss and therefore a separate calculation for dead 
weight loss is not necessary, unless the efficiency of the policy is also of interest. 
Mathematically, the change in consumer surplus is defined as: 
ACS = 
ý2Q(P)dP 
3.11 
Where QO is the Marshallian demand specification, which is a function of the price of the 
good, and other variables. P1 and P2 are prices before and after the policy implementation. 
The use of consumer surplus as a welfare measure, however, is contested (Slesnick 1998, 
Hausman 1981). The focus of interest in welfare measurement is the change in utility brought 
about by the change in price, keeping everything else constant. However, the consumer surplus 
measure is associated with a change in income, known as the income effect, since any changes 
in price changes the purchasing power of the fixed income of the consumer. In order to 
measure the change in utility only, the income effect needs to be separated. Two measures that 
do this are the compensating variation (CV) and the equivalent variation (EV). The 
compensating variation measures the additional income to be given to the consumer after the 
price change such that the consumer is on the original utility level before the price rise. The 
equivalent variation, on the other hand, measures the amount of income to be taken away from 
the consumer before the price rise, so as to leave the consumer on the same utility level after 
the price rise. The measures are similar to changes in consumer surplus, in that they are also 
based on the area under the demand curve, but the demand curve in this case is not the 
traditional Marshallian uncompensated demand, rather the Hicksian compensated demand 
(Zerbe and Dively 1994). 51 The disadvantage with the CV or EV is that deriving the Hicksian 
demand curve is analytically more complicated than deriving the Marshallian curve. 
While CV and EV are the true welfare measures, changes in consumer surplus have been used 
more often because of its simplicity. In addition, Willig (1976) showed that the difference 
between CV or EV with ACS is not large, and because of the measurement and modelling 
errors during the demand curve derivation, for practical purposes, all these measures can be 
treated as the same. However, Hausman (1981) and King (1983) had proposed methods to 
derive exact measures of CV from the Marshallian demand specifications for a single good. 
51 A rise in the price of a good has two effects: the substitution effect, where another good becomes 
cheaper and the income effect, where the buying power of the income is reduced. The ordinary 
Marshallian demand curve includes both effects. Hicksian demand curves keep the buying power 
(utility) constant. 
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They have also derived an exact expression of CV for linear and Cobb-Douglas demand 
functions. 52 On the other hand, Slesnick (1986), Jorgensen and Slesnick (1984) and Stoker 
(1986) formulated aggregate welfare measure for all households considering the consumption 
of all commodities. Their measure, however, is very data and computation intensive. 
Hausman's (1981) formulation for CV for the Cobb-Douglas demand function is utilized in the 
aggregate time series model (Chapter 5) of this research. For a comparison, however, ACS is 
calculated as well. The disaggregate model in Chapter 6 is of translog form, 1° and no direct 
formulations to derive CV is available for such a model (Hausman 1981, Stoker 1986). 
Therefore ACS is used to measure the changes in welfare for the translog model. 
In addition to the loss in welfare due to the increased effective price of fuel, in a tradable 
permit policy, households would receive their share of permits for free. Since the permits will 
have a price associated with them in the market, there is an accumulation of wealth to the 
household, which results in an increase in welfare. Thus the wealth accumulated from the free 
permits is added to the direct changes in CS or CV to get the net change in welfare. The 
accumulation of wealth through the free allocation of permits depends on the allocation 
strategy (§2.5.3 and §2.5.4). Fig. 3.5 explains the changes in welfare for three different initial 
demand and price response scenarios. In panel (a), the initial quantity of gasoline demanded 
(QI) and, therefore, carbon emissions, is higher, but the final quantity demanded (Q2) is lower 
than the allocated permit (Q). The households gain financially the amount CDGF, but there is a 
dead weight loss CDE because of the lower consumption. In panel (b) the initial (Ql) and final 
(Q2) gasoline demands are higher than the allocated permits (Q). The household suffers a net 
loss in welfare CFGE. In panel (c), the initial (Ql) and final (Q2) quantity demanded are 
lower than the allocated permits (Q). The household clearly benefits from the policy by an 
amount CFGE. 
3.3.2 Direct or Indirect Effects 
The measures of changes in welfare described in the preceding paragraphs measures the direct 
effects resulting from a change in the policy. The changes in welfare, however, may vary 
depending on whether only these direct effects are considered, or both direct and indirect 
effects of the policy are modelled. A partial equilibrium framework studies the direct effect on 
the burden of the households (Zerbe and Dively 1994). Thus, partial equilibrium considers the 
direct financial loss or loss in welfare because of an increase in the price of gasoline. The direct 
burden in this case will be the reduction in welfare due to decreased consumption of fuel at the 
higher price which is given by the changes in CS or CV. 
52 Functional specifications of the demand curves are discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Fig. 3.5 Net changes in welfare through Marshallian demand curve. In all three panels, burden 
= Area Pl ECP2 - Area PI GFP2 
A general equilibrium framework, on the other hand, considers the direct and indirect burdens 
faced by households as a result of an increase in the price of fuel (Zerbe and Dively 1994). As 
a result of an increased price of fuel, the production and distribution cost of other goods may 
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increase, leading to an increase in the price of other goods. The additional welfare lost because 
of this price change in the secondary market, is included in a general equilibrium setting. 
General equilibrium studies show that gasoline taxes are not as regressive as they would have 
been if only partial equilibrium effects had been considered (Casler and Rafiqui 1993). General 
equilibrium analysis, however is very data intensive, and is more useful when the whole 
economy is modelled, than a sub-sector, as in this case, when the focus is on gasoline (or 
carbon) consumption for personal use only. The additional data and resource requirements 
make it not feasible to develop a general equilibrium analysis in the present case. 53 
On the other hand, the partial equilibrium setting has the advantage of providing a simple and 
direct relationship between the increase in price and decrease in consumption quantity. As long 
as the demand curve is available, it is straight-forward to calculate the amount of reduction in 
consumption as a result of an increase in price. Similarly, if a cap on consumption is set in a 
tradable permit policy, the price of permits can be directly estimated from the demand curve in 
a partial equilibrium framework. Therefore, a partial equilibrium framework has been 
employed in this work to measure the economic burden. The results should therefore be 
interpreted with this mind. 
3.3.3 Treatment of Income and Time 
Income of a household or an individual has two important functions in the measurement of 
progressivity or regressivity of a policy. Firstly, it acts as a measure of the households' wealth 
and thus their ability to bear the burdens of the policy. Secondly, the demand for a consumer 
good also depends on the households' income. Differences in the treatment of income in 
regressivity calculations may result in different values of regressivity (Poterba 1990, Casler 
and Rafiqui 1993, Caspersen and Metcalf 1994, Metcalf 1999, Rogers 1993). This makes the 
treatment of income an important element of demand and regressivity analysis. 
There is a significant debate over the time period for which the income of a household should 
be measured. The most readily available measure for income is the annual income, however, 
Friedman (1957) argues that current consumption of goods depends not only on the current 
income, but also on the future expectations of income and suggests the use of permanent 
lifetime income to explain consumer expenditure patterns. Calculations of lifetime income, 
however, are fraught with difficulties and may be impractical to implement (Barthold 1993). 
53 Since only direct personal road transport is considered in this work, distribution and production costs 
are assumed to have no significant increase, and the policy therefore may 
have a negligible effect on the 
secondary market. It is however possible that the reduced travel as a result of reduced gasoline 
consumption will lead to a slowdown of the economy, which may 
have important secondary effects, 
requiring general equilibrium analysis. . 
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Lifetime income cannot be observed, neither is it reported in surveys, rather it must be 
simulated using various econometric models. Although there have been attempts to model 
lifetime income of households (Rogers 1993, Chernick and Rescovsky 1997, Walls and 
Hanson 1999), any such simulations are restricted by the underlying assumptions (Metcalf 
1999). Modelling lifetime income also requires extensive information on various demographics 
and past history of the households (Walls and Hanson 1999). Because of the conceptual and 
data limitations, there is a lack of consensus on how to measure lifetime income and there are 
examples of the same authors using both lifetime and annual income in calculating the 
regressivity of a policy in different studies (Rogers 1993, Dinan and Rogers 2002, Caspersen 
and Metcalf 1994, Metcalf 1999). 
Slesnick (2001) argues that well-being is a function of the goods consumed rather than the 
annual income received. Poterba (1990) acknowledged that lifetime income is a better measure 
of a household's well-being and suggested using total annual expenditure as a proxy for 
lifetime income. He found that the use of consumption expenditure as a measure of income 
deflates the measures of regressivity. Metcalf (1993), Casler and Rafiqui (1993) and West and 
Williams (2004) also use annual expenditure as a proxy for well-being and came to the same 
conclusion. Although annual expenditure may not be the perfect measure of lifetime income 
(Sabelhaus and Groen 2000), it has been used in the literature quite often, especially because of 
the availability of data (Poterba 1990). Use of expenditure will also allow another advantage 
during the estimation of one of the econometric demand models, as will be explained later in 
§6.3.2. 
Along the same line, the burden of a policy can also be measured over a lifetime, discounting 
all future burdens resulting from the current policy to their present value. However, the time 
dimension in burden calculations has received little attention in the literature. As opposed to 
Davies et. al. (1984) and Fullerton and Rogers (1993), who focus on 
income or property taxes, 
all the gasoline tax literature focus on annual burden. For a gasoline tax or 
tradable permit 
policy, it is possible to model lifetime burden through modelling 
long run decisions such as 
vehicle choice and residential location choice as a result of the policy. 
However, these two 
choices also depend on various other decisions outside of the 
household's control (e. g. 
investment in public transport or lack of investment in road) which may change 
during the time 
period when the decisions are made. Since it 
is not possible to model such government policy 
interventions in the future it is difficult to model accurately the burden over an entire 
lifetime. 
Therefore, burden is calculated on an annual basis. 
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3.3.4 Behavioural Response vs. No Response 
Another important determinant in burden calculations is whether a behavioural response to the 
proposed policy should be included or not. The welfare calculations mentioned in §3.3.1 are 
based on the behavioural response that gasoline consumption would be reduced as a result of a 
tradable permit policy. However, most earlier work on the distributional effect of a gasoline tax 
calculate the burdens on the assumption of no policy induced changes in the consumption of 
gasoline (Table 3.1). This approach misses one key aspect of the tradable permit or tax policy. 
The principle behind the policy is to use market mechanisms such that the price of the 
Table 3.1 Basis for burden calculation in different studies 
Reference Year Type of tax 
Type of Treatment of 
effects income 
Zupnick 1977 Gasoline Direct Annual income 
Income, 
Davies et. al. 1984 Direct Lifetime, modelled 
property etc. 
Poterba 1990 Gasoline 
Caster & Rafiqui 1993 Gasoline 
Fullerton and 
Rogers 
Rogers 
Jorgenson & 
Wilcoxen 
Goulder 
1993 Income 
1993 
Gasoline, 
alcohol 
1993 Carbon 
Direct 
Lifetime, proxy by 
Annual expenditure 
Indirect 
Lifetime, proxy by 
Annual expenditure 
Direct Lifetime, modelled 
Treatment Demand 
of burden response 
Annual No 
Lifetime No 
Annual No 
Annual No 
Lifetime No 
Direct Lifetime, modelled Annual 
Indirect Annual income Annual 
1995b Carbon Indirect Annual income Annual 
Chernick & 
Rescovsky 
Blow & 
Crawford 
Caspersen & 
Metcalf 
Metcalf 
1997 
Annual income, 
Gasoline Direct Intermediate (11 Annual 
year mean) income 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
__.............. --..... ...... 
1997 Gasoline Direct 
Lifetime, proxied Annual 
by expenditure 
Annual income, 
1994 
1999 
Walls & Hanson 1999 
Dinan & Rogers 2002 
West & Williams 2004 
Santos & 2005 
Catchesides 
Commodity Direct Lifetime income, Annual No 
modelled 
Annual income, 
Environment Indirect Annual No 
Lifetime, modelled 
Vehicle Annual income, 
Direct Annual No 
emissions Lifetime, modelled 
Carbon Indirect Annual income Annual No 
Pollution Indirect Annual income Annual Yes 
VMT Direct Annual income Annual Yes 
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polluting product goes up and accordingly, people reduce their consumption. Because the 
change in price results in some behavioural adjustment in the consumption of the good, it is 
therefore appropriate to calculate the burden after allowing for this response. Jorgenson and 
Wilcoxen (1993) and Goulder (1995) allow the behavioural response to a change in price in 
their general equilibrium models for an economy wide carbon tax policy. These models, 
however, focus on a larger energy framework, instead of gasoline only. Also, their work does 
not involve any burden calculation for different groups in society, but rather the burden on the 
economy as a whole. Since a natural response to a price rise of a commodity is to reduce the 
consumption of the commodity, studies that neglect behavioural responses will tend to 
overstate the burden. 
Fig. 3.6 shows the direct welfare loss because of a gasoline price increase (without any 
allocation of permits). The no-response case, denoted by the vertical line Q1, increases the 
expenditure of households by (P2-P1)Q1 (Area PIEGP2). When demand response is included, 
the corresponding welfare loss is PI ECP2, which is less than the no-response case. Demand 
response to an increased price is thus an important determinant in burden calculations. Because 
of the heterogeneity of different households, it is very possible that different households 
respond to the same price change differently. Thus, although a national aggregate demand 
response will be sufficient to determine average effect on welfare of a country, to determine 
the effect on different socio-economic groups, the demand response of each of these groups 
need to be determined. Fig. 3.6 shows that despite the initial demand being the same for the AB 
and HI demand curves, AB results in a lower loss in consumer surplus (PIECP2) because of its 
more elastic response to price than HI (PI EJP2). The only work that allows for a different 
behavioural response for different income groups in calculating the gasoline tax burden is by 
West and Williams (2004). There could, however, be other factors than income that would give 
u 
P2 
U 
Pi 
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Fig. 3.6 ACS for households in price response and no response case 
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rise to different demand specification among different households and these factors are 
investigated in Chapters 4 and 6. 
3.3.5 Unit of Analysis 
All the discussions and measures in the previous sections can be applied to both individuals 
and households. In comparing the burden or welfare, a key question is whose burden or 
welfare should be measured. Ideally it should be for every individual belonging to the 
population (Slesnick 1998), however, these data are often not available in national surveys 
(Bellü and Liberati 2005a). Therefore, households are almost always taken to be the unit of 
analysis in distributional calculations (Slesnick 1998). Also, driving and therefore demand for 
gasoline is inherently a decision made by a household, not individuals (Kayser 2000), and it 
seems appropriate to discuss the distribution of the burden on this decision making unit. The 
literature on distributional analysis of gasoline taxes uses households as the units of analysis as 
well (West and Williams 2004, Blow and Crawford 1997, Poterba 1990, etc. ). Therefore 
households are used as the unit for the distributional analysis. 
3.3.6 Equivalence Scales 
In determining the horizontal or vertical equity among households, i. e. distribution of burden 
on similar households or among different socioeconomic groups, it is necessary to identify the 
criteria to define similarity or difference in the level of well-being. Nominal income of the 
household is the most popular choice to measure such similarities or differences in welfare 
(Slesnick 1998). 54 The choice of households as the unit of analysis, however, leaves another 
issue unresolved. 
Consumption, and therefore welfare derived from consumption, depends on household 
characteristics, especially the size and composition of the household. A household with two 
adults spending US$ 50,000 a year clearly does not enjoy similar well-being as a single adult 
household with a similar expenditure. 55 Similarly, another household with a single parent 
living with his only child will enjoy a different state of well-being as compared to either of the 
previous two. Therefore, income, expenditure, or utility, whichever is the measure to quantify 
welfare, needs to be adjusted to account for the heterogeneity in household characteristics. 
sa Although theoretical discussions focus more on utility derived from consumption, as mentioned in 
§3.3.1 
ss Adding to the complexity, a single adult household that owns its property enjoys a different standard 
of living than a similar single adult household with similar expenditure 
but living in a rented property. 
Also, age, race and gender may influence well-being (Slesnick 1998). 
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In applied work, parametric equivalence scales (PES) are used to adjust the household 
expenditure or income to arrive at a similar level of well being (Bellü and Liberati 2005b). The 
most popular of these has the form: 
PES] = Famsize" 3.12 
where iu is known as the scale relativity parameter, 0< V: 51 (Coulter et. al. 1992), Famsize is 
the size of the household, including children. A PES defined as in Eq. 3.12 is a single 
parameter equivalence scale since only one characteristic of the household enters the 
definition, Famsize, with one corresponding parameter to be evaluated, yu (Duclos and 
Mercader-Prats 1999). The equivalent expenditure or income (1) becomes: 
y= 
Ynominal 
PESJ 3.13 
The PES defined in Eq. 3.12 takes into consideration the economies of scale in consumption 
within a household, e. g. two adults in a household do not need two washing machines (Bellü 
and Liberati 2005b). Buhmann et. al, (1988) report the value of yu ranges from 0.12 to 0.84 in 
applied work in the OECD countries. 56 
In addition to the economies of scale, the needs of different household members could be 
different. This is especially true for children, who, for example, would consume a different 
amount of food than adults. 57 To account for this, a double parameter PES2 is proposed (Cutler 
and Katz 1992): 
PES2 = (adult + k. child )'7 3.14 
where, k51 and measures the relative need of the children with respect to adults. Cutler and 
Katz (1992) suggest that the consensus value fork is 0.4 although 0.5 is widely used as well. In 
the UK and some OECD countries, further adjustments are made following McClements 
(1977). According to this measure, yr =1, but every additional adult has smaller needs than the 
first adult, i. e. a different k will be associated with second or third adult in the household. Also, 
children of different ages have different values of k. It is therefore more sophisticated than the 
PEST or PES2, however the values of k available in the literature are representative of the UK 
only. 
56 In gasoline demand studies using time series data, per capita consumption is often used. This 
implicitly assumes that tu =1, and there is no effect of the composition of household. 
Again, one can argue that female adults may need less than male adults, pregnant females need more 
than those who are not pregnant. This requires modeling the `perfect' world, which is impractical. 
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Theoretical considerations have given rise to more sophisticated measures of equivalence 
scales through econometric modelling of households' consumption expenditure, however 
Pollak and Wales (1979) and Blundell and Lewbel (1991) argue that such models are not 
identif ed. 58 Given the lack of consensus on the appropriate equivalence scale (Coulter et. al. 
1992), Eq. 3.14 is chosen for this work, since it is intuitionally more appealing. Following 
more recent US-focussed works of West and Williams (2004) and Makdissi et. al. (2005), u= 
0.5 and k=0.4 are used in the rest of the thesis. The choice of equivalence scale will affect 
only the grouping of the households in determining vertical or horizontal equity in Chapter 8. 
The measure is not applied to calculate the ratio of burden to expenditure, since the ability to 
share the burden will also depend on the household composition and dividing the burden and 
expenditure both by the same equivalence scale will result in the same ratio. It is therefore an 
implicit assumption in this work that the ability of a household to bear a burden is similar to its 
need to consume. However, the summary measures of progressivity or regressivity require the 
households to be ranked in an ascending order, and the equivalence scale is then applied to 
correct both the change in welfare and expenditure. In the aggregate demand model estimated 
in Chapter 5, attempts are made to modify the income and consumption as per the equivalence 
scales. 
In addition while investigating different allocation strategies, another option is investigated 
where children receive half the amount that the adults receive (k=0.5) and only adults receive 
the allocations (Table 2.1). This also follows the concept of equivalence scales. In the 
allocation case, k=0.5 is chosen since in the downstream tradable permits literature this was 
the only option that was discussed (Dresner and Ekins 2004). There is however significant 
scope of future research on the optimal allocation strategy based on some social welfare 
functions. 
3.4 Summary 
The first part of this chapter discusses various indexes to measure the inequality in a 
distribution (of burden or welfare or income). Among the two types of progressivity or 
regressivity measures, local progression measures, which deal with relative burden shares, 
have been deemed more relevant to this research. A progression measure similar to the Suits 
(1977) index is used. However, such an index fails to capture the subtleties in the changes in 
distribution, especially for socio-economic groups not based on income, therefore the results 
are also presented through charts and graphical tools, in addition to the summary measure. In 
addition to the vertical equity measures, the distribution of welfare change within different 
58 Identification describes what the econometric estimation measures: lack of identification means one 
cannot be certain what has been estimated through the econometric model. 
51 
socio-economic groups is presented, thus capturing the often neglected horizontal equity aspect 
of the policy. None of the literature on gasoline tax incidence attempted to determine the 
horizontal equity before. 
Households are chosen as the unit of analysis to measure the distribution of changes in welfare. 
To account for the differences in household sizes in determining the equality in well being of 
households, a doubly parametric equivalence scale of (adult+0.4 children)0-5 is used. This 
equivalence scale will be used as one specification of an aggregate time-series gasoline 
demand model as well. Only direct changes in welfare under the partial equilibrium 
framework are considered. This contains the loss in welfare due to a reduced consumption of 
fuel and the gain in welfare through the accumulation of freely issued permits. Two factors 
were important in this choice, firstly, the use of partial equilibrium allows the calculation of the 
permit prices directly, once the amount of reduction in emissions or consumption is decided. 
Secondly, a general equilibrium framework would require a larger dataset from all sectors of 
economy, although the current focus is only on personal transport. 
To account for the permanent income hypothesis that consumption is better reflected by 
lifetime income, expenditure is used to explain consumption and well-being. Ease of 
availability of expenditure data coupled with the criticism of the assumptions involved in 
modelling lifetime income helped arrive at this decision. 
Finally, unlike most distributional analysis of the gasoline tax, the behavioural response of the 
households is included while measuring their changes in welfare. The purpose of a tax or 
tradable permit is to induce a change in behaviour of households, and therefore it is appropriate 
to include the behavioural response while modelling the change in welfare. It is also possible 
that households may differ in their responses to a change in the price of gasoline. Since 
different elasticities will affect the changes in welfare differently, it is therefore very important 
to investigate if gasoline demand elasticities vary with different socio-economic groups or 
demographic compositions. Whether such hypothesis holds can be investigated by modelling 
gasoline demand. Demand modelling is also important to determine the permit prices for a 
given number of permits. Chapter 4 will review the literature on modelling fuel demand for 
personal road transport, which proxies for carbon emissions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FUEL 
DEMAND MODELLING 
4.1 Introduction 
The response of consumers to a fuel price increase, or the fuel demand elasticity, has an 
important role to play in the evaluation of the distribution of burdens from a policy. This 
chapter, therefore, reviews the literature on fuel demand. Because of its relevance to practical 
policy making, the literature on motor fuel or gasoline demand is abundant. The demand 
estimates in the literature are derived for different empirical contexts, using different 
determinants for demand interacting in various ways, to answer different policy questions. The 
data used and the analytical techniques also vary depending upon the various possible model 
specifications. The purpose of this review chapter is to identify a suitable model that can be 
used to determine gasoline demand that accounts for different behavioural responses of 
consumers by different socio-economic groups. 
The general issues related to gasoline demand modelling are discussed in section 4.2. Section 
4.3 reviews specific studies directly relevant to modelling demand for different socio- 
economic groups. Section 4.4 discusses the various possible responses of households to a 
change in household income and the price of gasoline. Section 4.5 explains the motivation for 
further investigation into gasoline demand modelling and lays the foundation for the models 
estimated in this dissertation. Section 4.6 summarizes the review, 
4.2 Modelling Gasoline Demand 
4.2.1 Techniques to Model Gasoline Demand 
There is a vast literature on modelling gasoline demand based on econometric techniques to 
derive the demand. In this approach, gasoline demand is expressed as a function of several 
explanatory variables, the relationship between demand and the variables 
is hypothesized, and 
then parameters of the function are estimated following established econometric techniques. 
Very recently, Artificial Neural Network (ANN) methods 
have been proposed to forecast 
gasoline demand (Nasr et. al. 2002) or energy 
demand (Nasr et. al. 2003). While the ANN 
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methods have been successful in forecasting gasoline demand, these models are totally data 
driven and do not have any theoretical or behavioural underpinning. Also, one of the key 
concepts behind a tradable permit system is the constraining of consumption and allowing 
behavioural adjustments and ANN based models are not capable of modelling these 
behavioural adjustments. Therefore, attention is focused on the econometric models. Dahl and 
Sterner (1991), Sterner and Dahl (1992), Dahl (1995), Goodwin (1992), Goodwin et. al. 
(2004), de Jong and Gunn (2001), Graham and Glaister (2002a, 2002b, 2004) and Basso and 
Ourn (2007) have all provided comprehensive reviews of the existing econometric literature on 
fuel demand. The following sections discuss the salient features in econometric modelling of 
gasoline demand. 
4.2.2 Model Structure 
Gasoline demand can be derived directly through reduced form models, or as a component of 
system-wide estimation, through structural equation models. The consumption of gasoline 
arises from the need for travel. Fuel demand therefore depends on the demand for travel, and 
fuel economy of the vehicle fleet, and is related with the following identity (Eltony 1993, 
Johansson and Schipper 1997, Puller and Greening 1999): 
vehicle miles travelled 
gasoline = 4.1 fuel economy 
or 
vehicle stock x miles travelled per vehicle 
gasoline = 4.2 fuel economy 
In structural equation models, the right hand components of Eqs. 4.1 or 4.2 are estimated 
separately from their own set of explanatory variables, and gasoline demand is inferred 
indirectly from the identity (Basso and Oum 2007). Such models provide insight into the 
response processes, although they have not been popular among researchers or analysts (Basso 
and Oum 2007). 
Some studies (Kim 2003, Nicol 2003 and West and Williams 2004) determine gasoline 
demand as a part of the demand for other goods. These studies assume that consumption 
decisions are taken jointly and therefore they should be estimated over all goods that a 
household consumes. These studies basically model the share of the budget spent on different 
goods, subject to the household budget constraints. Once again, the approach has not been 
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widely used, possibly because of the need for extensive disaggregate data at the household 
level. 
The process of a joint decision leading to demand for different commodities is simplified by a 
key assumption that the demand for gasoline is separable from the demand for other goods. 
Gasoline demand then becomes a single-equation function of the hypothesized explanatory 
variables, the model known as a reduced form model. Although the assumption of separability 
has been questioned (Kim 2003), it is a widely used assumption in the specification of fuel 
demand (Sterner and Dahl 1992). Basso and Oum (2007) also report that the reduced form 
models are `by far, the preferred one in both academic and non-academic literature'. 
4.2.3 Determinants of Demand 
Demand for gasoline is a derived demand and is arrived at by a step-by-step decision making 
process (Sterner and Dahl 1992). The first decision involves whether to buy a vehicle, how 
many vehicles to buy and which type of vehicle. Utilization of the vehicle, or the distance 
travelled and therefore the consumption of gasoline is the next step. The decision to buy a 
vehicle may however be determined by the expected amount that one will travel, and therefore, 
there is an interdependency between these decisions. 
The interdependent demand process is simplified in the reduced form model, as mentioned in 
§4.2.2. The vehicle purchase decision is also generally not modelled as a reduced form. 59 The 
choice of the determinant variables in the reduced form model varies between studies. The 
demand for gasoline depends on the demand for travel, which in turn depends on income, 
habits, culture, taste and the situation of individual households (Sterner and Dahl 1992). Since 
households have budget constraints and households consume other goods at different prices, 
the price of gasoline also enters the demand function. In its simplest form, gasoline demand 
(G) depends on the price of gasoline (P) and income of the consumer (1). 
G=J`ý(P, Y) 4.3 
A second type of model, sometimes termed as a vehicle stock model (Sterner and Dahl 1992, 
Graham and Glaister 2002a, 2002b) includes the vehicle stock (S) as one of the explanatory 
factors: 
G= f2 (P, Y S) 4.4 
59 There are, however, a few examples of studies that focus on the joint vehicle choice and utilization 
decision (e. g. Walls and Hanson 1993, Blow and Crawford 1997) 
55 
As information on the number of vehicles is often available, these models are easy to estimate. 
The limitation is that it does not reflect the vehicle characteristics, especially fuel economy 
which is clearly a determinant of gasoline demand (Eqs. 4.1 or 4.2). The third type of model 
incorporates vehicle characteristics (FE)60 into the previous model, capturing the performance 
of vehicle stocks. 
G=f3(P, Y, S, FE) 4.5 
None of these three models can explain the influence of other exogenous drivers of demand for 
travel. The demand for gasoline, and therefore travel depends not only on income, but also 
other socio-economic determinants. The fourth class of models attempt to incorporate these 
socio-economic variables and other plausible factors with a range of variables (EX). 
G=fý(P, Y, IA) 4.6 
Studies that include other explanatory variables are generally disaggregate in nature and 
attempt to explain the effect of socio-economic variables on gasoline demand. Different studies 
use different variables to represent the socio-economic characteristics. Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980,1981) and Puller and Greening (1999) found that the employment status, 
residential location, presence of children and age, ethnicity, gender, educational attainment of 
the household head are important variables to explain gasoline demand at the household level. 
Other explanatory variables also may include vehicle characteristics, such as vintage (model 
year) of the vehicles, type of vehicles (automobiles, sports utility vehicles, vans etc. ), number 
of cylinders, size of cylinders, all of which basically determines fuel economy of the vehicle 
fleet. Often, in time-series data, a time trend is added to capture the effect of other explanatory 
factors that may have varied with time, but cannot be explicitly taken into consideration 
because of lack of information. Choice of the explanatory variables is often dictated by the 
type and availability of data, which are discussed next. 
4.2.4 Data Type 
Gasoline demand has been modelled using all types of data: cross-sectional, time-series and 
cross-sectional/time-series or panel data (Graham and Glaister 2002b). Cross-sectional 
estimation methods rely on the difference between the observations at the same point in time 
for different households or different regions. Most cross-sectional studies use disaggregated 
micro level data (West and Williams 2004, Blow and Crawford 1997, Greening et. al. 1999, 
60 FE is used to represent vehicle characteristics in order to emphasize that Fuel Economy is the most 
important vehicle characteristics in determining gasoline demand. Most vehicle characteristics directly 
or indirectly affect the fuel economy of the vehicle. 
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Puller and Greening 1995). The use of disaggregated household level data allows for the 
estimation of the effect of various socio-economic factors on the consumption of gasoline. Use 
of cross-sectional data however has an implicit assumption that demand is in equilibrium with 
price at that point in time when the data were obtained (Graham and Glaister 2002b, Basso and 
Oum 2007). Goodwin (1992), Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Basso and Oum (2007) argue that 
cross-sectional studies based on a single time period observation may be unreliable. 
Time-series data, on the other hand, are mostly used for national or regional level aggregation 
of the observations. Sterner and Dahl (1992) argue that aggregate data are more appropriate to 
study total consumption in a region. Since most policies focus on national level 
implementation, aggregated time-series data have been quite popular (Basso and Oum 2007). 
Recent literature (Bentzen 1994, Samimi 1995, Eltony and Al-Mutairi 1995, Alves et. al. 2003, 
Ramanathan and Subramanian 2003, Cheung and Thomson 2004) casts some doubt over the 
use of time-series data in gasoline demand models, especially if the time-series is long. It is 
argued that if the explanatory and dependent variables both are trending in time, it is possible 
to have a good correlation between them, although the two variables may be correlated through 
a third variable (time) and may not be related themselves (Greene 2003, Gujarati 2003). Any 
parameter estimated from a regression analysis with such correlations between the dependent 
and the explanatory variables is therefore unreliable (Granger and Newbold 1974). Special 
econometric techniques, known as cointegration methods, have been developed to identify 
such correlation, which is discussed in detail in §5.4.4. 
The third data type is a combination of cross-section and time-series, where observations for 
different cross-sections are available over time. Baltagi and Griffin (1983) strongly 
recommend the use of panel data, with the cross-sections being different regions or countries to 
obtain a more efficient estimation of all the regions together. Pesaran and Smith (1995) 
however argue that different countries may have differences in the structure of their gasoline 
consumption and the assumption that all countries have identical parameters is thus not 
appropriate. Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981), however utilize panel data methods at the 
household level, where data for a large number of households were available for four time 
periods. Since the dataset comes from the same country, 
Pesaran and Smith's (1995) criticism 
does not hold, although it could still be hypothesized that 
households are heterogeneous units 
and can have different parameters associated with them. 
Some authors have also attempted to 
generate pseudo panels from independent cross-sectional studies at 
different points in time 
(Dargay and Vythoulkas 1997,1998, Dargay 2002), 
but these studies principally focus on 
modelling car-ownership. 
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Models fl to f., can be estimated using all of these three types of data. Time dependent data, 
however, can allow one to understand the adjustment processes due to a change in the 
explanatory variables through a dynamic model. The next section discusses the treatment of 
time in models with time-series data. 
4.2.5 Treatment of Time 
In the time-series context, models fi to f, contain explanatory variables measured at the same 
time period as gasoline use. It is implicitly assumed that the changes in demand immediately 
follow the changes in the explanatory variables. While this is a practical assumption with 
respect to data requirements, in reality the full consumption response may not occur 
immediately (Basso and Oum 2007, Graham and Glaister 2002a). The previous models do not 
consider this time dimension and are known as static models. Any model with single period 
cross-sectional data is also static in nature (Basso and Oum 2007). Dynamic models, on the 
other hand, acknowledge that adaptation takes time and assume that the demand for gasoline in 
the current period is a function, not only of current variables but also of their past values 
(Sterner and Dahl 1992, Dahl and Sterner 1991, Graham and Glaister 2002a, Basso and Oum 
2007). 
Among the different dynamic models, the lagged endogenous models or autoregressive models 
assume that the consumption in the current period is a function of consumption in the past, in 
addition to other current period explanatory variables. The most common of these 
formulations, the partial adjustment model, is expressed as: 
Gr =f (Pt, Y1, Et G, -) 
4.7 
The partial adjustment model presumes that there exists a desirable level of gasoline 
consumption with respect to price and income changes, but because of the inflexibility in 
residential choice, vehicle stock and other habitual factors, consumers adjust their consumption 
only partially in each time period (Sterner and Dahl 1992). 
Lagged exogenous models, on the other hand, assume that the determinant variables have a 
lagged structure. These models explain current consumption as a function of not only current 
price and income, but also their past values. Mathematically, 
Gr = f6 (E1 Pr-i, 2 Yr-d 
4.8 
The lagged exogenous models are not very common because of the presence of 
multicollinearity among the lagged variables (Sterner and Dahl 1992). Another limitation 
is 
that there is no a priori way to know how many lags to use. Sometimes a structure is imposed 
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upon the distributed lags (Puller and Greening 1999). 61 Econometrically, the lagged exogenous 
models with a specific geometric structure can be converted to an autoregressive one using the 
Koyck transformation (Greene 2003), getting around the possible problem of multicollinearity. 
A third form of a dynamic model is a combination of the two, and is known as the 
Autoregressive Distributed Lag model, known as ADL (i, j): 
Gi = f7 (fj Pt-1, IJ Yr-J, E, G, 
-d 4.9 
Among the dynamic models, the partial adjustment models have been most widely used in the 
literature to determine gasoline demand (Dahl and Sterner 1991). All of the dynamic models 
can contain other explanatory variables and their lags in their arguments. 
4.2.6 Elasticity Timeframe 
The elasticity of demand for a commodity is a measure of the change in consumption in 
response to a change in one of the explanatory factors that determines the demand for the 
commodity. One important parameter in defining the elasticity is the timeframe under 
consideration. The short run elasticity refers to the adjustments that take place immediately 
after the change in an explanatory variable. A more technical definition defines short run as the 
period during which no capital investments are made (Varian 2006). In terms of gasoline 
demand, the capital investments could be buying a new car or relocating to a new residence. 
Thus a short run is defined when the number of vehicles in a household does not change or the 
household does not change its residential location (Archibald and Gillingham 1980). In the 
short run, the changes in consumption are generally brought about through changes in travel 
behaviour, e. g. less driving, changes to driving patterns, trip chaining, ride sharing and choice 
of mode. Depending upon the time unit in the underlying data, the corresponding time period 
for short run adjustments could be a month, a quarter or a year (Sterner and Dahl 1992). 
Naturally, adjustments taking place within a month are expected to be smaller than those in a 
year and therefore the absolute estimates of price elasticity using monthly or quarterly data 
tend to be smaller than those using annual data (Dahl and Sterner 1991). There is, however, no 
consensus on the time period that defines the short run and the definition is often governed by 
the periodicity of data. 
In contrast, the long run elasticities refer to the change in demand after full adjustment has 
taken place. This can take many years, and may involve new vehicle acquisition and/or change 
61 The structure forces the lags to follow a specific relationship, thus the number of parameters to be 
estimated become smaller and multicollinearity can be reduced. 
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of residence or work location. Espey (1996,1998) estimates that the short run price elasticities 
are around three-fourths of the long run elasticities. 
4.2.7 Functional Forms 
The functional forms of a model dictates the mathematical relation between the dependent and 
the explanatory variables. The choice of functional form can affect the estimates of the 
response parameter that determines how gasoline consumption may change in response to a 
change in one of the explanatory variables (Greene and Hu 1986). In some cases, the 
functional form also may dictate how the response parameters vary as a function of other 
variables. Thus, different functional forms impose different constraints on the relationship 
between the variables. Unfortunately, economic theory often provides no guidance regarding 
the choice of the best functional form (Pace 1995, Schmalensee and Stoker 1999). 
Many different functional forms have been used in the gasoline demand literature. These 
include linear, log-linear, semilog, translog, and non-linear. 62 A linear model results in price 
(income) elasticities which are proportional to price (income) and inversely proportional to 
consumption. A semilog model results in income (price) elasticities that are proportional to 
income (price) only. A log-linear model, also known as the Cobb-Douglas model, results in a 
constant elasticity of demand. In the absence of any economic reasoning, the choice of 
functional specification in the literature is often governed by statistical methods of goodness of 
fit or hypothesis testing (e. g. Greene 1982, Greene and Hu 1986, Dahl 1986). In some cases, 
the choice is governed simply by the ease of interpretation of the parameters, e. g. a log-linear 
function gives the required elasticities of demand directly. Sterner and Dahl (1992) and Espey 
(1998) however suggest that the short run elasticity estimates do not vary from one functional 
form to another. 
In the gasoline demand literature, the log-linear specification is the most popular choice, a 
form suggested by Dahl (1986), Greene (1982) and Greene and Hu (1986) through statistical 
tests. Since each functional form imposes some structure on the behavioural response, it is 
somewhat surprising that there was not much discussion on this aspect until recently, when 
Hausman and Newey (1995), Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) and Coppejans (2003) have 
introduced flexible functional forms through nonparametric or semiparametric techniques. 
The flexibility of the functional form, e. g. whether the function is capable of capturing a 
change in the price elasticity at different levels of income has not been a major issue as well 
(Basso and Oum 2007). The constraints and behavioural structure imposed by some of the 
62 Simple examples of functional forms, when income and price are the only explanatory variables, 
linear: G=a+ßyY+ßpP; log-linear: lnG=a+ßylnY+ßplnP; semilog: lnG=a+ßyY+f pP; translog: 
lnG=a+ßylnY+ f plnP+ßpylnPlnY+ßpp(lnP)2+ßyy(lnY)2 . 
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popular functional forms are discussed in further detail in §5.2.1, whereas semiparametric and 
nonparametric methods are discussed in Chapter 7. 
4.2.8 Equivalence Scale63 
Models which use aggregate data generally convert all the variables to a per capita basis. 
Therefore it is automatically assumed that children and adults are equivalent in terms of 
gasoline consumption. At the same time, no economies of scale in consumption are 
incorporated. Use of other parametric forms of equivalence scales, however, are not common 
in studies that focus on modelling gasoline demand only, although they have been used in 
estimating the distribution of welfare (e. g. West and Williams 2004). Studies that use total 
gasoline consumption generally have population in the list of explanatory variables to control 
for the changes in population. On the other hand, studies that employ disaggregate household 
level data generally model gasoline demand at the household level. Some studies, especially 
those which focus on the adjustment procedure, as mentioned in Eq. 4.2, also model gasoline 
demand on a per vehicle basis. Goodwin et. al. (2004) report that per capita based estimation 
may give a lower consumption response with respect to an increase in the price of fuel. Espey 
(1998) however, suggested that per capita, per vehicle, per household or aggregate 
consumption models do not produce any systematically different elasticity estimates. 
4.2.9 Discussion 
The different types of models appearing in the gasoline demand literature were results of 
different data types and the different questions that they sought to investigate. As a result, there 
are wide ranges of elasticity estimates available in the literature. There are, however, consistent 
patterns and interpretations from these various models. 
Dynamic model specifications, as mentioned in §4.2.6, take into consideration the adjustments 
in different time periods, and thus can generate short run, intermediate run and long run price 
and income elasticities. Although the structure of the tags has been a focus of many studies, 
Espey (1998) found that there are no significant differences between elasticity estimates from 
dynamic models with different lag structures or a partial adjustment model. 
Static model specifications that have vehicle stock and vehicle characteristics, in addition to 
price and income, control for the changes in fuel consumption due to a change in vehicle 
ownership or fuel economy. These models therefore capture the adjustments through changes 
in driving behaviour only and generate short run elasticities (Blum et. al. 1988, Espey 1998, 
63 See §3.3.6 for a discussion on equivalence scales. 
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Sterner and Dahl 1992). On the other hand, static model formulations with price and income as 
the only explanatory variables do not control for any changes in the vehicle stock or vehicle 
characteristics. These models thus should give the long run elasticities, although there is a 
consensus that they consistently give lower price elasticities when compared with the long run 
price elasticities from dynamic models (Espey 1998, Sterner and Dahl 1992). It is now 
acknowledged that these models provide intermediate to long run price elasticities (Basso and 
Oum 2007). 
Cross-sectional studies generally produce more elastic short run responses for price elasticity 
(Dahl and Sterner 1991, Espey 1998). On the other hand, cross-sectional time-series or panel 
data produces smaller short run price elasticity than the time-series data. Baltagi and Griffin 
(1983) and Dahl and Sterner (1991) suggest that panel data may produce intermediate to long 
run elasticities. On the other hand, Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981) and Greening et. al. 
(1995) use panel data with a large number of households who do not change their vehicle 
stock. They argue that the two major sources of long run adjustments were precluded in their 
estimation and infer their results as short run estimates. Models with household level data 
generally provide higher price elasticities in the short run (Table 4.1). Espey (1998) finds that 
the income elasticities from the cross-sectional studies are smaller than those from time-series 
studies. Table 4.2 presents the suggested short run and long run elasticities by the major review 
authors. These reviews however contain various countries including the USA. 
The elasticity estimates presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are for demand for a country as a 
whole. Although there exists a wealth of studies that models gasoline demand in general, the 
Table 4.1 Short run price elasticities from studies based on household data (US studies) 
Studies Year Data Price elasticity' 
Archibald and Gillingham 1980 Consumer expenditure survey -0.43 
Archibald and Gillingham 1981 Consumer expenditure survey -0.77 
Greene and Hu 1986 Family opinion poll -0.5 to -0.6 
Walls et. al. 1993 
Residential transportation energy 
-0.51 consumption survey 
Hausman and Newey 1995 
Residential Energy consumption 
-0.81 survey 
Greening et. al. 1995 Consumer expenditure survey 0.0 to -0.67 
West and Williams 2004 Consumer expenditure survey -0.46 
Kayser 2000 Panel study of income dynamics -0.23 
Nicol 2003 Consumer expenditure survey 0 to -0.6 
Puller and Greening 1999 Consumer expenditure survey -0.44 to -1.33 
a all short run, except Hausman and Newey (1995) 
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Table 4.2 Price and income elasticities reported by the major review articles (all countries) 
Studies Year 
Price elasticity 
Short run Long run 
Income elasticity 
Short run Long run 
Basso and Oum 2007 -0.2 to -0.3 -0.6 to -0.8 0.3 to 0.5 0.9 to 1.3 
Goodwin et. al. 2004 -0.25 -0.6 0.4 1.0 
Graham and Glaister 2002 -0.3 -0.6 to -0.8 - - 
Dahl and Sterner 1991 -0.26 -0.86 0.48 1.21 
Dahl 1986 -0.29 -1.02 0.47 1.38 
number of studies that focus on different demand responses for different socio-economic 
groups or regions is, surprisingly, small. The next section focuses on these studies individually. 
4.3 Studies on Disaggregate Demand Modelling 
In principle, the ideal way to determine the distributional effect of a tradable permit is to model 
the response of each individual household, and thus have separate elasticities for each 
household. This is, however, not feasible since a long time-series dataset for each household 
will be required, which is not available. Instead elasticities can be measured for similar groups 
based on some common socio-economic characteristics. It is, however, necessary to formulate 
hypotheses or evidence in the literature that the price response in the consumption of gasoline 
could vary by socio-economic group. The prime interest in this dissertation is income-based 
groups, since the objective is to determine vertical equity with respect to income (§3.4). 
As mentioned above, studies that focus on demand for different socio-economic groups are 
few. Most studies that address fuel demand elasticities for different socio-economic groups 
tend to use cross-sectional household level data. There are two distinct approaches to 
modelling gasoline demand for different groups. In the first approach the sample of households 
are divided among the desired groups and then individual models are estimated for each group. 
In the second approach, when the grouping variable can be expressed quantitatively, price and 
income can be interacted with the grouping variable in the model specification. The model is 
then estimated for the entire sample and mean values of each group are used to generate 
different responses for different groups. For example, if groups based on income are the focus, 
then price and income are interacted with income. After estimation of the model over the 
whole sample, mean income of each quintile can be used to determine quintile-wise price and 
income responses. It is also possible to combine the two approaches to derive demand by 
multi-dimensional groups. Both these approaches in the literature are reviewed here. 
Archibald and Gillingham (1980) used US household level data (1972-73 Consumer 
Expenditure Survey, CEX) to determine fuel demand under the framework of household 
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production theory (Becker 1965, Lancaster 1966). They used various demographic variables 
(e. g. age, sex, race and educational attainment of the household head, location and composition 
of the household), in addition to price and income, to explain gasoline consumption. They have 
employed both the methods described above in their model by first dividing the sample into 
one car and multi-car households and then using an interaction term for price and income. 
Although they found a statistically significant interaction effect for one-car households, the 
interaction term was not different from zero for multi-car households. This indicates that there 
is a difference between the two types of households. Although their focus was not on income 
quintiles, their model specification allowed them to report that for the one car sub sample, 
lower income households have a consistently higher price elasticity. It is important to note that 
the interaction term in price and income, as used by Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981) in 
their translog functional form, always results in a consistent direction of change in the price 
elasticity with a change in income. For example, absolute price elasticity will always be higher 
(lower) with higher income if the parameter estimate for the interaction term is negative 
(positive). 64 
The use of an interaction term between gasoline price and income, or driving cost and income, 
to describe the variation of price elasticity with income level is common in household level 
studies. Kayser (2000) used data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics of 1981 and 
modelled gasoline demand in the USA conditional upon car ownership, using a discrete choice 
model for automobile choice in the first step. She reported that households with higher income 
consistently respond more to a price change. Yatchew and No (2001), on the other hand, used a 
nonparametric approach to conclude that price and income do not interact in Canada. Hausman 
and Newey (1995) also found that the price elasticity does not change with the 
level of higher 
income from their parametric estimation. 65 Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) also modelled 
gasoline demand semiparametrically and reported that income elasticity of gasoline 
does not 
fall with higher income. 
West (2004) used a two step model to determine the driving cost elasticity of vehicle miles 
travelled (VMT) for income deciles in the USA using CEX data for 1997. The first step 
is a 
discrete choice model to determine the number and type of vehicle choice, the second 
is a 
continuous model for VMT demand. Results show that the elasticity of 
VMT with respect to 
operating cost decreases with higher income deciles, with a slight reversal 
for the wealthiest 
two deciles. The reversal is due to the functional form of her model. The model 
is linear in 
variables; therefore, the driving cost elasticity was proportional to 
driving cost and inversely 
6a More on functional forms in model specification in 
§5.2.1 
65 Hausman and Newey (1995) focus principally on nonparametric estimation, 
but also present results 
for a translog model. More on nonparametric and semiparametric approaches 
in §7.4.2 
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proportional to VMT at the point of the estimate (i. e. the mean value of their deciles). It is 
possible that at higher income deciles VMT does not increase as fast as in other deciles, 
causing the slight reversal. 
Blow and Crawford (1997) used UK National Travel Survey data to determine the VMT 
demand, conditional upon vehicle choice incorporating Heckman's (1979) selectivity 
correction. 66 They divide their sample into one-car and multi-car households and then estimate 
their model with interaction terms for each sample. In their final result, however, they combine 
the results to report VMT elasticities for 20 different groups (five income quintiles for four 
population densities) and suggest that the driving cost elasticity of VMT decreases consistently 
with higher income quintiles. They also report a higher driving cost elasticity for urban 
regions. Santos and Catchesides (2005) follow Blow and Crawford's model, ignoring the 
selectivity bias for simplicity. They also report findings similar to those of Blow and Crawford. 
Thus, all these studies demonstrate that the price elasticity can vary for different socio- 
economic groups. Both of these models use a semilog functional form and the mean income of 
different income quintiles to determine different elasticities for different income groups. 
Along another stream of the literature, Greening et. al. (1995) recognised that price and income 
elasticities can be dependent on household structure and life-cycle and clustered the 
observations into different groups. They derived demand equations for different groups based 
on various household characteristics. Using the 1990 CEX data they determined that in 
general, retired or unemployed households are least responsive to fuel price changes, while 
households with traditional family structures have the largest price elasticities. It cannot be 
determined from their analysis whether there is a link to income levels based on household 
structure. 
All these studies assume that fuel or VMT demand can be separated from the demand of other 
consumer goods and thus be analysed independently. Among the studies that focus on group 
wise demand estimation, only two dropped the separability assumption and viewed the demand 
for gasoline to be inter-linked with the demand for other goods as well as labour force 
participation. West and Williams (2004) followed the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) by 
Deaton and Muelbauer (1980), while Nicol (2003) used the Quadratic Almost Ideal (QAI) 
demand formulation by Banks et. al. (1996,1997). Nicol reports different gasoline demand 
elasticities for different regions of the US and Canada, however, the regions are not based on 
urban or rural locations, and no significant differences can be observed. 
66 Selectivity correction is discussed in §6.4.3. 
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Of all these studies, only West and Williams (2004) specifically determine different price 
elasticities of gasoline for different income groups. They applied the AIDS (Deaton and 
Muelbauer 1980) over three goods: gasoline, leisure and a composite of other goods using US 
individual household expenditure data from 1996 to 1998. Using an Instrumental Variables 
technique they determine compensated (Hicksian) and uncompensated (Marshallian) price 
elasticities for different income quintiles. Heckman's (1979) two stage model was employed to 
avoid the selection bias for wage and car ownership. However, they used a sample with only 
one and two-adult households and utilized an equivalence scale to arrive at expenditure 
quintiles. They reported price elasticity as decreasing with successively wealthier expenditure 
quintiles, although, price elasticities among the lowest and highest income households were 
statistically insignificant. Any behavioural reasoning to justify their results was not offered, as 
the primary focus was on the burden of fuel price changes on different income groups. 
Table 4.3 presents the salient features of the disaggregate demand models for gasoline, VMT 
and car ownership, that incorporate different responses for different groups of households. 
Most of these studies focus on one grouping variable and ignore other dimensions of 
behavioural change. For example, West and Williams (2004) model gasoline demand for five 
income quintiles, but ignores whether elasticity could be different between urban and rural 
areas as well, a result found by Blow and Crawford (1997) for the UK. Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980,1981) acknowledged that vehicle ownership would affect the gasoline 
demand parameters, yet ignored the effect of rural or urban location in determining the 
response of households to a change in price of gasoline or income. Thus, there is a lack of 
studies that attempt to model all these different dimensions of behavioural response in one 
study. 
4.4 Plausible Behavioural Responses 
The literature mentioned above reports that there could be significant heterogeneity in the price 
sensitivity of different socio-economic or regional groups. Not many of the studies however 
start with a plausible hypothesis as to why behaviour may vary, although a few (e. g. Kayser 
2000) try to explain their findings after estimation. 
There are reasons to believe a priori, that households in different socio-economic and 
geographical groups would react differently to the same stimuli. Generally, there is a lack of 
alternate modes of transport in rural regions. Therefore, the option of switching to an alternate 
mode in response to a change in fuel price is limited in rural regions. Thus rural households 
would possibly respond less to a price change than urban households. This hypothesis is 
supported by Blow and Crawford (1997) and Santos and Catchesides (2005) for the UK. 
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The behavioural response could be more complex when income groups are taken into 
consideration. Lower income households in urban areas may be inclined to switch to alternate 
transport modes, resulting in a higher than average price elasticity, as found by West and 
Williams (2004). On the other hand, lower income households may already be driving as little 
as possible because of their budget constraints. Their travel could be a necessity and they may 
be unable to reduce their level of driving, resulting in a lower price elasticity than average, as 
explained by Kayser (2000). 
In general, wealthier households may be less sensitive to any price change because of their 
higher income (Robinson 1969, Gertler et. al. 1987). However, wealthier households also may 
have more options to reduce fuel consumption as much of their driving may be discretionary, 
such as for leisure trips (Kayser 2000). They are also more likely to own more than one vehicle 
and can use their more fuel efficient vehicle more intensively in response to an increased price. 
In addition, they may switch to air travel if the price of fuel increases as a result of higher 
taxation relative to jet fuel prices. All these factors could lead to a higher fuel price elasticity 
for higher income groups. 
Income elasticity of the lowest income group could be higher than average, if the extra income 
is spent on travelling more or buying a new car. On the other hand, if the households in the 
lowest income group are substantially budget constrained they may spend the extra income on 
other necessities, resulting in a lower than average income elasticity. For high income groups, 
the income elasticity would depend upon whether there is demand satiation or not. If income is 
not a constraint on wealthy households and these households already travel as much as they 
can, extra income may not result in more road travel, and gasoline consumption will not 
increase substantially. 
Archibald and Gillingham (1980) and Blow and Crawford (1997) assumed that the demand for 
gasoline could be different for single or multiple vehicle households. Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980) report similar price elasticities while Blow and Crawford (1997) find a 
statistically insignificant estimate for multiple-vehicle households. It is, however, plausible that 
a household with multiple personal vehicles will drive its more fuel efficient vehicle more in 
response to a rise in the price of fuel. Therefore, multiple-vehicle households may actually 
respond more to a price change than a single vehicle household. This hypothesis is supported 
by Bomberg and Kockelman (2007), who carried out a questionnaire survey to understand the 
response of consumers to the gasoline price rise in 2005, and report that households indeed 
drove their most fuel efficient vehicles more. 
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Bomberg and Kockelman (2007) also report that car-pooling or ride-sharing was one of the 
responses of households during the price rise in 2005. The ability of a household to share a ride 
may depend on the composition of the household and therefore the response of households to a 
change in price could also be different depending on household composition. A larger 
household, in general, may have more options at its disposal to rearrange its travel pattern, and 
may therefore be more price responsive. Thus, there are some a priori expectations as to how 
different households may respond to a price or income change, although the effect of income is 
not clear. 
4.5 Motivation for Research on Gasoline Demand and Modelling Methodology 
Table 4.4 lists the conclusions from applicable studies on how the price and income elasticities 
of demand vary depending on income. The effect of income on income elasticities of gasoline 
demand is clear from these studies. As explained, there are different plausible responses to a 
price increase and accordingly different studies report different conclusions. However, all these 
econometric models, which report the variation of price elasticity with respect to income or 
income groups, fail to incorporate the fact that households in the higher income groups could 
be different from those in lower income groups not only on the basis of household income. 67 A 
price and income interaction term tells us the difference in price elasticities of two similar 
households that differ in income only. Yet, a higher income household, in general, will tend to 
be a bigger household, is more likely to be located in a non-rural setting and is also likely to 
own more vehicles (US Department of Labor 2005). All these factors could have an effect on 
the price or income response of the households. Therefore clustering the households on the 
basis of income and reporting the price elasticity on the basis of only the mean income of the 
group could give an incorrect elasticity estimate. The plausible behavioural responses for 
different socio-economic groups were also not investigated in one, comprehensive gasoline 
demand model. 
This dissertation follows two different approaches to model gasoline demand such that 
different behavioural responses for different groups can be modelled. In the first approach, 
aggregate time-series data for five income quintiles is used. This type of model has an 
underlying assumption that the gasoline consumption and other explanatory factors for 
different quintiles are representative of an average household in that quintile. Similar aggregate 
time-series modelling techniques are also applied for groups based on urban and rural 
67 Greening et. al. (1995) and Nicol (2003) could have been able to circumvent this issue, however they 
did not model demand for different income groups. West and Williams (2004) estimate group wise 
models, yet because of the nature of their model, their price elasticity is a linear function of only income. 
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locations. None of the existing studies that attempt to model gasoline demand for different 
income groups have utilized aggregate time-series data before. 
The average representative household assumption, however, may obscure the effect whether it 
is the income that plays a part in differing price sensitivity or some other demographic factors 
that are subsumed in grouping the households together. These demographic factors could 
include vehicle ownership or household composition as mentioned in §4.4. Therefore 
disaggregate modelling techniques are employed in the second model. Unlike other 
disaggregate studies, interactions between price and income with socio-economic variables are 
introduced to model the possible differences in responses by different types of households. 
Since pure cross-sectional data for one time period could be unreliable (§4.2.4), a small time- 
series of disaggregate household level data will be used. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter reviews the literature on gasoline demand modeling techniques. Effect of different 
model structures, explanatory variables, data types, functional forms and treatment of time are 
discussed. Plausible differences among the households in their responses to a change in price 
or income change are identified. Households may have different responses depending on their 
income, location, vehicle holdings and other demographic factors. Although there is a large 
literature on gasoline demand modeling for specific countries, studies that model different 
elasticities for different socio-economic groups or regions are very few. The limitations of 
these disaggregate models for the current objective of analyzing the burden distribution and the 
motivation for further investigation into gasoline demand for different socio-economic groups 
is presented. The next three chapters estimate gasoline demand models to incorporate 
differences in responses by different types of households. 
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CHAPTER 5 
MODELLING GASOLINE DEMAND USING 
AGGREGATE DATA 
5.1 Introduction 
The reviews on tradable carbon permits (Chapter 2) and measurement of equity analysis 
(Chapter 3) reveal that fuel demand models are necessary to determine the price of permits as 
well as the distribution of burdens. The review of fuel demand models in the previous chapter 
(Chapter 4) indicates that different households could have different responses to the same 
increase in the price of gasoline. The literature that attempts to model these differences in 
behaviour, however, is very small. All of the studies that model different elasticities for 
different socio-economic groups utilize cross-sectional household level data. Most of these 
gasoline demand models have an interaction term between price and income and simply use 
the average income for different income groups to obtain different price elasticities for 
different income groups. Such an approach fails to account for the possibility that households 
in the higher income groups may have different responses from those in the lower income 
groups for factors other than household income alone. A price and income interaction term 
gives the difference in price elasticities for two similar households that differ in income only. 
Yet, a higher income household in the USA will tend to be a bigger household, is more likely 
to be located in a non-rural setting and is also likely to own more vehicles (US Department of 
Labor 2005). Thus, reporting the price elasticity on the basis of only mean income of an 
income group could give an incorrect elasticity estimate. This suggests that one approach is to 
model gasoline demand for different socio-economic groups, which is the approach followed 
in this chapter. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 describes the econometric model including the 
model specification and the econometric estimation procedures. Section 5.3 discusses the 
annual data set and various imputations and modifications required to construct the dataset. 
The results of the model based on annual data are presented in section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents 
a model with quarterly data. Section 5.6 summarizes the findings. 
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5.2 The Econometric Model 
5.2.1 Specification of the Model 
The aggregate econometric model is a reduced form model, the most commonly used model in 
the gasoline demand literature (§4.2.2). Fuel demand is modelled independently of other 
consumption in a household. Four variables have been deemed as key determinants of fuel 
consumption following the literature review (§4.2.3). They are the income of the consumer, the 
price of fuel, the fuel economy characteristics of the vehicle fleet, and the vehicle stock. The 
model is therefore similar to Eq. 4.5 in §4.2.3. The next important issue in modelling gasoline 
demand is the functional form of the demand. 
As mentioned in §4.2.8, the log-linear formulation is the most popular functional form in the 
fuel demand literature. According to this specification, the demand for fuel for different 
income groups is given by: 
/ 
G; =C Y 
Y3i PßPi FE 
PEE' 
SPSi ;; ý 
5.1 
Such a model is known as the Cobb-Douglas model. Expressed in the log-linear form and 
acknowledging the errors in the observations, 
In G; r = 
C; +, 8y, In Yr +ß1 In Pt + ßFE! In FE; t + 
ßs; In St, + e1 5.2 
where, G11= average fuel demand per capita for a household in the ith group at time t 
Ylt = average income (expenditure) per capita for a household in the ith group at t 
PI = average price of gasoline at t 
FE<< = average fuel efficiency of the vehicles used by household in the ith group at t 
S, 1= average vehicle stock per capita 
in household in the ith group at t 
C1= constant for household in the ith group 
Eft = randomly distributed error term 
The parameters Pi's represent the elasticity of demand with respect to the corresponding 
variables. Since the vehicle stock and vehicle characteristics (through fuel economy), are 
controlled for, the corresponding income and price elasticity can be described as short run 
responses. This log-linear formulation imposes the restriction that the elasticity of gasoline 
demand with respect to the corresponding variables remains constant throughout all values of 
the variable and the demand. 
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There are other possible specifications that allow for elasticities to vary with price, income or 
consumption. A linear model allows the elasticities with respect to price or income to change 
with price, income or consumption level. In this model, gasoline demand is a simple linear 
function of the explanatory variables and the estimation equation is: 
G, t = C. + ßYiY1 + Ph Pt + ßFE, FEIL + ßsi Si, + cit 5.3 
The elasticities of demand with respect to price and income become: 
P Y,. 
17Pi = ßP; and irr = 8r; 5.4 G; G; 
In a linear model, therefore, the elasticities vary linearly with, price or income and inversely 
with consumption. Yet another form, which has not been used much in the gasoline demand 
literature, is the semilog functional form: 
G=e 
Y1+ +ß1 FEi+ßs1S1+Ci 
5.5 
This is a non-linear formulation. Taking logarithms of sides, and acknowledging the errors 
involved, the estimation equation becomes 
In G, 
r = 
C1 + ß1 Yr + ßPi Pr + /FE, FEir + ßsr Sir + car 5.6 
which can be estimated via the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. The price and income 
elasticities of demand for the semilog formulation are: 
'7P; _ ßp; P and iiy = ßrryr 5.7 
The semilog formulation, similar to a linear specification, results in a price elasticity that varies 
linearly with price: the absolute value of the price elasticity is higher at higher prices. This may 
be a desirable property as it implies that personal vehicles would become less and less 
competitive with other modes with increasing gasoline price. On the other hand, both the linear 
and the semilog formulation imply that the income elasticity increases with increases in 
income (assuming a positive parameter estimate). There is no reason to believe that the income 
elasticity will increase with increasing income levels. Rather, at higher income levels, it is 
more plausible that households already drive as much as possible and are less likely to respond 
to a change in income. Through disaggregate studies, Kayser (2000) and Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980) find that income elasticity indeed decreases at higher income. There is also 
a possibility that at very high income, households will switch from car travel to air travel. 
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Therefore, both the linear and semilog specifications are at odds with these behavioural 
possibilities. 
A linear formulation also allows the price elasticity to decrease with increases in consumption. 
There is again no a priori reason to believe that a household with lower use of gasoline will 
consistently reduce its consumption more than a household which uses more in response to an 
increased price. Rather, a household which consumes more gasoline possibly drives more, 
some of which may be discretionary, allowing them to respond more to a price change. For 
these reasons, both the linear and semilog specification do not appear to be attractive options, 
although such specifications are examined as a comparison. 
The translog formulation allows the price or income elasticity to vary with respect to both 
variables. This, however, requires many parameters to be estimated from the limited time- 
series data available (described later in §5.3). Also, because the dataset is arranged according 
to different income groups the possible interaction of income and price are already accounted 
for and the translog formulation does not add anything extra. Therefore, a log-linear 
specification is more suitable for this analysis . 
In addition, to capture the desirable property of a semilog price specification, suggest a 
specification with all variables except price in the logarithmic form can be tested. 
InG,, = Cl +ßY, In Y, +ßp1Pt +ßFE, In FE, +ßs1 InSl1 +811 5.8 
Although this specification does not appear in any of the gasoline demand studies, it has the 
theoretical appeal that the price elasticity changes with price, as mentioned above. For the 
other variables, the specification results in a constant elasticity. 
In order to capture the dynamic adjustments in the consumption of gasoline, it is possible to 
model a dynamic model as in Eqs. 4.7,4.8 or 4.9 with lagged dependent or lagged independent 
variables as explanatory factors. The small dataset (20 observations per quintile), however, 
makes this problematic. A lagged exogenous model would require at least 4 extra parameters 
to be estimated (assuming 1 lag for each independent explanatory variable), with possible 
multicollinearity among the lagged and level explanatory factors. While multicollinearity in 
itself does not bias the results, in a small dataset, it will be difficult to get efficient estimates of 
the parameters (§6.4.2). A lagged endogenous model or a partial adjustment model has the 
advantage that it requires a smaller number of parameters to be estimated. Therefore, a lagged 
endogenous model is estimated to examine the dynamic adjustment procedure. The dynamic 
model has the following specification: 
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InG; 
t = C; + yInG; r_I + ßr; In Y,, +ßp; Pi, +8FEj InFE; t +ßs, In Si, +S, 5.9 
5.2.2 Estimation of the Model 
All of the models in Eqs. 5.2,5.3,5.6,5.8 and 5.9 can be econometrically estimated by 
applying OLS for each group. Since individual quintiles have time-series data, there is a 
possibility of correlation among the error terms of successive observations. Therefore a first 
order autocorrelated , AR(1) error structure is used such that 
sit = pi st 
, t-1 
+ vit 5.10 
where p; is the autocorrelation coefficient for the i-th group and v, 1 is independently and 
identically distributed with a mean of 0 and variance cr,, i. e. 2 
E[v; 1v; S] =a2 if t=s 
=0if tts 5.11 
Estimation of the individual group wise model can be carried out using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
estimator or first difference estimator, which utilises the Generalised Least Squares (GLS) to 
estimate the parameters of the model (Greene 2003). The Cochrane-Orcutt estimator, however, 
discards the first observation. Since the dataset contains a small sample of 20 yearly 
observations for each group, omitting an observation is not desirable (Gujarati 2003). The 
Prais-Winsten estimator, on the other hand, does not have this problem and allows full use of 
all the observations (Gujarati 2003). Therefore this is the preferred method to estimate the 
group wise models with autocorrelation. 
As the dataset contains the fuel consumption of different income groups over time, it is a 
perfect example of panel data and therefore panel econometric methods can be applied as well. 
However, panel data methods are best applied when the parameters corresponding to the 
variables are the same across all groups (Hsiao 2003). Under the panel econometric 
framework, testing the hypothesis that different groups have different elasticities would 
involve the addition of dummy variables for each group interacting with the explanatory 
variables in a multiplicative form (Gujarati 2003). This is known as the Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) model and would generate exactly the same parameter estimates as 
individual group wise OLS estimation (Gujarati 2003, Hsiao 2005). 
If the parameter values vary by group, as is the hypothesis here, Zellner (1962) suggests 
utilising the across-group correlation in the error term to get efficient estimation of the 
parameters for individual groups. It is possible that all the groups will be affected by some 
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other external variable that has not been explicitly incorporated as an explanatory variable. The 
error terms could then be correlated with each other, and accounting for this cross-correlation 
allows a more efficient estimation than individual group wise estimation. This is known as a 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) or Zellner regression. The SUR method in general 
gives similar parameter estimates as an individual regression for different groups, but the 
estimation error is reduced (Greene 2003). In a seemingly unrelated regression model, the error 
e11 is assumed to be correlated across the groups for each time period. Thus for all t, 
E[e, cj, j =UY, if t=s 
= 0, otherwise 5.12 
Zellner (1962) has shown that the two stage GLS is a consistent and efficient estimation 
method for such an equation system. However, because of the time-series nature of the data, 
there is the possibility of serial correlation among the errors of each group. Therefore a first 
order auto-correlated error formulation is chosen, with a separate autocorrelation coefficient 
for each group. Kmenta and Gilbert (1970) showed that such a model would lead to more 
efficient estimates of the regression coefficients. 
When the disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated, Parks (1967) 
suggests applying OLS to estimate the autocorrelation parameter for each group, transforming 
the original data using the Prais-Winsten transformation and then applying the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method on the transformed data to derive the parameter 
estimates. Parks' (1967) method is used to derive the parameter estimates. A separate model 
using a similar specification for representative households in urban and rural areas is also 
estimated. 
5.3 Description of Data 
5.3.1 Data Sources 
The principal data source used for the aggregate analysis is the Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) annual summary data for the USA from 1984 to 2003 (US Department of Labor 2005). 
The CEX summary data tables provide average income, expenditure, vehicle stock, and 
average expenditure on different items, including gasoline, and household characteristics for 
different breakdowns of the population. Two breakdowns are possible for an income based 
classification: income ranges and income quintiles. The classification based on income range is 
set at nominal levels and are not uniform from year to year. For example, in 1984, there were 
eight groups, whereas in 2003 there were nine groups for the income range based breakdown. 
The ranges of income for the groups also vary from one year to another. The classification 
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based on quintiles is fixed and provides a better representation of relative income distribution, 
although households within each group may change from year to year. 68 Total expenditure, 
gasoline expenditure, vehicle stock, and household size for different income quintiles were 
used from the CEX summary dataset as was the share of people with at least one vehicle in 
each income quintile. 
A continuous time-series of fuel economy for different income quintiles is not readily available 
from a single source and a variety of data sets were used to construct an estimate. Fuel 
economy data for different income groups were constructed from the Transportation Energy 
Databook (Davis and Diegel 2005), Truck Inventory and Use Surveys (TIUS, US Census 
Bureau 1995), Vehicle Inventory and Use Surveys (VIUS, US Census Bureau 1999,2004), 
Residential Transportation Energy Consumption Surveys (RTECS, EIA 1985,1987,1991, 
1993,1997), and the National Household Travel Survey (NHTS 2001, US Department of 
Transportation 2004). 
The nominal and real price of gasoline and consumer price index data for different years were 
collected from the Transportation Energy Databook (Davis and Diegel 2005). 
5.3.2 Construction of the Annual Dataset 
The CEX summary estimates report the weighted average of vehicle owning and non-vehicle 
owning households. Some modifications of these summary average estimates are made to 
reflect the average values for households owning vehicles. The average expenditure for fuel for 
the vehicle owning households can be determined through the following relationship: 
Fuel Expenditureveh«le 
owners = 
100 x Fuel Expenditureaverag, 
percent of households owning at least one vehicle 
5.12 
This nominal fuel consumption expenditure measure for vehicle owning households is 
converted to fuel consumption per household by using nominal price per gallon in different 
years, obtained from the Transportation Energy Databook (Davis and Diegel 2005). Vehicle 
stock per vehicle owning household is also determined from a similar relationship. 
Similarly annual expenditure has been modified to reflect the expenditure of those households 
owning at least one vehicle, assuming that average households with vehicles have higher 
expenditure (extra expenditure on vehicles) than those without. This higher expenditure is 
68 It can be argued that the fact that income ranges within each quintile vary each year could be 
problematic. This could, however, be beneficial as it provides a fixed measure of income distribution 
over time, regardless of actual levels of income. 
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derived from the average expenditure, average vehicle related expenditure, and the percent of 
households owning at least one vehicle. 
The modified nominal expenditure data are converted to real expenditures using the Consumer 
Price Indices (CPI) for the corresponding years to represent real lifetime income. In order to 
control for the effect of household size, the modified real expenditure, gasoline consumption, 
and vehicle stock variables are converted to a per capita basis, by dividing them by the number 
of persons in the household. The estimated time series for real expenditure and gasoline 
consumption for five income quintiles are graphically presented in Figs. 5.1 and 5.2. 
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The annual average fuel economies for cars and light trucks are available as a time-series in the 
Transportation Energy Databook (Davis and Diegel 2005). Since Sports Utility Vehicles 
(SUV's) are classified as light trucks, but are used mostly for personal transport, their fuel 
economy is incorporated in the time trend for personal-use vehicles. The TIUS and VIUS 
surveys report the proportion of total light trucks used as personal transport for various 
intermittent years. This proportion has increased over the years with increasing penetration of 
SUV's and a linear interpolation between survey years provides a continuous time-series of the 
proportion of light trucks used for personal transport. A weighted average of the light truck and 
car fuel economy over the years then gives a time-series of average national fuel economy 
(FEgvgTEDB) for personal vehicles in the USA. 
The average fuel economies of vehicles owned by households of different income quintiles are 
likely to differ from each other and also differ from the average national fuel economy 
(FEavg TEDB). Since a continuous time-series of fuel economy for different income quintiles is 
not available from a single source, a fuel economy estimate has to be constructed from 
different sources, as mentioned above. The RTECS surveys, conducted intermittently, report 
fuel economy estimates for the vehicles owned by different income groups by income ranges. 
The number of vehicles in these income ranges is also stated in the surveys. A linear 
interpolation was used to convert the fuel economy for income ranges to fuel economy for 
income quintiles (FEgRTECS) for the survey years. The RTECS surveys were discontinued in 
1997; therefore, for the year 2001, NHTS micro data was used to arrive at a quintile fuel 
economy estimate. 69 Average fuel economy (FEavgRTECS) of the entire vehicle fleet was also 
determined for each of the survey years. Since the surveys were intermittent, a continuous 
time-series of fuel economy for vehicles belonging to different quintiles cannot be obtained 
without some interpolation. 
A linear interpolation of the average fuel economy of the entire fleet (FEavgRTECS) however, 
does not match with the average fuel economy of the national fleet, derived earlier (FEavgTEDB) 
The quintile wise fuel economy (FE qRTECS) therefore is modified such that the weighted 
average of the quintile-wise fuel economies match with the national fuel economy (FEQVgTEDB) 
First, the quintile fuel economies are modified using the ratio of FE a gTEDB and FEavgRTECS for 
the specific RTECS or NHTS years. 
E, E, RTECS ' gNEW 
FEg TECS x FEQ gECS 5.13 
1 TEDB 
avg 
69 An energy module was added to the NHTS in 2001, enabling the estimation of fuel economy. The 
Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (NPTS), a predecessor to NHTS, did not have estimates for 
fuel economy of the household vehicles. 
81 
These new quintile-wise fuel economies, when averaged with corresponding weights, matches 
the national fuel average (FEQVg"E"") for those specific years. A linear interpolation between 
years, however, will still not match the national average time-series. For this reason ratios are 
used so that quintile-wise fuel economy for every year can be expressed as a ratio of the 
corresponding national average fuel economy (FEavgTED) . RgRTECs is defined as the ratio of new 
quintile fuel economy (FE yNFw 
RTECS) to FEpVg `EDB for both the RTECS and NHTS survey years. 
FE RTEC ;S 
R RTECS 
-q 
new 
q FE TEDB avg 
5.14 
These ratios (RgRTEcs) are available for different quintiles for different RTECS and NHTS 
survey years. The RgRTECSs are then linearly interpolated between the survey years to derive a 
quintile fuel economy to average fuel economy ratio (R) for each year. This interpolated ratio 
(R) in conjunction with the time-series average fuel economy (FEpvgTT°B ) gives an estimate of 
the fuel economy for different income quintiles as a continuous time-series, which is 
graphically shown in Fig. 5.3. 
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For the urban/rural model, fuel consumption, expenditure and fuel economy for average 
vehicle owning households in urban and rural areas are derived from the same sources 
in a 
similar manner. Fuel economy for urban and rural households is graphically shown in Fig. 5.4. 
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5.4 Results from Annual Estimates 
This section presents the results of the aggregate gasoline demand model using annual data. 
Specification tests for omitted variables, functional form, and choice of variables for five 
income quintiles are followed by test results for the appropriateness of SUR estimates. Tests 
for the possibility of spurious regression are presented in the next section, followed by the 
results of parameter estimates and elasticity estimates for five income quintiles. The last 
section presents the results for estimations for urban and rural households. 
5.4.1 Specification Test for Omitted Variables 
The base model is a constant elasticity specification with expenditure, gasoline consumption 
and vehicle stock all expressed on a per capita basis. At the very first stage, a RESET test 
(Ramsey 1969, Maddala 2001) has been carried out to test for the presence of any omitted 
variable which may have biased the estimates. " The null hypothesis in the RESET test is that 
there is no omitted variable in the specification. The test statistics for individual quintile wise 
specifications are 1.15,1.63,0.35,0.76 and 1.57 for successively higher quintiles, which are 
all less than the critical value at 95% (F[3,12] = 3.50) confidence level. The null cannot 
therefore be rejected, implying that the specification does not suffer from any omitted variable 
bias. Therefore the four explanatory variables, expenditure of households, vehicle holdings, 
fuel economy and price of fuel are sufficient to explain gasoline demand of different income 
quintiles. 
70 An estimator is biased if its expected value is different from the true value of the parameter it is 
estimating 
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5.4.2 Choice of Variables 
In order to check the robustness of the chosen variables, the base model is compared against 
various other alternate possibilities with slightly different form of the variables. Results of such 
alternate possibilities are presented in Table 5.1 Model A contains a time trend in addition to 
all explanatory variables in the base model. Since Model A contains at least all the variables of 
the base model, the base model is nested in Model A, and a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test (Greene 
2003, Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985) can be carried out to test the significance of the additional 
variable representing the time trend. " For all but one income quintiles, the addition of the time 
trend fails to improve the model significantly at 95%. The base specification with four 
explanatory variables is therefore maintained. 
Since none of the other alternate models in the following sections are nested within the base or 
vice versa, hypothesis tests through an F test or an LR test cannot be carried out. Instead, the 
goodness-of-fit criteria are used to compare the models. Two such criteria are the adjusted R2 
and the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC, Akaike 1974). 72 The adjusted R2 represent the 
proportion of the variation in gasoline consumption that can be explained by the variations of 
the explanatory variables, with some penalties for each additional explanatory variable. The 
higher the adjusted R2 value for an estimated model, the better is its explanatory power. The 
AIC, on the other hand, is based on the concept of minimizing the loss of information from the 
given data. Lower AIC refers to smaller loss of information and therefore a better model 
(Akaike 1974, Greene 2003 ). 73 AIC also penalizes for increasing the number of explanatory 
variables in the model. 
Model B tests whether annual income could explain gasoline consumption better than annual 
expenditure, as used in the base model. Model B therefore contains reported annual income, 
instead of expenditure as one the explanatory variables. Model C contains same fuel economy 
(FEavgTEDB) for all income quintiles, instead of different fuel economies for different quintiles, 
which was constructed as in §5.2.2. Model D expresses expenditure, gasoline consumption and 
vehicle stock in a per household basis, instead of the per capita basis in the base model to test 
if consumption is better explained in a per household basis than a per capita basis. Model E 
contains all three variables in their original value to test if the modifications for vehicle 
ownership were an improvement. 
71 LR=2(loglikelihoodiarger - loglikelihoodsmaller), distributed as X2 with degrees of freedom = difference in 
the number parameters between larger and smaller models 
72 AIC = -2 xloglikelihood +2 xdegrees of freedom 73 Another measure for goodness-of-fit, which is similar to AIC is the Schwartz Information Criteria 
(SIC, Schwartz), also known as the Bayesian Information criteria (BIC), which is discussed in Chapter 
6, where it is more relevant. 
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For all these additional models, the base model performs marginally better than the alternate 
ones for four income quintiles based on AIC (have lower AIC), indicating that the Base model 
is best to explain gasoline demand for the five quintiles. A closer investigation also reveals that 
the four quintiles are not the same every time, indicating there was no systematic 
misspecification for a particular quintile. 
5.4.3 Appropriateness of SUR 
Parameter estimates and model diagnostics for five quintiles for the constant elasticity base 
model are presented in Table 5.2. In addition to the SUR model estimated by FGLS, individual 
models with first order autocorrelation for each quintile are also estimated using the Prais- 
Winstein estimation technique (Greene 2003). Clearly, the standard errors of the parameter 
estimates are smaller in the SUR estimation than OLS estimation. For example, for quintiles 2, 
3 and 4 parameter estimates for vehicle stock in the OLS estimation were statistically 
insignificant, whereas for the SUR model, they are all significant. Therefore, there is a 
significant gain in the efficiency of estimation in the SUR procedure. 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for a diagonal error covariance matrix by Breusch and 
Pagan (1980) examines if there is any correlation among the errors of different equations with 
the null hypothesis being no presence of cross-sectional correlation. The test rejects the null at 
the 99% confidence level (LM statistic = 30.423 99% critical x2[10] = 23.21, p=0.001), 
implying there is correlation among the errors between the different quintiles. This further 
justifies the choice of SUR estimation over individual group wise OLS estimation. 
The Wald test (Greene 2003) for equality of the corresponding parameters across different 
groups in Table 5.2 is rejected at the 99% confidence level (test statistic = 64.93,99% critical 
value x2[16] = 32.00, p=0.000). This indicates that the parameter estimates and thus 
elasticities do vary significantly between different groups, and supports the hypothesis that the 
responses vary for different socio-economic groups. That the parameter estimates vary among 
groups also confirms that panel data econometric techniques to estimate one parameter for all 
groups may not be appropriate. 
5.4.4 Testing for Spurious Regression 
The aggregate time-series model has the possibility of suffering from spurious regression, a 
phenomenon associated with time-series regression. If two variables are trending in time, it is 
possible to have a good correlation based on ordinary econometric estimation procedures, 
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despite not having any real correlation. This is termed as spurious regression and the parameter 
estimates become invalid (Granger and Newbold 1974). 74 
A time-series of a variable is known as non-stationary when its mean and/or variance changes 
over time (Greene 2003, Maddala 2001). If the series is to be differenced to make it stationary, 
then it is known as a difference stationary series. A regression of such a difference stationary 
variable on another difference stationary variable may be spurious. However, such a regression 
could be valid, if the residuals of the regression are stationary, a phenomenon known as 
cointegration in time-series econometrics (Granger and Weiss 1983, Engle and Granger 
1987). '5 
Whether a time-series is stationary or not can be tested through the presence of a unit root. A 
simple unit root test on gasoline demand G involves testing for p=1 in the equation Gt =y+ 
pG1 _t + 
(5t) + ct , where the trend 
6t may or may not be present, and the number of lags in 
gasoline is chosen such that c, is random white noise. There are various tests available for the 
presence of a unit root in a series. Although studies that investigated stationarity properties of 
the variables in applied gasoline demand studies universally used the ADF (Dickey and Fuller 
1979) or the PP tests (Phillips and Perron 1988), Maddala and Kim (1998) argue strongly 
against these tests as they have lower power against the alternative (i. e. the tests tend to accept 
the presence of a unit root too often). Instead, they suggest using the modified ADF test known 
as the Dickey-Fuller Generalized Least Squares (DF-GLS) test by Elliot et. al. (1996). 
Therefore the DF-GLS test is followed here. 
The residuals of each regression are tested for the presence of unit roots by the DF-GLS test, 
instead of testing each and every variable for its stationary properties. Following Granger and 
Weiss (1983), if the presence of a unit root in the residuals can be rejected, the regression is not 
spurious, even if the individual variables in the estimation equation were non-stationary. 
Results of the unit root test on residuals are presented for the base log-linear specification with 
per capita consumption in Table 5.3. Since unit root tests have a tendency to accept the null of 
unit roots too often, Maddala and Kim (1998) suggest using a higher significance level (around 
25%) to determine the presence of a unit root. At the 10% level, 5 groups among the 7 tested 
clearly exceed the critical value, indicating that the residuals are stationary. 
76 The other two 
groups are also close to the critical value at 10% (2.77 and 2.53 against 2.89). Therefore, the 
74 One such spurious regression constructed by Hendry (1980) could explain that cumulative rainfall is a 
better indicator of price inflation than money stock in the UK! 
75 An excellent discussion on nonstationarity and cointegration appears at Hendry and Juselius (2000). 
Text book treatments are available in Maddala and Kim (1998). 
76 Elliott et. al. (1996) do not report critical values at 20% or 25%. Cheung and Lai (1995) proposed 
response surfaces to determine the critical values for Elliot et. al. (1996), but he also considers only 1%, 
5% and 10% significance levels. 
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presence of a unit root can be rejected and the parameter estimates for the model can be 
assumed not to suffer from spurious regression. The DW statistics are near 2, either statistically 
rejecting the hypothesis that the residuals of the AR(1) specification are not correlated or 
cannot decisively indicate that they are correlated. '? 
Table 5.3 DF-GLS test for the presence of unit root in the residual 
Residuals for... Lagst Test statistics 
Quintile 1 
-4.336 
Quintile 2 1 -2.772 
Quintile 3 1 -3.980 
Quintile 4 1 -4.293 
Quintile 5 1 -4.896 
Urban 1 -2.530 
Rural 1 -3.852 
a 10% critical value -2.890 by Elliott et. al. (1996) 
Lags chosen by the minimum Schwartz criteria, as automatically reported in Stata 
5.4.5 Parameter Estimates for Reported Income Quintiles 
The parameter estimates in Table 5.2 are presented for both SUR estimation and individual 
group wise estimation. Both estimation procedures provide estimates with expected signs: 
income and vehicle stock have positive signs, indicating fuel demand increases with an 
increase in income or vehicle stock, whereas price and fuel economy have negative signs. 
Although the sample size is very small and parameter estimates should be treated with caution, 
the parameter estimates are still significant for most explanatory variables. This provides 
confidence in the robustness of the results. 
Taking the absolute values of the parameters, the short-run price elasticity of gasoline is found 
to be the largest (0.35) for the poorest income group, though demand is still fairly inelastic. 
The response to price decreases as one moves across the income quintiles, reaches a minimum 
for the third quintile (0.20) and then again increases to 0.29 for the wealthiest quintile. This U- 
pattern (Fig. 5.5) in the variation of price elasticity with income group has not been focused in 
previous analyses. The only similar study, West and Williams (2004), reports consistently 
higher elasticity values for successively poorer expenditure quintiles; however, their parameter 
estimates for the highest and the lowest expenditure quintiles have very high standard errors 
and are statistically not different from zero. The discrepancy between results is possibly 
because of their use of expenditure quintiles, whereas income quintiles is used in this analysis. 
West and Williams (2004) also considered only one and two person households and used an 
77 The DW statistics has a range of values for which the test is inconclusive (Greene 2003). 
92 
equivalence scale to arrive at a given standard of living. The results found here, on the other 
hand, are for an average `representative household', the representative household being larger 
for successively wealthier quintiles. West (2004) however reports a U-shaped price elasticity 
for VMT demand for different deciles. 78 
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Fig 5.5 Gasoline demand elasticity with respect to price for different reported income quintiles 
for different functional forms 
Individual OLS estimation gives slightly higher price elasticities than the corresponding SUR 
estimates, but the U-shape of the price elasticity is maintained. This is an indication of the 
robustness of the SUR estimates. 
The U-pattern of the gasoline price elasticities between different income groups is intriguing 
and may be a result of the substitution pattern between travel modes. For the lowest income 
group, it is possible that a price increase results in that segment of the population having an 
increased propensity to use public transport and other alternatives or perhaps to forego some 
trips. Households from the wealthiest income group may have less need to respond to higher 
gasoline prices, yet it may also be easier for them to do so, as much of their consumption may 
not be a necessity. These are also, on average, larger households, and may have more options 
at their disposal for ride sharing within the household, or switching to a more fuel efficient 
vehicle. In addition there is a possibility of substitution by air travel for long distance driving if 
the price of gasoline rises more as compared to jet fuel. The middle income groups have the 
lowest response to gasoline price changes. 
78 West (2004) did not discuss the reasons behind this. A careful study of the work reveals that the 
reversal at higher income deciles is a result of the functional form of her model specification. 
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An interesting finding is the statistical insensitivity of gasoline demand to income changes for 
the lowest and the highest income groups. Income may not be a constraint in the wealthiest 
income groups and the income insensitivity of gasoline demand may indicate that there is 
demand satiation for road travel among the households in this group. Also, since the value of 
time increases with an increase in income, these households possibly substitute road travel by 
air travel for medium and long distances as their income rises. Income insensitivity in the 
lowest income quintile suggests that the driving households in this quintile drive for their 
livelihood and essential mobility and therefore their gasoline consumption is a bare necessity. 
An increase in income in this group results in spending on other necessities, rather than more 
driving. Individual estimation for different income groups also shows a similar income 
elasticity pattern. Although not directly comparable, West and Williams (2004) also report 
income insensitivity in both the highest and lowest expenditure groups. Schmalensee and 
Stoker (1999) reported income insensitivity for lower income groups only. 
The demand elasticity with respect to fuel economy is expected to be near unity as, 
technologically, fuel consumption has a one to one correspondence with fuel economy. Given 
the same amount of travel, consumption will decrease at exactly the same ratio as fuel 
economy goes up. However, as fuel economy increases, the cost of driving goes down and thus 
driving may increase, increasing gasoline consumption. This is known as the rebound effect 
(Greene et. al. 1999, Berkhout et. al. 2000), and the presence of the effect would result in an 
elasticity value of less than unity. The results here support the hypothesis of a rebound effect as 
the parameters corresponding to fuel economy for all of the groups are less than unity. 
Statistically, however, some of the estimates are not significantly different from unity. 
Berkhout et. al. (2000) report that the rebound effect and the price elasticity are closely related. 
As the price of gasoline also reflects the cost of driving, the rebound effect (1-elasticity with 
respect to fuel economy) is expected to follow roughly the same estimated U-pattern as the 
price elasticity. Although the rebound effects are statistically not very different from unity for 
most estimates, the U-shape is still roughly visible in the results. However, the maximum 
rebound is observed in the wealthiest quintile (0.25), as opposed to the lowest quintile (0.08), 
which is most sensitive to prices. Alternatively, Small and Van Derider (2006) find that the 
rebound effect in the US has been declining and suggest that the increasing income of all 
households over the years is one reason for the rebound effect being lower, compared to 
previous estimates. In this work, the rebound effect decreases with higher income groups 
among the lowest two quintiles. Small and Van Dender's (2006) estimations are based on an 
average representative household, which may not capture as much variation in behaviour by 
income group as the estimates here do. It could be hypothesized that the rebound effect would 
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be more pronounced for households that use more gasoline, as the savings would be more 
`visible'; since the wealthiest quintiles in the dataset consume the largest quantities of gasoline, 
they consequently exhibit the largest rebound effect. 
5.4.6 Comparison of Quintile Results for Different Specifications 
Results for the linear and semilog specification are also presented in Table 5.2. However, as 
discussed in §5.1.1, the preferred specification is still the log-linear one for theoretical reasons. 
The statistical significances of the variables in the linear and semilog specifications are similar 
to the log-linear specification. Table 5.4 shows that the elasticity estimates are also not very 
Table 5.4 Elasticity estimates for different income groups from four specifications by SUR 
Specification: Log-linear Lineara Semiloga 
Semilog with 
linear price 
Quintile I 
Income -0.067 -0.002 -0.029 -0.052 
Price -0.351 
** 
-0.353** -0.329** -0.328** 
Fuel economy -0.922** -1.035** -0.982** -0.931** 
Stock 0.464** 0.451 ** 0.478** 0.460** 
Quintile 2 
Income 0.465** 0.521** 0.515** 0.485** 
Price -0.219`* -0.217** -0.218** -0.221 
Fuel economy -0.992** -1.069** -1.057** -1.019 
Stock 0.171 ` 0.099 0.109 0.116 
Quintile 3 
Income 0.381** 0.417** 0.405** 0.379** 
Price -0.203** -0.195 -0.193** -0.193** 
Fuel Economy -0.819" -0.864** -0.856** -0.825*` 
Stock 0.475** 0.447** 0.452** 0.472** 
Quintile 4 
Income 0.387** 0.352** 0.376** 0.400** 
Price -0.263 
** 
-0.251 
** 
-0.249** -0.251 
** 
Fuel economy -0.822 -0.852** -0.849** -0.835** 
Stock 0.306** 0.273** 0.274** 0.270** 
Quin tile 5 
Income 0.086* 0.058 0.082 0.080 
Price -0.293** -0.275** -0.278** -0.279** 
Fuel economy -0.749** -0.763** -0.777** -0.766** 
Stock 0.671** 0.677** 0.652** 0.660** 
"' significant at 95%, ' significant at 90% 
a where required, estimated at mean value of the corresponding variables 
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different between different functional forms. For linear and semilog specifications the 
elasticities are calculated at the mean value of the corresponding variables. The U-shape of 
price elasticity is visible for these specifications as well (Fig. 5.1). 
The log-linear specification with price in linear form (Eq. 5.8) is of special interest, since this 
model has some theoretical appeal. This specification also reports a similar pattern of results as 
the log-linear formulation. However, the parameter estimates of this model could be spurious. 
Table 5.5 presents the unit root test of this specification with linear price for the five quintiles 
as well as urban and rural households. At least four of the groups have lower test statistic than 
the critical -2.89 at 10% significance and therefore one cannot reject the presence of unit root 
in the residuals. Even at a higher significance level as per Maddala and Kim (1998), the test 
statistics for two groups, quintile 2 and urban, are too low to reject the presence of a unit root. 
This model specification is therefore excluded from further consideration. 
Table 5.5 DF-GLS test for unit root in the residual for the log-linear specification, except price 
which is in levels 
Residuals for... Lags Test statistica 
Quintile 1 1 -4.302 
Quintile 2 1 -1.998 
Quintile 3 1 -2.707 
Quintile 4 3 -3.181 
Quintile 5 1 -2.699 
Urban 1 -2.315 
Rural 1 -2.821 
'10% critical value -2.890 by Elliott et. al. (1996) 
5.4.7 Results from the Dynamic Model 
Results from the lagged endogenous model of Eq. 5.9 are presented in Table 5.6. The model is 
estimated using the SUR method for all five quintiles and also by OLS for each quintile. 
Parameter estimates between the two methods differ, although statistically the differences are 
not significant at the 95% confidence level. In general, results from the dynamic model are 
somewhat inconsistent between groups. The parameter estimates for the lagged gasoline 
consumption for quintiles 1 and 5 are statistically significant, but have opposite signs. On the 
other hand, estimates for the lagged gasoline consumption for the other three quintiles are 
statistically insignificant. For the individual group wise estimation, on the other hand, four 
quintiles had statistically insignificant parameter estimate for lagged consumption. The 
statistical insignificance for the majority of the groups implies that the short run and long run 
responses are the same for these groups, which is counter intuitive. 
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Table 5.6 Estimation results for lagged endogenous model for different income groups for the 
log-linear specification 
SUR-FGLS Individual OLS 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Quintile I 
Lag of Gasoline consumption 
Income 
Price 
Fuel economy 
Stock 
Constant 
P 
Adj. R2 
DW 
Quin tile 2 
Lag of Gasoline consumption 
Income 
Price 
Fuel economy 
Stock 
Constant 
P 
Adj. R2 
DW 
Quintile 3 
Lag of Gasoline consumption 
Income 
Price 
Fuel Economy 
Stock 
Constant 
-0.406** 
-0.149 
-0.515* 
-1.215** 
0.495** 
15.939** 
0.049 
0.833 
1.903 
-0.049 
0.287*` 
-0.288** 
-0.985** 
0.131 
7.752** 
0.339 
0.855 
1.323 
0.089 
0.129 
0.093 
0.118 
0.125 
1.561 
0.100 
0.119 
0.053 
0.117 
0.108 
1.072 
0.099 
0.117 
0.058 
0.101 
0.201 
1.215 
-0.398** 
0.166 
-0.563 
-1.353 
0.368 
13.583** 
0.121 
0.868 
1.757 
-0.024 
0.502** 
-0.311 
-1.079** 
-0.060 
5.933** 
0.098 
0.877 
1.803 
0.132 
0.189 
0.106 
0.152 
0.210 
2.109 
0.137 
0.180 
0.061 
0.153 
0.171 
1.579 
P 
Adj. R2 
DW 
Quintile 4 
Lag of Gasoline consumption 0.067 
Income 0.263"* 
Price -0.267** 
significant at 95%, { significant at 90% 
0.114 
0.337** 
-0.249** 
-0.763** 
0.487** 
5.596** 
0.174 
0.777 
1.651 
0.212 
0.532** 
-0.255** 
-0.788** 
0.499 
3.256* 
-0.049 
0.807 
2.097 
0.142 
0.167 
0.070 
0.127 
0.321 
1.747 
0.073 0.071 0.120 
0.116 0.371** 0.172 
0.051 -0.262** 0.061 
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Table 5.6 (cont. ) Estimation results for lagged endogenous model for different income groups 
for the log-linear specification 
SUR-FGLS Individual OLS 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Fuel economy -0.798 0.086 -0.814 0.115 
Stock 0.113 0.108 0.192 0.211 
Constant 6.759** 1.181 5.709** 1.701 
P -0.229 -0.337 
Adj. R2 0.786 0.798 
DW 2.459 2.674 
Quin tile 5 
Lag of Gasoline consumption 0.185** 0.076 0.149 0.105 
Income 0.092 0.132 0.216 0.199 
Price -0.340** 0.052 -0.336** 0.062 
Fuel economy -0.555 0.118 -0.640*' 0.157 
Stock 1.047** 0.126 0.0.892" 0.226 
Constant 7.454** 1.386 6.645** 2.017 
p -0.020 -0.013 
Adj. R2 0.819 0.830 
DW 2.040 2.026 
N 5x19 
significant at 95%, ' significant at 90% 
The SUR estimation of the lagged endogenous model, however, could be biased (Kiviet et. al. 
1995). The dynamic model also uses less information since one observation from each group is 
dropped from the already small sample of 20 observations. At the same time, one extra 
parameter is estimated from this smaller sample (6 parameters estimated from 19 
observations). All these factors, therefore, cast doubt over the results from the dynamic 
specification. 79 
A direct comparison of the partial adjustment model with the static model is not possible since 
they have different numbers of observations. To arrive at approximate comparisons, the static 
model of Eq. 5.2 is re-estimated using the same 19 observations. F-tests carried out to test the 
79 A cointegration gasoline demand model was also estimated to understand the dynamics of the 
adjustment process using US data from 1949 to 2004 (Wadud et al. 2007). The cointegration 
model confirmed the well known result that gasoline demand elasticities tend to be larger in the long 
run than short run (long run income and price elasticities were 0.59 and -0.12, while short run were 0.46 
and -0.09 respectively). Due to data limitations, however, it was not possible to analyse responses across 
different income groups. Consequently, the cointegration results are less informative for the focus of this 
research which is on comparing the gasoline demand elasticities of different socio-economic groups. 
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restriction that the coefficient for lagged gasoline consumption is zero gives F-statistics of 
2.458,1.616,0.979,0.610 and 1.629 respectively for quintiles 1 to 5. Since the corresponding 
critical value, F[1,13] = 4.67 at the 95% confidence level, the null hypothesis that the static 
model of Eq. 5.2 is appropriate cannot be rejected. This result and the problems with 
estimation of the dynamic SUR model suggest that the static model is preferred, and is used for 
distributional analysis in Chapter 8. 
5.4.8 Parameter Estimates for Urban and Rural Households 
The CEX summary data (US Department of Labor 2005) also reports average data for 
households in urban and rural locations. This allows the extension of the representative 
household framework to urban and rural households. Estimation results for the urban/rural 
location model are presented in Table 5.7. The log-linear specification is maintained for this 
model as well. The model passes the Ramsey's RESET test for both urban and rural regions at 
Table 5.7 Estimation results for urban and rural groups for two different specifications 
Model specification Log-linear Log-linear with level price 
Estimation technique SUR-FGLS SUR-FGLS 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Dependent variable 
Urban 
Income per capita 
Price 
Fuel economy 
Vehicle per capita 
Constant 
P 
Adj. R2 
AIC 
DW 
Rural 
Income per capita 
Price 
Fuel economy 
Vehicle per capita 
Constant 
P 
Adj. R2 
AIC 
DW 
Ln(gasoline) 
0.412" 
-0.289** 
-0.923** 
0.281** 
6.208** 
0.117 
0.936 
0.127 
0.029 
0.049 
0.101 
1.151 
-8.545 
1.767 
0.440* 
-0.196** 
-0-751** 
0.610** 
5.033** 
0.242 
0.094 
0.181 
0.198 
1.782 
Ln(gasoline) 
0.467** 
-0.0018** 
-0.952** 
0.198* 
4.577** 
0.102 
0.934 
0.128 
0.000 
0.051 
0.101 
1.183 
-8.511 
1.797 
0.246 
0.001 
0.186 
0.206 
1.938 
N 
significant at 95%, significant at 90% 
-0.096 
0.470 
-6.575 
2.191 
2X20 
0.441 * 
-0.0012` 
-0.786`* 
0.679** 
4.307** 
-0.062 
0.447 
-6.532 
2.123 
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a 95% confidence level. 80 Cross-sectional correlation among the errors and therefore SUR 
regressions are supported by the Breusch-Pagan test (LM test statistic = 15.060,95% critical 
x2[1] = 3.84, p=0.000). The Wald test for equality of the coefficients is rejected as well, 
indicating that the parameter estimates for urban and rural regions are statistically different 
(test statistic = 11.635,95% critical x2[4] = 9.49, p=0.020). The alternate log-linear model 
with price in levels fails the RESET test for rural household at a 95% level. 8' The possibility of 
a spurious regression cannot be ruled out for urban households as shown by the DF-GLS tests 
in Table 5.5. 
The price elasticity is less in rural regions, -0.196 as compared to -0.289 in urban areas. This is 
expected as rural households often do not have an alternate transport mode. Blow and 
Crawford (1997) and Santos and Catchesides (2005) earlier found similar results for VMT 
demand in the UK. Although Puller and Greening (1999) report that rural households are more 
price elastic than most urban households in the USA, there are no a priori theoretical reasons 
for this to happen. 
The results for urban and rural locations offer another plausible explanation of the unusual U- 
shaped responsiveness to price for different income quintiles. The literature suggests that the 
price responsiveness should decrease with higher income (Robinson 1969, Gertler et. al. 1987). 
Therefore households similar in composition and location, but belonging to higher income 
groups should have consistently lower price elasticities. On the other hand, the higher income 
quintiles tend to have a higher proportion of households living in urban areas, who are more 
responsive to a change in gasoline price. As the average representative household in each 
quintile is a weighted average of the households living in both rural and urban areas, the 
weight for urban location increases with higher income quintiles. Since households in urban 
areas are more price elastic, there is a tendency for the price elasticity to be higher for higher 
income quintiles. In addition, since it is possible to switch to a more fuel efficient vehicle for 
those households with multiple vehicles (§4.3), they will be more price responsive. Households 
in the higher income quintiles tend to be multiple vehicle households and have more vehicles 
overall. Also much of their travel could be discretionary which can be reduced easily in 
response to an increase in price. Thus higher income households may have a tendency to have 
higher price elasticities. Table 5.8 summarizes the trends associated with each of the socio- 
economic variables over the five income quintiles in order to provide plausible explanations as 
to how these would effect fuel price elasticities by income quintile. Combining these 
tendencies, it appears the association of income with price elasticity results in a consistently 
80 F[3,12] = 0.14 (p = 0.933) and F[3,12] = 3.02 (p = 0.072) for urban and rural households respectively. 
81 F[3,12] = 3.86 (p = 0.038) 
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lower price response as one shifts from the lowest to the middle income groups (across the 
bottom three income quintiles). Shifting to the highest income quintiles, factors such as urban 
or rural location, multiple vehicle ownership and a higher proportion of discretionary trips may 
result in lower price elasticities. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the results for an econometric estimation of gasoline demand for 
representative households of different income quintiles. This was the first attempt to model 
gasoline demand for different groups using time-series data for different groups. The results of 
this model should be treated with caution since the size of the estimation sample is small (20 
observations, 5 parameters). Results show that the response of households from different 
income groups or location based groups can indeed be different and thus may lead to 
differences in household burden estimations from a tradable permit policy to reduce carbon 
emissions or gasoline consumption. A model for representative urban and rural households 
confirms the hypothesis (§4.4) that the price elasticity for urban regions is larger than that of 
rural regions. The income quintile based model reports that the representative household in the 
highest quintile can be income insensitive, indicating possible demand satiation in that group. 
The absolute price elasticity for the lowest income quintile is the highest; the elasticity then 
decreases with higher income, reaches a minimum and then increases again until the highest 
quintile. This unusual shape could be a result of more urban and more multi vehicle 
households and larger households in the higher income quintiles. These hypotheses however 
could not be tested with the aggregate data. The aggregate model is also limited by the 
assumption that all households in a quintile are homogenous and can be adequately represented 
by the average household of the group. The gasoline demand model with disaggregate 
household level data in the next chapter relaxes this assumption and investigates the possibly 
different effects various demographic variables can have on the elasticities of gasoline demand. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MODELLING GASOLINE DEMAND USING 
DISAGGREGATE DATA 
6.1 Introduction 
The U-shaped price elasticity pattern found in the aggregate analysis may mask some of the 
underlying heterogeneity between households. The results in Chapter 5 are possible if the 
household's response to a price change depends not only on income but also on vehicle 
ownership, location, household size and other possible inter-group differences. The average 
representative household assumption used in Chapter 5 obscures the effect of whether income 
causes the differing price sensitivity or some other demographic factors of those groups. In this 
chapter, a household level panel dataset is used to determine disaggregate gasoline demand. 
The econometric model incorporates various interactions terms so that the effect of different 
demographic and location variables on price and income elasticity can be directly 
accommodated. Specifically, the literature review in Chapter 4 and the aggregate model in 
Chapter 5 suggest that the presence of multiple vehicles or more members in a household could 
increase the price responsiveness of a household. These possibilities are explored in this 
chapter. The disaggregate modelling of gasoline demand will also allow a better understanding 
of the distribution of burden (from permit trading) among households where different 
households can have different responses, which is a more realistic possibility. 
The chapter starts with a description of the econometric model in section 6.2. The description 
includes the functional form of the model as well as the explanatory variables included. The 
source of the dataset and imputations are described in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 contains various 
aspects of estimation. This section briefly describes the panel data techniques used, and the 
issues of collinearity and selectivity bias as applied to the current model. Section 6.5 presents 
the results of the disaggregate model including various tests. A distribution of elasticities for 
the households present in the 2002 CEX dataset is presented in section 6.6. Section 6.7 makes 
two observations on gasoline demand models using household level data and puts these 
elasticity estimates in the wider context of the gasoline demand literature. Section 6.8 
summarizes the findings. 
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6.2 The Econometric Model 
6.2.1 Specification of the Model 
Studies that use disaggregate household level data to derive gasoline demand utilize the 
household production theory by Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966). Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980) first utilized this framework, which was later followed by Greening et. al. 
(1995), Puller and Greening (1999) and Kayser (2000) as well. In this framework, a household 
derives utility from the transportation services produced by itself through a combination of 
inputs such as gasoline, number of vehicles, other goods (e. g. public transport, walking etc. ) 
and own time. The gasoline demand decision is taken by maximizing household utility subject 
to the constraints of production technology (e. g. fuel economy, vehicle characteristics etc. ), 
price, income and preferences (Archibald and Gillingham 1980,1981). This results in a 
demand specification which is a function of the price of gasoline, income, vehicle 
characteristics, and household characteristics. 
A linear or semilog function in price and income forces the absolute value of the elasticity with 
respect to a variable to always increase as the magnitude of that variable increases. None of 
these specifications are flexible to accommodate the possibility that the absolute elasticity 
could decrease with an increase in the corresponding variable (§5.2.1). To accommodate more 
flexibility in the specification of gasoline demand, a translog formulation can be used (§4.2.7). 
The translog specification is similar to the log-linear Cobb-Douglas specification of Eq. 5.1 
with additional explanatory terms involving the variables. These terms include interactions 
within the variables themselves as well as interaction with other variables. For example, a 
translog specification in price and income (expenditure) will include (lnP)2, (InY)2 and 
lnPxlnY, in addition to the regular terms of lnP and lnY. A simple translog specification for 
gasoline demand with price and income as explanatory variables is: 
lnG =)3Y lnY+)3P lnP+, flPY InPxlnY+)3PP(lnP)2 + flyy(lnY)2 6.1 
The advantage of a translog specification is that it can capture a decrease or an increase in the 
absolute elasticity with an increase in the corresponding explanatory variable. In addition, 
through the interaction of the two variables, it can also accommodate if the elasticity with 
respect to one of the variables varies with a change in the other variables. Based on Eq. 6.1, the 
price and income elasticities are: 
77p =, 8p +)6py InY+2ßpp InP and 77y = )6Y +, 8py lnP+2,8yy lnY 6.2 
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The income elasticity (riy) can be positive through a positive value of ßy, yet, with increasing 
income the income elasticity could decrease through a negative value of ßyy. Since the value 
and the sign of ßyy is estimated from the data, there is no a priori structure imposed upon the 
variation in income elasticity, as is the case for linear or semilog specifications (§5.2.1). 
Similarly, the absolute price elasticity (rip) could decrease with an increase in income if ßpy is 
estimated to have a positive sign. The only structure imposed by the specification on elasticity 
is that the variation of the elasticity will still be linear with respect to the changes in the 
variables chosen. 
The translog specification, however, cannot accommodate a U-shaped price elasticity for 
different income quintiles. A specification that is capable of allowing a price elasticity that 
may show a quadratic response with income is: 
In G= ßY In Y +ßP In P +, py In Px In Y+/3 In Px (In Y)2+, ßpP (in P)2+/ßYY (in y)2 6.3 
6 2.2 Accommodating Heterogeneity and Other Explanatory Variables 
In this analysis, heterogeneity among households is not accommodated through a random 
parameter for each household, rather it is determined by homogenous responses with respect to 
a few socio-economic variables. Since these socio-economic variables could be different for 
different households, the overall response to price and income can be different for various 
households in the sample. In addition, the interaction and quadratic terms in the translog form 
already allow the price and income elasticities to change with income and price, allowing 
heterogeneity in households' responses. 
It was hypothesized in §4.4 that multiple vehicle households would have higher price 
elasticities and larger income elasticities than single-vehicle households. Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980,1981) acknowledge this possibility and separate the sample of households 
into two different groups: single-vehicle and multiple-vehicles. This method of splitting the 
sample however reduced their sample size in both groups and this may have resulted in their 
statistically insignificant estimate for the price elasticity for the multiple vehicle households. In 
this analysis, interactions of price and income with a dummy variable for multiple-vehicle 
households are used instead. This allows the utilization of the entire sample enabling a more 
efficient estimation of the parameters. Since, a priori, a multiple vehicle household should be 
more responsive to a change in price (§4.4), the interaction with price should have a negative 
sign. 
The residential location of a household is also a very important factor in determining fuel 
demand. Rural households, in general, tend to consume more gasoline than urban households, 
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since they tend to drive more, as driving is the only mode of travelling and driving distances 
are generally longer in rural regions (Archibald and Gillingham 1980,1981, Schmalensee and 
Stoker 1999, Kayser 2000). A dummy variable for the rural setting of the household is 
therefore added to capture this difference. Following §4.4 and §5.4.7, to accommodate the 
possible hypothesis that rural households' response to an increase in price and income could be 
different from that of urban households', the rural dummy variable is interacted with price and 
income. The expected sign of the price interaction term is positive, since a rural household 
should be less price elastic than an urban household. 
The response of households to a change in price could also be different depending on 
household composition, (i. e. number of people and children in the household). For example, a 
two-person household would possibly have more options at its disposal to change its travel 
pattern than a single person household. However, a two-person household with one adult and 
one child may be more constrained in changing its travel pattern than a single person 
household. Households with multiple wage earners may have more options to share a ride than 
households with only a single wage earner; thus, a multiple-earner household is assumed to be 
more capable of responding to a change in price. To test this hypothesis, price and income are 
interacted with a dummy for multiple-earner households. Since a price increase will allow 
multiple-earner households to be more flexible and responsive in their travel pattern, the price 
interaction should generate a negative parameter estimate. The appropriateness of all these 
interactions will be statistically tested in the analysis that follows. 
In addition to price and income, vehicle characteristics and households' preferences also enter 
the demand function. It is assumed that preferences are a function of a household's 
demographic characteristics. Econometric estimation using household level data therefore 
requires controlling for these household characteristics. A literature review of previous 
disaggregate models (§4.3) reveals that the demographic variables that may affect the 
consumption of gasoline of the household are size and composition of the household, number 
of earners in the household, age, race, gender, and education of the household head. The 
number of automobiles, vans or SUV's are also used as explanatory variables; the presence of 
82 other types of vehicles is specified through a dummy variable. ' 83 
82 The data includes fuel consumption data for recreational vehicle and boats; these are not likely the 
major sources of quarterly fuel use and their presence is controlled for through a dummy variable. 
83 Using the NHTS 2001 data, Davies and Diegel (2005) show that the average utilization per vehicle 
remains similar for households with different number of vehicles, indicating total utilization is directly 
dependent on number of vehicles. 
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6.3 Data 
6.3.1 Data Source 
Most of the data used comes from the public-use micro data file of the CEX surveys (US 
Department of Labor 2005). CEX contains household level data for expenditure on various 
items, as well as other demographic characteristics, income and vehicle characteristics. The 
sample for the survey is designed to represent the US civilian population in each quarter. The 
survey contains two separate components: 
a. A quarterly interview survey in which the household is interviewed every three 
months, over a 15 month period 
b. A diary survey completed by the household over a two week period 
The two week period in the diary survey is not fixed and different households start their two 
weeks at different periods. Since it will be almost impossible to collect daily price data for 
each location in the diary survey, attention is focused on the interview survey data. Other cross 
sectional studies on gasoline demand also utilize the interview survey data (Archibald and 
Gillingham 1980,1981, West and Williams 2004, Puller and Greening 1999). 
In the interview surveys, each household is surveyed at most for four consecutive quarters over 
a year and reports expenditures from the previous quarters, barring any missing interviews. 84 
The survey, however, is a rolling one, implying that all households are not interviewed at the 
same point in time, although the interval between the interviews of the individual households is 
always three months. Since different households are interviewed in different months, the 
reported expenditures are for different quarters. 
In addition to the expenditure data on various items, the interview survey collects information 
on the households' demographics, including family size, number of children, and number of 
earners in the household, and age, education, race and gender of the household head. 
Information on the number of vehicles, vehicle type, characteristics of vehicles, and 
expenditure on fuel are also available for every complete interview. 
The fuel price data used here is collected by the US Energy Information Administration (2006) 
which reports monthly weighted average pre-tax price of gasoline in each state. Data on 
vehicle fuel economy is from Heavenrich (2006). 
84 The first interview collects only demographic information and no expenditure information. 
107 
6.3.2 Construction of the Dataset 
Data from the 1997 to 2002 CEX interview surveys are used. Following Archibald and 
Gillingham (1980,1981) and Greening et. al. (1999), the initial dataset is narrowed down to 
those households that have completed all four interviews and those who have not changed their 
vehicle stock during all four interviews. 
CEX also reports the number. and type of vehicles owned by a household. As long as the 
vehicle is an automobile or a light truck (SUV), other characteristics of the vehicle are 
available as well, including model year, model number, make of vehicle, and number of 
cylinders. In addition, the dataset also identifies whether households have other vehicles such 
as a boat or a recreational vehicle, which may consume motor fuel as well. The major variable 
that affects fuel consumption, fuel economy of the household's vehicle stock, however, is 
absent, and had to be constructed from other sources. 
The data on model year, make of the vehicle, model number from the CEX surveys can be 
matched with the CAFE (Corporate Average Fuel Economy) fuel economy database (US 
Department of Energy 2007) which contains fuel economy for different vehicle models, makes 
and years. The CEX data however did not contain all the required information for all the 
personal vehicles in a household, so not all could be matched with the CAFE database. After 
automated matching, only 2,175 households are left with information for all vehicles for which 
a one-to-one correspondence with the fuel economy could be made from the CAFE database. 
Thus 84% of the originally narrowed sample has to be discarded following this method. 
Instead, another source was used to construct the final dataset. 
Heavenrich (2006) published a dataset with new vehicle fleet fuel economy based on the 
model year, vehicle type (automobiles, SUV's, vans) and number of cylinders present in the 
vehicle. This data was used to assign fuel economy for the households in the CEX data based 
on the vehicle model, the number of cylinders and model year. Household fuel economy is 
then derived as the harmonic mean85 of these fuel economies for the personal vehicles, the 
assumption being that all the vehicles are driven an equal amount. For missing information on 
a vehicle in a multiple-vehicle household, the household is assigned the mean fuel economy 
derived from the other vehicles that it owns. The limitations in the assumptions are 
acknowledged, yet this derived fuel economy is assumed to be a good indicator of fuel 
S5 Harmonic mean of fuel economy = 
no of vehicles 
. 
Harmonic mean 1: (1 / fuel economy of each vehicle) 
is the appropriate measure when averaging fuel economy. 
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consumption characteristics of the vehicle fleet owned by a household. 86 After the matching 
process, 13,251 households are left with four observations for each (from 14,441 households, 
who have not changed their vehicle stock, and have been interviewed for four consecutive 
quarters). 
Vehicles such as motorcycles, recreational vehicles and boats are excluded from the estimated 
household fuel economy, since fuel economy for these vehicles could not be ascertained. Also 
these vehicles are, generally, not used as frequently as the personal vehicles. Adding their fuel 
economy to household fuel economy, without the knowledge of how often they are used may 
bias the fuel economy estimates. Also, the combination of a boat and a recreational vehicle 
does not necessarily use double the amount of fuel used by either a recreational vehicle or a 
boat. The effect of these vehicles is therefore included through a dummy variable representing 
the presence of these vehicles, instead of the number of these types of vehicles. 
The price data is required for every household for the period it reports its expenditure. The 
most popular source of price data, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (US Department of Labor 
2007b), however, does not have monthly retail prices for all the states. Instead, retail price data 
are available in an unorganized manner. Monthly price data are available for different US 
regions, for a combination of states, for a combination of cities, for urban areas of different 
regions, or for different city sizes. This is problematic, since different city sizes contain cities 
from different states which may have variations in their prices. Similarly within one region, 
different states have different prices. Since one of the biggest sources of variation in price is 
due to different state taxes in different states, such agglomeration is not suitable. 
The Energy Information Administration (2006) reports the monthly average price of fuel in a 
state before tax. This is, however, not the retail price faced by households. State tax rates for 
different states and federal tax rates are collected from the Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA 2006) for every month from 1997 to 2002. Sales tax data are also collected for the 
relevant states. Total taxes are then calculated and added to the pre-tax prices for each state for 
each month. This price matrix (PJA1`erTc ) still does not represent the retail price since the profit 
of the gasoline stations are not added in. Therefore the after tax prices, when averaged over the 
entire United States (PAftýrTaX ), consistently falls below the US average retail price (PRetall ) 
estimated by the US Department of Labor (2007b) by around 4% to 15% (mean 7.8%) for 
86 Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981) used the number of cylinders instead. The number of 
cylinders, however, could be only 4,6 or 8, therefore providing much less variation than the fuel 
economy estimates used here. Also, the fuel consumption of vehicles with similar cylinders could 
change depending on whether it is a car or an SUV, which is also accounted for in the fuel economy 
estimates. 
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different months. The after-tax price matrix is therefore marked-up by the ratio of US average 
retail price to the average after tax price for each month. 87 
- Re tail 
Retail After Tax 
Pt 
Pit 
- 
P1E X 
-After Tax 
Pt 
6.4 
Since the households report expenditures for a three month period prior to the interview month, 
for every month, a three month average for the previous three months is constructed. This 
three-month average price matrix is matched with the households depending on the state-wise 
location of each household and the month of the interview. Gas consumption per quarter is 
determined using this nominal three month-average price, whereas, for the price data in the 
estimations, the nominal price is converted to real price. 
As explained in §3.3.3, expenditure is used to proxy for lifetime income. There is another 
practical advantage of using expenditure data. CEX surveys collect income of the household 
only twice, at the first and the last interview; therefore reported income will not show any 
inter-quarter variations between the first, second, third and fourth interviews. Thus, reported 
income could not have been used as an explanatory variable for the four observations. 
Summary characteristics of the data are presented in Table 6.1. 
6.4 Estimation of the Models 
6 4.1 Panel Data Techniques 
The dataset traces 13,251 households for four quarters. The easiest method to estimate the 
model is to pool all the observations together and estimate it using OLS, assuming each 
observation is independent of each other. However, it is more appropriate to use panel 
data 
econometric techniques since it has advantages over the OLS. Panel econometric techniques 
allow more efficient estimation and can control for unobservable traits of each 
household that 
may affect gasoline demand (Hsiao 2003, Baltagi 2005). Specific treatment of the 
unobservable variables allows us to recognize that households are heterogeneous and may 
differ from each other. This is certainly a more plausible representation of reality than 
assuming all households are similar, which is the implicit assumption in the pooled model. 
The basic framework in the panel data model is: 
Ylt -xt i3 + a; + Eit 
87 The price matrix is presented in Appendix A. 
6.5 
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Table 6.1 Summary statistics for the disaggregate dataset 
Continuous variables Mean Std. V. 
Total quarterly expenditure 8379.68 6043.69 
Family size 2.50 1.41 
No of person less than 18 years old 0.62 1.04 
No of person over 64 years old 0.42 0.70 
No of wage earners 1.29 0.97 
Age of household head 52.19 16.77 
Nominal price of gasoline (US cents/gal) 140.83 21.61 
No of cars, SUVs, vans 1.82 0.94 
No of other vehicles 0.19 0.57 
Quarterly gasoline consumption (gal) 221.52 180.89 
Fuel economy 21.31 3.59 
Discrete characteristics Proportion of households 
Head is female 43.33 
Head is non-white 14.29 
Highest education level of head is high school 36.94 
Highest education level of head is some college 27.85 
Highest education level of head is college graduation 29.68 
Head is less than 25 years old 3.09 
Head is between 25 and 44 years old 34.49 
Head is between 45 and 64 years old 35.66 
Head is greater than 64 years old 26.75 
One child in the household 13.29 
Minimum two children in the household 19.57 
Located in Northeast 16.99 
Located in Midwest 24.57 
Located in South 34.88 
Located in West 23.55 
Located in rural area 10.18 
where yu = dependent variable for household i at time t 
xit = vector of explanatory variables for household i and time t 
/3 = vector of corresponding parameters 
ai = household specific effect for household i 
e<< = randomly distributed error with a mean 0 and variance a-2 
When ai is considered to be fixed for every household, Eq. 6.5 is known as a fixed effects 
model. The model can be estimated by OLS after introducing dummy variables for each 
household to capture the ai's. Such a model would be a Least Squares Dummy Variables 
(LSDV) model (§5.2.2, Gujarati 2003, Hsiao 2005). The advantage of a fixed effects model is 
that it can allow a; 's to be correlated with the x, t's and still produce consistent estimates (Hsiao 
2003, Greene 2003). 
Fixed effects models, however, have a big disadvantage in that they cannot measure the impact 
of an explanatory variable which does not change with time as those variables are subsumed 
within the a; 's (Greene 2003, Hsiao 2003). 88 Many of the explanatory variables in this analysis 
e. g. location of households, number of vehicles in the household and average fuel economy of 
the household do not vary with time within a household. These are important variables to 
determine gasoline demand in a household, and the principal interest is in identifying the 
impact of some of these time invariant variables (multiple vehicles, rural location, multiple 
earners). The fixed effects model also fails to efficiently estimate the parameters for which the 
variables are persistent (i. e. do not vary much) within a household (Beck 2001, Wilson and 
Butler 2007, Plumper and Troeger 2007). 
The LSDV model relies on the number of time-series observations to increase in order to 
achieve consistency of the estimates of the household specific effects (Greene 2003). 89 In the 
present case, there are only four observations for each household, which is too small. 90 Also, in 
a fixed effects model, the individual household specific fixed effects can soak up much of the 
variances in the dependent variable. The residual variances available for the explanatory 
variables could be much less, especially in the present case, where the number of household 
specific fixed effects is very large (13,251). 
The fixed effects models are suitable when inference is to be made conditional on the effects 
present in the sample (Hsiao 2003, Baltagi 2005). The model is applicable to only the 
households present in the sample, and not outside of the sample (Greene 2003). The interest 
here, however, is not the specific households in the sample, rather, what the sample say about 
the population. These limitations of the fixed effects model make it unsuitable for this dataset. 
The second option, the random effects model, assumes that the individual specific effects, i. e. 
the a, 's, are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and are randomly distributed across the 
households (Ballestra and Nerlove 1966). In a random effects model: 
Yit =x ß+a+ul +slt 6.6 
where, u; is a randomly distributed household specific effect with mean 0 and variance d2. 
88 Hahn and Meinecke (2005) developed a method to deal with time-invariant regressors for non-linear 
panel model, however, the method is applicable only for large observations per cross-sectional unit 
89 Estimates of other time-varying explanatory variables are consistent, though. 
90 Meier et. al. (2001) comments `as T (no of time-series observations) approaches 1, the costs of the 
(fixed effects) model often exceed its benefits'. 
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The random effects model is consistent with the idea that the households have been randomly 
drawn from the population and can be used for inference about the population (Hsiao 2003, 
Greene 2003). Such a model is especially attractive in the context of a large number of 
households with smaller time-series observations (Hsiao 2003). Random effects models also 
can estimate the parameters for time invariant explanatory variables. The econometric 
estimation of a random effects model can be done by the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) or 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) method (Hsiao 2003, Baltagi 2005). 
Given that quarterly observations for each household, while continuous, are not the same for 
each household, it is necessary to accommodate time specific effects. There is, however no 
reason to presume that the time specific effect will be randomly distributed as the household 
effects are, as done by Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981). Gasoline demand has been 
increasing over the years, therefore a time trend is more appropriate to account for the effect of 
time. Also the utilization of a vehicle and travel patterns may change with seasons, thereby 
affecting quarterly gasoline consumption. To capture the possible seasonal effect, which would 
be the same for every year, a month specific dummy variable is included for the interview 
months. Thus the final model includes random household effects and fixed month effects. 
The fixed and random effects models both assume that the source of heterogeneity among the 
households can be captured by the different intercepts allowed by the a; 's (Hsiao 2003). These 
models therefore cannot accommodate that the effects of the explanatory variables, i. e. the ß's 
may vary from household to household. This is a more plausible hypothesis, and can be 
accommodated in panel data techniques, by a random coefficient model (Swamy 1970, 
Hildreth and Houck 1968). These models require the number of observations for each cross 
sectional unit to be at least as large as the number of parameters in the model. The dataset here 
with only four observations per household therefore does not allow the estimation of such a 
model. Therefore the household specific heterogeneity in gasoline demand can only be 
captured by the random household effects. The heterogeneity of households' responses (if 
there is any) to a price or income change in the random effects model is captured through the 
interaction of the variables. 
Since the data has a time dimension, it is important to treat the time effect properly. There are 
two ways to incorporate the effect of time in an econometric model. The first is to assume that 
the error term e, t is correlated with the error term of the previous period, el, -r. The error thus 
follows the AR(1) structure: 
git = P-'o-l + vor 6.7 
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where, p is known as the autocorrelation coefficient and v11 is normally and randomly 
distributed about a mean 0. Panel data models with autoregressive error can be estimated by 
methods proposed by Baltagi and Wu (1999) 
The second option is to model gasoline demand through a dynamic model as explained in 
§4.2.5. Such a model would capture the adjustment procedure in time. Since multicollinearity 
could be an issue, especially in the limited time dimension of the data, a partial adjustment 
model is used (See §4.2.5). In the panel data framework, such a model can be described as: 
YT = YYý, t-t + xii3 + a, + Ear 6.8 
The presence of the lagged endogenous variable in the model specification, however makes the 
GLS or the ML estimation inconsistent, which is a result of correlation between the lagged 
endogenous variable and the error. Holtz-Eakin et. al. (1988) Arellano and Bond (1991), and 
Arellano and Bover (1995) utilized the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM, Hansen 
1982) to arrive at consistent estimates for such a model. 91 They have suggested two methods, 
the difference GMM (Holtz-Eakin et. al. 1988, Arellano and Bond 1991) and the system GMM 
(Arellano and Bover 1995). The system GMM is more appropriate when y in Eq. 6.8 
approaches a value of 1 (Arellano and Bover 1995, Bond 2002). Like other econometric 
estimation processes, various specification tests can be carried out to test the validity of the 
GMM estimated model. However, some of the specification tests, e. g. the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) test for first and second order autocorrelation in the error term, cannot be carried out if 
the time-series observations are less than five (Wawro 2002), which limits its application in the 
present case, since there are only four time specific observations for each household. 
In summary, the random effects model is the preferred specification. A fixed effects static 
model is also estimated for comparison. In addition, to capture the dynamic adjustment 
behaviour of households an AR(l) error model and a partial adjustment model are also 
estimated. Both the dynamic models are estimated with random effects only. 
6 4.2 Multicollinearity 
In a translog formulation, many of the variables can be very highly correlated. The linear and 
quadratic terms on lnP and lnY are prime candidates for being highly correlated. In addition, 
the price and income interactions with the dummy variables could have high correlation with 
the price and income variables respectively. Presence of high correlation does not violate any 
assumption of the regression model (Greene 2003, Gujarati 2003), the estimated parameters, 
91 Anderson and Hsiao (1981,1982) suggested earlier a two stage least squares (2SLS) method, but that 
has been subsequently superceded by the GMM estimation methods. 
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however, may have large variances and therefore large standard errors, which may give rise to 
additional adverse effects (Mansfield and Helms 1982), for example: 
0 Large changes in parameter estimates with small changes in data 
" Low significance levels for estimated parameters, yet jointly the correlated variables 
could be significant, and R2 for the regression is high 
" Implausible magnitude of parameters 
" Wrong sign of the parameters 
Kmenta (1986) suggests that one cannot test for the presence of multicollinearity, but may 
measure the degree of it in a sample. There is also no unique test to identify when 
multicollinearity becomes a problem in the estimation of the parameters (Gujarati 2003). If it is 
suspected that multicollinearity could be a problem, one of the common suggestions to remedy 
the problem of multicollinearity is to obtain more data (Gujarati 2003, Greene 2003). The idea 
is that more data would possibly have more variation within the correlated variables, and 
therefore allow a more precise estimation of the parameters. Dropping a variable is another 
commonly employed technique, however, the variables chosen here are believed to affect 
gasoline consumption, and dropping any explanatory variable may result in an omitted variable 
bias (Greene 2003). 92 
Since the dataset is very large, multicollinearity is not expected to be a problem, despite the 
high correlation among the interaction variables. 93 The use of the translog formulation is a 
standard practice in applied econometrics, where the possibility of multicollinearity is not even 
discussed. Also, even if multicollinearity affects the estimation, the joint effects of the 
correlated variables are estimated with more precision than the individual estimates (Gujarati 
2003). Since the focus is to find the effect of price or income on different areas or households, 
the joint effect is of interest, and therefore multicollinearity may not be a problem. 
6.4.3 Selectivity Bias 
The estimation sample contains only those households that own at least one vehicle. Therefore 
the parameter estimates are representative of only that segment of the population that owns a 
vehicle. In econometric studies, where the sample for estimation is selected following a 
selection criteria such as here, it is often a common practice to employ Heckman's (1979) 
92 Other methods to get rid of multicollinearity include combining cross-sectional and time-series data, 
utilizing a priori information or transforming the variables. All of these techniques are still rules-of- 
thumb, and have their accompanying criticisms (Gujarati 2003). 
93 Although pair-wise high correlation of the variables have been suggested as an indication of 
multicollinearity, in models with more than two explanatory variables, e. g. the present case, this does 
not provide a reliable guide at all (Farrar and Glauber 1967, Gujarati 2003). 
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correction for sample selection bias. Such a bias occurs when the estimated parameters are 
used to infer the character of the entire population, since the sample does not represent the 
entire population. If, for example, the interest is in using the parameter estimates to predict the 
gasoline demand change in the entire US, then the selectivity correction has to be incorporated. 
These corrections are employed by the gasoline demand models estimated by West and 
Williams (2004) and Nicol (2002). 
The purpose of the current research is not to determine the demand elasticity of the entire 
population. The main interest is to observe the behavioural response of households that use 
gasoline. Only households that own vehicles will adjust their consumption of gasoline, not the 
households that do not consume gasoline. It is an assumption that the households that own or 
have leased at least one vehicle are regular users of gasoline, and only these households 
constitute the population of interest. 94 Therefore the issue of sample selection and any bias 
resulting from sample selection does not arise in the present context (Winship and Mare 1992). 
Another form of selection bias may arise due to the selection of those households for which all 
four interviews are available. Sample selection bias occurs when the probability of the 
household entering the sample is systematically determined by the explanatory variables in the 
model (Heckman 1979). However, there is no reason as to why this would be the case, since 
the explanatory variables do not determine which household would complete all four 
interviews and which household would not. Therefore any possibility of bias due to sample 
selection is ignored. 
6.5 Results 
6.5.1 Household Specific Effects vs. No Effects 
As discussed in §6.4.1, the random effects panel data model is the theoretically preferred 
model. It is however important to statistically test whether incorporating the household specific 
effects (be it random or fixed) is preferred over a model, which does not consider any 
household specific effects. Such a model where household effects are not incorporated 
is 
known as a pooled model. The specification test, due to Breusch and Pagan (1980), tests 
if the 
variance of the household specific effect is zero. If this null is rejected, 
it means that there are 
household specific effects that are correlated between household specific observations. 
The 
corresponding Lagrange Multiplier test statistic is 13,400, which is distributed as 
x [1]. The 
null of no household specific effect is therefore clearly rejected. A comparison of the goodness 
94 In the original sample, non-vehicle owning households sometimes report expenditure on gasoline. 
These sporadic events are possibly a result of some specific circumstance (e. g. car rentals), and could 
be 
difficult to include in the current econometric framework. 
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of fit between the pooled model (SIC=94476.17) and the random effects model 
(SIC=81750.32) also shows better goodness of fit for the random effects model. 
6.5.2 Random Effects vs. Fixed Effects 
As discussed in §6.4.1, the ideal estimation technique for the given panel dataset is the random 
effects model estimated by GLS or ML. Both estimation methods produce exactly the same 
parameter estimates. 95 The random effects model was estimated by the ML method, since this 
method gives a log-likelihood value, which allows the testing of the model against other 
alternatives. 
The first stage of the model specification test involves testing of random effects against a fixed 
effects. The traditional test for this is the Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978). The null 
hypothesis is that the fixed effects model is consistent but inefficient against the alternative 
that the random effects model will be efficient but could be inconsistent. The fixed effects 
model here however is very different from the random effects model, since the random effects 
model contains many variables which are time invariant, which could not be accommodated by 
96 the fixed effects model. The Hausman test therefore is not directly applicable. 
Hsiao and Sun (2000), argue that the choice between a fixed and random effects model is 
essentially a question about model choice, and can be decided based on a model choice 
framework instead of the hypothesis testing framework of the Hausman test. Through Monte 
Carlo studies, they also suggest that the Bayesian or Schwartz Information Criteria (SIC)97 
performs the best in the choice between a fixed and a random effects model. 
Since a fixed effects model for the entire sample would contain 13,251 dummy variables to 
represent the 13,251 different households, and all the parameters corresponding to the 13,251 
dummies are to be estimated, computing resources become a limiting factor in the analysis. All 
13,251 households could not be accommodated while estimating the fixed effects model. A 
random subsample of 10,000 households is therefore chosen, which is the maximum that could 
be estimated through the High Performance Computing (HPC) facilities at Imperial College 
London. 98 The random effects model also has been estimated initially for the same 10,000 
households for a comparison and the comparison of the models is presented in Table 6.2. The 
95 Parameter estimates between the two methods vary at the 4`h decimal position. 
96 The Hausman test statistic depends on the differences in the parameter estimates and variance- 
covariance matrices of the fixed and random effects estimations. The statistic could not 
be calculated 
since the difference matrix was not positive definite. This is not an uncommon occurrence 
in the 
practical application of Hausman tests to panel data (http: //www. stata. com/help. cgi? 
hausman) 
97 SIC = -2 *log(likelihood) + 
degrees of freedom *log(number of observations) 
98 http: //www3 . imperial. ac. uk/ict/services/teachingandresearchservices/highperformancecomputing 
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Table 6.2 Choice between random and fixed model on a subsample of 10,000 households 
Degrees of freedom SIC 
Random Effects 45 61337.2 
Fixed effects 10042 140746.9 
random effects model performs better than the fixed effects model since it has a much lower 
SIC. The initial arguments in §6.4.1 for using the random effects model are therefore supported 
by the goodness of fit tests as well. 
It is worthwhile to note that parameter estimates similar to a fixed effects model can be 
obtained through a computing trick. If the time-series observations of every household are 
deducted from the mean value for that household, the household specific fixed effects vanish 
and the resulting demeaned model gives same parameter estimates as the fixed effects model. 
While such a demeaned model may be desirable to determine the estimates of the relevant 
parameters, especially when there are many cross sections as in the present case, they are not 
directly comparable to a random effects model since essentially they are two completely 
different models. The random effects model still contains the household effects, which are 
randomly distributed, whereas the fixed effects model is actually a demeaned model with no 
household specific effects present in the model. 99 
6.5.3 Choice of Variables 
For the nested models, the likelihood ratio (LR) test can be performed to detect the significance 
of additional variables. For non-nested models, the goodness-of-fit criteria are used again. The 
disaggregate model is estimated over a large dataset, and the adjusted R2 is not very sensitive 
to the changes in variables. Therefore adjusted R2 cannot be relied upon to test the goodness- 
of-fit between models containing different variables. AIC imposes a constant penalty of 2 for 
each additional parameter estimated (Chapter 5, footnote 4). SIC, on the other hand imposes a 
higher penalty, depending upon the number of observations (Greene 2003). Fitting an extra 
variable should improve a model with many observations much better than 
if there were 
smaller observations, therefore a higher penalty is justified when a large number of 
observations are used. Burnham and Anderson (2004) suggest that SIC performs well 
in large 
samples, while Hsiao and Sun (2000) clearly prefer SIC for panel data. Therefore 
SIC is 
chosen in the present context of panel data with a large number of observations. 
99 Stata uses the demeaned regression to estimate the fixed effects models, whereas Limdep or 
SAS 
estimate the dummy variable model. 
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The base model is the random effects translog model in price and income with various socio- 
economic variables. The base model contains a time trend and monthly time dummies to 
capture any monthly cycle observed in gasoline demand. In addition, family size is included 
along with two dummies, one for the presence of a single child and one for more than one child 
in the household. The final specification of the base models is 
lnG = fly In Y+/3P lnP+, ßpy InPxInY+, 8ppgnP)2 +, 8, y(InY)2 +, 3FDfemale+ 
ßNwDnonwhite + ßsDschool + ßscDsomecol +, ßcDcolg rad + 825Dle25 + 
ß2544D2544 +, ß64Dge64 + ßFs In famsize + , ßc1Dchild l+ &2Dchild2 plus + 6.9 
, mw Dm idwest + ßw Dwest + , ßs Dsouth + 8R Drural + /3c In car + 
ßovDotherveh + ý8FE In mpg + ßE In earner + ßTtime + 
Y12 
J 
8M, kDmonthk 
where the variables are defined as follows: 
Dfemale Dummy variable for gender of household head (=1 if female) 
Dnonwhite Dummy variable for race of household head (=1 if nonwhite) 
Dschool Dummy for education of household head (=1 if some school 
experience) 
Dsomecol Dummy for education of household head (=1 is passed school and 
some college experience) 
Dcolgrad Dummy for education of household head (=1 if college graduate) 
D1e25 Dummy for age of household head (=1 if age<=25) 
D2544 Dummy for age of household head (=1 if 25<age<=44) 
Dge65 Dummy for age of household head (=1 if age>=65) 
famsize Family Size 
Dchildl Dummy for the presence of single child (=1 if number of children =1) 
Dchild2plus Dummy for the presence of more than one child (=1 if number of 
children> 1) 
Dmidwest Dummy for regional location (=1, if household is located in the 
Midwest region) 
Dsouth Dummy for regional location (=1, if household is located in the 
Southern region) 
Dwest Dummy for regional location (=1, if household is located in the 
Western region) 
Drural Dummy for urban/rural location (=1, if household is located in a rural 
area) 
car Number of cars, SUV's, vans (personal vehicles) 
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Dotherveh Dummy for the presence of other vehicle types (=1 if number of other 
types of vehicles >0) 
mpg Fuel economy of household vehicle fleet in miles per gallon 
earner Number of wage earners in the household 
Dmulcar Dummy for the presence of multiple personal vehicles (=1 if car> 1) 
Dmulearn Dummy for the presence of multiple wage earners (=1 if earner> 1) 
time Time (in years) 
Dmonthk Dummy for k-th month 
The base model is compared against various possible alternatives in Table 6.3. Models A and 
B have different specifications of the dummy variables for children. One contains a single 
dummy variable for the presence of any child, another contains three dummies for single child, 
two children and more than two children in the household. Both of these models are marginally 
inferior to the base model, based on SIC. 
Model C drops the monthly dummies and time trend of the base model and adds separate 
dummies for every month in every year. This can therefore be seen as a two-way panel model 
where the cross sectional effects are random, but the time effects are fixed. The model fits 
worse than the base model based on SIC. 
Model D drops family size and dummies for children and incorporates dummies for family 
types as per Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981). Nine family types are defined in the CEX 
surveys, resulting in eight dummies. This model also fairs worse than the base model via 
SIC. 100 
Model E drops the number of wage earners and price and interactions with multiple earning 
households and adds the number of adults and corresponding interactions. This model also 
fairs worse than the base model, justifying the choice of interactions with multiple-earner 
households (§6.2.2). 
6.5.4 Functional Specification 
Model diagnostics for a translog and Cobb-Douglas specification in price and income are 
presented in Table 6.3 as well. The base model is a translog model as in Eq. 6.1, with 
additional demographic variables. Model F represents Eq. 6.3 with an extra interaction term on 
) added to the translog specification of Eq. 6.1. Since the base model is nested in lnP x (lnY Z 
100 The nine family types are: husband and wife only; husband and wife, own children, oldest child<6; 
husband and wife, own children, oldest child>6, <17; husband and wife, own children, oldest child>17; 
other husband and wife units; male single parent, one child <l7; female single parent, one child <17; 
single persons; other units. 
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Model F, the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test can be directly applied (Greene 2003). The addition of 
the extra interaction term, however, does not significantly improve the base model. 
Model G drops the (lnY)Z term and adds lnP x (lnY)2 in its place. This model performs almost as 
well as the base translog model. Along with the base model, the elasticity estimates from this 
model are presented in the next section as well. 
Model H is a simple Cobb-Douglas specification in price and income, i. e. the interaction and 
higher order terms of price and income from the base model are dropped. The Cobb-Douglas 
model is nested within the base translog model and the LR test reveals that the translog model 
is a significant improvement over the Cobb-Douglas model. Model I contains an interaction 
between price and income, added to the Cobb-Douglas model. This model is also nested within 
the base, and the LR test indicates that the base is significantly better than Model I. Model J 
contains the base translog model except the quadratic price, and the base model is again 
significantly better than Model J. 
6 5.5 Significance of the Interaction Terms 
In the gasoline demand literature, interactions of price and income with other dummy variables 
to capture the heterogeneity based on location or vehicle ownership have not been used before. 
It is therefore important to test whether these interactions are useful in explaining gasoline 
demand or not. Since all the candidate models without the interactions are nested within the 
base model, an LR test can be used in these cases (Table 6.3). 
Model K drops all the price and income interactions with the dummy variables for rural 
location, households with multiple wage earners and multiple vehicles. The LR test clearly 
indicates that the base model is a significant improvement over this model. Models L, M and N 
drop the price and income interactions with the rural dummy, multiple-earner dummy and 
multiple-vehicle dummy respectively. Once again the base model is a significant improvement 
over each of these alternate models. Presence of the interaction terms is therefore appropriate 
in the base model. 
6 5.6 Parameter Estimates 
Parameter estimates of the translog random effects model (the base model) for the entire 
sample of 13,251 households are presented in Table 6.4. Since dummy variables are used in the 
models to represent different demographic characteristics of the household, it is important to 
identify the reference household with respect to which the effect of the dummy variables is 
calculated. The reference household is headed by a white male, of the age between 45 and 64, 
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with elementary school or no school experiences. The household is located in an urban area in 
the northwest region of the USA. The reference household has a single personal vehicle, no 
other types of vehicle and a maximum of one earning member-'O' 
Parameter estimates for price and income (expenditure)"' have expected signs: price has 
negative and income positive signs. The parameter estimate for the interaction between price 
and income is positive indicating that the absolute value of the price elasticity decreases with 
an increase in income. This is also consistent with the theoretical literature (Robinson 1969, 
Gertler et. al. 1987). A negative parameter estimate for the quadratic term in income means 
that the income elasticity decreases with higher income. This confirms the a priori hypothesis 
that higher income households may already maximize their travel (via car) and do not increase 
this much with a further increase in income. 
Gasoline consumption is lower when the household head is female and higher when the 
household head is non-white. This finding is similar to Archibald and Gillingham (1980), who 
reported parameter estimates of -0.22 for female and 0.22 for nonwhite household head. 
Estimates from the random effects model here are -0.044 and 0.036 for female and nonwhite 
head of households respectively. This indicates that the effect of gender and race on gasoline 
consumption may have fallen substantially over the years. ' 03 Pucher and Renne (2003) report 
that women and men are becoming more alike in terms of their urban travel behaviour. 
Converting the parameter estimates to percentage change, households with female heads 
consume 4.3% less gasoline than households with male heads. 114 Similarly, nonwhite vehicle 
owning households consume 3.7% more compared to white vehicle-owning households. 
The effect of educational attainment of the head of the household was insignificant for two 
groups, although educated (college graduate) households tend to use 3.8% less fuel for driving. 
Archibald and Gillingham (1980) also report that households with higher education levels tend 
to use less fuel. 
Households with younger heads tend to drive more, with the youngest (less than 25 years) 
driving around 6.4% more than the reference household. Older household heads, on the other 
hand drive 17.5% less than the reference household. Observing the trend of results for the 
dummy variables for the age of household head, households consume successively smaller 
quantities of fuel with increasing age. Model specifications which use age explicitly, however, 
101 Definitions of the variables are presented in Notations, at the beginning of the dissertation. 
102 Recall that lifetime income is proxied via the expenditure variable. 
103 Archibald and Gillingham (1980) use 1972 CEX data. 
104 Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) show that percentage change effect for a dummy variable is given by 
e'-1, where ß is the parameter estimate for the dummy variable. Generally, e8-1 and ß tend to be close in 
magnitude, as in this case, but they need not be (Kayser 2000). 
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are slightly split with the effect of age. Kayser (2000) reports a negative effect and Yatchew 
and No (2001) report positive effects for younger ages and negative effects for middle-aged 
households. "' Therefore, the results here are consistent with Kayser's (2000) findings. 
Overall, family size has a significant positive effect on gasoline consumption. However, this is 
offset slightly when there are two or more children in a household, which lowers gasoline 
consumption by around 5.6% (one child in the household has no statistically significant effect). 
Kayser (2000) also reported lower fuel consumption for the presence of several children, 
although her estimates were not statistically different from zero. West and Williams (2004) 
report that the presence of children increases the share of gasoline in a household's budget, 
which is in apparent contradiction to the findings here. There is however a difference between 
the explanatory variables in the two econometric specifications. West and Williams (2004) 
consider one or two adult households, and children are additional to these adults in the 
household. In the specification here, family size contains all members in the household, 
therefore giving each of them equal weight. Thus for a family size of three, presence of two 
children would reduce the consumption of gasoline compared to no children in the family. 
These findings with respect to children are therefore consistent with those in the literature. 
Results show that the presence of more wage earners in a household increases gasoline 
consumption. Puller and Greening (1999) also find that the consumption of gasoline increases 
with the number of wage earners in a household. Kayser (2000) found that households where 
the head and spouse do not work consume less gasoline. 
Households located in the midwest region consume similar amounts of gasoline as those in the 
northeast region. Households in the southern region, on average, consume 8% more gasoline 
than those in the northeast. Western households, however, consume 3.4% less gasoline than 
those in the northeast. Archibald and Gillingham (1980) and Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) 
both report that Western households consume less gasoline. 106 
Households in rural regions consume more gasoline than those in urban areas. The statistically 
significant positive parameter estimate for the interaction of price with the rural dummy 
variable indicates that gasoline demand for rural households is less price elastic than for urban 
households. This finding is similar to the aggregate estimates in §5.4.7 for the USA. Blow and 
Crawford (1997) and Santos and Catchesides (2005) also found similar results for the UK. The 
lower price elasticity is possibly the result of a lack of alternate transport modes in rural areas. 
105 Yatchew and No's (2001) dataset is for Canada and they used a flexible semiparametric functional 
form for age. 
106 The classification of the regions are based on the CEX data regional classifications 
(http: //www. bls. gov/cex) 
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Interaction of the rural dummy with expenditure was statistically insignificant, indicating that 
income elasticities do not differ significantly between urban and rural households. 
Multiple wage earner household interactions are also statistically significant for both price and 
income. Parameter estimates when price is interacted is negative, suggesting that these 
households may become more efficient in their travel behaviour with an increase in gasoline 
price. Income elasticities of multiple wage earner households are also higher. Households with 
multiple vehicles are also more price elastic, supporting the proposition that these households 
may increase use of their more fuel efficient vehicle in response to a price increase. In general, 
the presence of multiple vehicles has a larger effect on the price and income elasticities than 
the presence of multiple earners in a household. 
Model G, the other disaggregate model which performs as well as the base model, also has 
almost exactly similar parameter estimates for the demographic variables. Since Model G 
incorporates an interaction between price and quadratic income, it allows the price elasticity to 
vary as a function of quadratic income. The statistical significance of this negative parameter 
tells us that the absolute price elasticity may increase with higher income. This finding is 
consistent with the U-shape price elasticity from the aggregate model in Chapter 5. The 
specification tests carried out earlier, however cannot confirm whether this is a better 
functional form than the base model. It should be mentioned that Model G is not an extension 
of the translog model, rather it replaces the quadratic expenditure term in the translog model 
with the interaction of price and quadratic expenditure. The elasticities estimated from Model 
G are presented in the next section. 
In addition to the two random effects models, results for a fixed effects and a pooled OLS 
model are also presented for comparison. The parameter estimates of the fixed effects model 
are different from those in the random effects model. This is expected, since the fixed effects 
model cannot accommodate the information generated by the time invariant variables such as 
location. Parameter estimates of many of the fixed effects models are insignificant, which is a 
result of the persistence of these variables. As an example, the dummy variables for education 
may change within the 1 year period if someone graduates from a college during that period. 
Since only a few households go through this transition, the variable is not time-invariant as a 
whole, yet the variation is negligible and has little effect on the estimation processes. The 
status of household head may also change for a very few households depending on their 
earning capabilities. Within households, variations of family size are also negligible. These 
small variations do not allow the variables to be time invariant and be subsumed in the fixed 
household effects (e. g. location), yet makes efficient estimations difficult. As a result, the fixed 
effects model could not efficiently pick up the changes of these persistent variables: Dfemale, 
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Dnonwhite, Dschool, Dsomecol, Dcolgrad, Dle25, D2544, Dge65, Lnfamsize, Dchildl 
Dchild2plus, Lncar and Lnearner. Although the parameter estimates for other variables differ 
(not by much) from those in the random effects model, there is consistency in the sign of the 
statistically significant parameters. The finding from the random effects models that the price 
and income elasticities decrease with increasing income is also supported by the fixed effects 
model. The fixed effects model also indicates that significant interactions occur with price and 
the dummies for rural location and multiple wage earner households. Results show that the 
rural households are less price responsive than urban households and multiple wage earning 
households are more price responsive than single or zero earner households, another finding 
supported by the preferred random effects model. 
The parameter estimates from the pooled model where no household specific effects are 
present are more similar to the random effects model. The reason is that the random effects 
model derives most of the variations from inter-household differences (54.2%) than within 
household differences (3.6%). The elasticity estimates in the next sections, however, reports 
results from the preferred model, the random effects model. 
6.5.7 Elasticities of Gasoline Demand 
Many of the parameter estimates in the previous section generate elasticity of gasoline demand 
with respect to the corresponding variables. Effects of dummy variables (without interaction) 
are also captured directly. The effect of price, income and rural location are not directly 
evident from the parameters in Table 6.4 because of the associated interaction terms. Because 
of the presence of the dummy variables and corresponding price and income interactions, the 
elasticities can be estimated only for one specific value of the dummy variable, and therefore 
for specific types of households. Three dummies for rural location, multiple earning 
households and multiple vehicle households thus gives eight (23) types of households for 
which elasticities are derived. 
Gasoline demand elasticities with respect to price and income for different household 
characteristics are presented in Table 6.5. The statistical significance of the elasticity 
parameters and standard errors of the elasticity are also shown. Income and price are kept 
constant at the national average to determine the first set of elasticities. These elasticities 
therefore are for households that have similar income and are facing similar prices, but are 
different in terms of their locations, vehicle holdings or number of wage earners. Urban 
households in general are more price elastic than rural households. Urban multiple-vehicle, 
multiple wage earner households are the most price responsive (-0.577), whereas single earner, 
single vehicle rural households are the least responsive (-0.091). It is therefore clearly evident 
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that the price elasticity of different types of households can be very different. Multiple wage 
earner and multiple-vehicle households also have higher income elasticities. The elasticity 
estimates from Model G are almost exactly similar to those in the base model. 
Estimating the price and income elasticities for different household types at the average price 
and income highlights the differences in the households who differ by location, vehicle holding 
or number of earners. However, these eight types of households do not represent average 
households, since a rural, single earner, single vehicle household will possibly have lower 
income than an urban, multiple-vehicle, multiple-earner household. In order to understand the 
behaviour of these eight representative households, the elasticities of these household types are 
calculated at the mean income and mean price for each group. These are the second set of 
elasticities in Table 6.5. Urban multiple wage earner, multiple-vehicle households are still the 
most responsive (-0.490), although the price elasticity is not much different for urban multiple- 
vehicle single earner households (-0.484). Calculation of elasticities by group means also 
reduces the variation of the elasticities among the households from the first set of elasticities 
estimated at national mean income and price for all households. Income elasticities also show 
less variation. It is however, still evident that the response to a price or income change varies 
across household type. Once again, the elasticities from Model G are the same as those in the 
base model. Therefore, both model specifications show that the rural households are more 
price responsive than urban households, while multiple vehicle and multiple wage earner 
households are more price responsive than single vehicle and single wage earner households. 
6 5.8 Testing for Multicollinearity 
As mentioned in §6.3.4, the presence of multicollinearity does not violate any of the 
assumptions made in the regression analysis, rather, it is the estimation of the parameters that 
may become less precise. The parameter estimates for most of the interaction variables in the 
model are estimated with small standard errors. The only interaction variable that was not 
significant was the interaction of income with rural dummy. However, there was no a priori 
hypothesis that the income effect would be different for a rural area, and the statistical 
insignificance therefore could be valid, and not a result of multicollinearity. Magnitudes of all 
the parameters are also within a plausible range. Still, in order to test if multicollinearity had 
affected the estimates and their inference, 1% of the households are randomly dropped from 
the sample and the model is re-estimated on the new sample. If multicollinearity had affected 
the estimation, the parameter estimates could show a wide swing due to this small change in 
data. The results, presented in the last two columns of Table 6.4, however, do not show any 
significant changes. All the parameters estimates are similar to those of the original model. 
Interaction of income with rural dummy also retains its statistical insignificance. Estimates of 
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none of the other correlated variables (possible swing variables) show any appreciable change. 
Therefore, the presence of collinearity among the explanatory variables did not adversely 
affect the parameter estimates in the model, and inferences made in §6.5.6 are valid. Pair-wise 
estimates of correlation between the variables is presented in Appendix B, although this does 
not provide any reliable guide when more than two explanatory variables are present (Farrar 
and Glauber 1967, Gujarati 2003). 
6.5.9 Treatment of Time 
All the results from §6.5.1 to §6.5.8 are for the static model in Eq. 6.6. One salient feature of 
the static random effects model is that the model derives much of its variance from inter- 
household differences rather than within-household differences. Thus, the model can explain 
54.2% of differences in gasoline consumption between households, but only 3.6% within 
households (§6.5.6). Since the time dimension (which is within-household) does not have 
much variation to properly model a dynamic model, the static model may be sufficient to 
explain the variations with this dataset. Nonetheless two models are estimated to examine the 
time dimension specifically. 
The parameter estimates for two dynamic models are presented in Table 6.6. It is important to 
note that for both these models, one-fourth to half of the time-series observations are lost, 
which could be significant, since the data on the time dimension is already very small. The first 
model is an autoregressive error model (§6.4.1, Eq. 6.7). The autocorrelation coefficient in the 
error (p) is only 0.03. The Durbin-Watson modified statistic (Bhargava et. al. 1982) to test the 
null of no autocorrelation is 1.934. The corresponding nearest critical value for 15 explanatory 
variables, 1000 cross-sections and 6 time-series observations is 1.952 for a 5% significance 
level. The test statistic is thus very near to the critical value and one can conclude at 90% to 
95% confidence that the null of no time-specific correlation in the error cannot be rejected. It 
should be mentioned that the parameter estimates of this model are very similar to the static 
model, giving more confidence that the static estimation could be sufficient. 
As mentioned earlier in §6.4.1, the partial stock adjustment model (Eq. 6.8) can be estimated 
through the difference GMM or the system GMM methods. As Espey (1998) has shown that 
the short run price adjustments in gasoline demand is around three-quarters of long run 
adjustments, the parameter y in Eq. 6.8 should be around 0.25, not 1.107 Since the difference 
GMM gives biased result when y is near 1, a value of 0.25 would not bias the estimations 
through the difference GMM method. The Sargan test statistic (Sargan 1958,1988) for the 
10' For a stock adjustment model, long run effect =' =1- y 0.75 1- y, long run effect 
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Table 6.6 Gasoline demand parameter estimates with special treatment for time 
Model type 
Household specific effect 
Estimation method 
LnY 
LnP 
LnPXLnY 
(LnP)2 
(LnY)2 
Dfemale 
Dnonwhite 
Dschool 
Dsomecol 
Dcolgrad 
D1e25 
D2544 
Dge65 
Lnfamsize 
Dchild1 
Dchild2plus 
Dmidwest 
Dsouth 
Dwest 
Drural 
DruralxLnP 
DruralxLnY 
Lncar 
DmulcarxLnP 
DmulcarxLnY 
Dotherveh 
Lnmpg 
Lnearner 
DmulearnxLnP 
DmulearnxLnY 
Time 
Dfebruary 
Dmarch 
Dapril 
Statistically significant at 95%, 
Autoregressive error 
Yes-random 
Baltagi and Wu (1999) 
Coef. Std. Err. 
0.660** 0.185 
-4.835 1.174 
0.211 ** 0.034 
0.261 *" 0.116 
-0.081 
** 0.006 
-0.044 0.008 
0.036`* 0.011 
-0.013 0.017 
-0.019 0.018 
-0.039** 0.019 
0.063** 0.021 
0.045** 0.010 
-0.192** 0.011 
0.176`# 0.013 
-0.011 0.013 
-0.058** 0.016 
0.013 0.013 
0.077** 0.012 
-0.035** 0.013 
-1.371** 0.417 
0.251 0.078 
0.024 0.018 
0.245** 0.021 
-0.152*` 0.021 
0.100`* 0.012 
0.098`# 0.013 
-0.442`* 0.025 
0.356** 0.032 
-0.084** 0.021 
0.042** 0.011 
0.000 0.000 
0.006 0.012 
-0.001 0.013 
0.031 ** 0,009 
statistically significant at 90% 
Dynamic partial adjustment 
Yes-random 
Difference GMM 
Coef. Std. Err. 
0.721** 0.360 
-4.861 
** 2.024 
0.151*' 0.064 
0.296 0.199 
-0.071 
** 0.010 
0.017 0.050 
0.016 0.079 
-0.002 0.076 
-0.036 0.080 
0.004 0.082 
-0.046 0.056 
-0.007 0.031 
0.019 0.039 
0.036 0.043 
0.027 0.036 
0.021 0.050 
0.458** 0.154 
0.056 0.038 
0.017 0.095 
0.119" 0.027 
0.007 0.063 
-0.132** 0.036 
0.072`* 0.020 
-0.005 0.001 
-0.068** 0.014 
-0.083 0.014 
0.032*' 0.013 
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Table 6.6 (cont. ) Gasoline demand parameter estimates by disaggregate model 
Model type Autoregressive error Dynamic partial adjustment 
Household specific effect Yes-random Yes-random 
Estimation method Baltagi and Wu (1999) Difference GMM 
Coef. Std. Err. Coe£ Std. Err. 
Dmay 0.046 0.012 -0.011 0.012 
Djune 0.024** 0.013 -0.043** 0.012 
Diuly 0.032** 0.009 0.028** 0.013 
Daugust 0.049** 0.013 - - 
Dseptember 0.057** 0.013 - - 
Doctober 0.048** 0.009 0.050** 0.012 
Dnovember 0.022* 0.013 -0.043** 0.012 
Ddecember 0.007 0.013 -0.064 0.012 
LnG lag 1 - - 0.029** 0.012 
Intercept 14.47365 3.164291 - - 
Adj. R2 0.417 - 
N 53004 26502 
Statistically significant at 95%, - statistically significant at 90% 
system GMM rejects the validity of the restrictions associated with the model (test statistic 
37.46,95% critical y[4] = 9.49, p-value = 0.000). The difference Sargan test (Arellano and 
Bond 1991), which tests the validity of the restrictions imposed by the system GMM over the 
difference GMM reports a statistic of 32.2 (95% critical , 
2[2] = 5.99, p=0.000), again 
rejecting the system GMM over the difference GMM. Therefore, the difference GMM model is 
preferred over the system GMM model. 
The Sargan statistic for the difference GMM cannot reject the validity of the restrictions 
imposed by such a model (test statistic = 5.20,90% critical Z2[21 = 4.614, p-value = 0.074) at 
90% confidence level. The parameter estimates for some of the time variant variables are 
similar to those in the static model. The effect of time invariant variables, however, cannot 
be 
determined at all. Many of the parameter estimates are statistically insignificant in the 
difference GMM model, because of the persistence of these variables discussed in §6.5.6 in the 
context of fixed effect models. This model reports an estimate of 0.029 for y, which 
is very 
small. This result gives some indication that the previous static model captured 
intermediate to 
long run price elasticities, since the expected value of y from the literature is much 
higher than 
0.029. This result, however, should be treated with extreme caution, since one of the 
important 
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specification tests for such a model, the AR(2) test by Arellano and Bond (1991), 108 cannot be 
carried out because of the limited time-series observations available. In addition, the rolling 
nature of the panel may also affect the estimation procedure. Therefore, future discussions are 
based on the static model, which appears sufficiently robust. 
6.6 Distribution of the Elasticities 
The elasticities in Table 6.5 are for representative households and do not capture the full 
distribution of the elasticities among different households because the price that the households 
face is kept the same for all of these reference households. Since the price of gasoline varies 
widely from state to state, it is therefore important to incorporate the price that a specific 
household faces, depending on the state it is located in. Fig. 6.1 presents the price elasticity of 
gasoline demand for all individual households in the 2002 CEX survey interview survey micro 
data. The elasticity of every household depends on its total expenditure, the number of 
automobiles and the number of wage earners in the household, which state the household is 
located in and whether the household is located in an urban or rural setting. 10' The median of 
the distribution is -0.473 and mean -0.469. The distribution, however, shows a few households 
to have positive price elasticities as a result of their unique combinations of price and income. 
Similarly, a few households have a short run price elasticity greater than 1. In order to control 
for these extreme values, the elasticities are censored at 99.5th and 0.5th percentile, which are 
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Fig. 6.1 Distribution of price elasticities of gasoline demand for all 2002 households 
pos The AR(2) test examines whether the error term of the differenced model are not 2"d order correlated, 
a critical assumption in the difference GMM estimation. This test cannot be carried out if the number of 
observations in time-series is less than five (Wawro 2002). 
'09 Households with no vehicles have been assigned the elasticity of similar households with one vehicle. 
This however will not affect the burden calculations due to price increase in Chapter 8, since gasoline 
consumption of most of these households is nil. 
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-0.035 and -0.886 respectively. All households with price elasticities larger than -0.035 are 
assigned an elasticity of -0.035 whereas all households with elasticities smaller than -0.886 are 
assigned -0.886. The resulting censored distribution is presented in Fig. 6.2. Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 
both show that there could be wide variation in the elasticities if household characteristics are 
allowed to affect the elasticity values. These individual elasticities for the households will be 
used in Chapter 8 to determine the distributional effect of a tradable carbon permit policy. 
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Fig. 6.2 Distribution of price elasticities of gasoline demand for all 2002 households, with 
censoring at 0.5th and 99.5th percentile 
Income elasticities are presented In Fig. 6.3. Once again there are variations to be observed 
among the households. The mean and median of the distribution are 0.340 and 0.342 
respectively. For a very few households, income elasticity is negative, which is unlikely in 
reality. Therefore, the income elasticities values are censored at 0.5th and 99.5th centiles, as 
with the price elasticities. The corresponding income elasticities at the cut-off points are 0.046 
and 0.643 respectively. Fig. 6.4 presents the censored distribution of income elasticities. The 
red lines refer to a normal distributional plot. 
6.7 Discussion 
The elasticity estimates in the disaggregate model shed some light on the unique finding of a 
U-shaped price elasticity with increasing income quintile in Chapter 5. The results from the 
disaggregate model suggest that the absolute value of the price elasticity decreases with 
increasing income. However, more households belonging to the higher income quintile live in 
urban areas and the higher income quintiles also have a consistently higher proportion of 
multiple-vehicle and multiple wage earner households. It was hypothesized that both these 
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Fig. 6.4 Distribution of income elasticities of gasoline demand for all 2002 households, with 
censoring at 0.5h and 99.5th percentile 
factors could be associated with larger price elasticities and these effects could counteract the 
decrease in price elasticity with increasing income resulting in the U-shape in Chapter 5. The 
disaggregate analysis indeed shows that households with multiple vehicles, multiple wage 
earners and urban location are indeed more price elastic and thus lends support to this 
hypothesis. However, the effect of income (expenditure) is more pronounced when all 
households in 2002 CEX micro dataset were grouped into five income or expenditure quintiles 
and median price elasticities calculated for each group (Table 6.7). As such, no evidence of a 
U-shaped curve could be established using the disaggregate parameter estimates for the 2002 
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dataset. This is also directly evident from the disaggregate parameter estimates in Table 6.4, 
where the estimates for the price interactions with income are larger than the estimates for 
price interaction with dummies for multiple-vehicle or multiple wage earner households. 
The variation of the price elasticity estimates between five income quintiles (Table 6.7) is 
smaller than those reported in West and Williams (2004), which is possibly a result of the 
specific attention given to other demographics. The median parameter estimates (-0.473) are 
also very similar to Archibald and Gillingham's (1980), who used 1972 CEX data to derive a 
price elasticity of -0.43. The similarity of the results for two different periods of analysis 
indicates that the price elasticities of households may have not changed significantly as 
reported in some of the recent literature (Hughes et. al. 2007). It is however, important to note 
the differences in the modelling approaches. Here, disaggregate household level data is used, 
which always gives higher price elasticity estimates than aggregate data, as used by Hughes et. 
al. (2007). 
Table 6.7 Median price elasticity for expenditure quintiles 
IS` quintile 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintile 
Income (before tax) quintiles -0.510 -0.513 -0.474 -0.454 -0.397 
Expenditure quintiles -0.596 -0.517 -0.484 -0.454 -0.334 
Expenditure quintiles 
-0.724a -0.689 -0.549 -0.448 -0.180a (West and Williams 2004) 
a statistically insignificant 
Two significant observations were made from the whole process of disaggregate modelling. 
Firstly, Archibald and Gillingham (1980,1981) and Greening et. al. (1999) would suggest that 
the price elasticity estimates here are short run since the effect of vehicle change and 
residential relocation has been controlled for in the estimation. However, one can argue against 
this reasoning. The random effects panel data techniques do not depend only on intra- 
household variations but also on inter-household variations. While it is true that the individual 
households do not change their vehicle holdings, or relocate, clearly the survey households are 
located in different locations with different vehicle holdings. The parameter estimates reflect 
these inter-household differences as well. Therefore, the estimates are more likely to be 
intermediate run than short run. This belief is further strengthened by the fact that 54.2% 
variation in gasoline consumption in the disaggregate model is explained by inter-households 
differences, whereas only 3.6% is explained by intra-household differences. As discussed in 
§4.2.10, this intermediate to long run interpretation would also be in agreement with Baltagi 
(1983) and Dahl and Sterner (1991) as well. The dynamic estimation process in §6.5.9 gives 
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some indication that the results could be intermediate to long run, although the conclusion is 
not statistically sound because of the lack of specification tests. 
Secondly, it is important to understand why studies using household level survey data always 
report significantly higher price elasticities. This understanding is related to the use of 
household survey data. The CEX survey reports only that part of gasoline consumption that is 
spent on private use. Any business use of the vehicles is thus excluded from the expenditure. 
Since business use is generally paid for by the employer and does not come out of the 
household budget, it is possible that households will not be as price sensitive for any business 
use as they would be for private consumption. Therefore private consumption of gasoline will 
be more price elastic than business consumption. On the other hand, a majority of the 
aggregate gasoline demand studies do not differentiate between private and business 
consumption, and often contain consumption by other sectors (e. g. freight) as well, who could 
also be less price responsive (Graham and Glaister 2002b, Goodwin 2004). Therefore overall 
price response from these aggregate studies would be smaller than when only private 
consumption is used. 
If one is willing to accept these two hypotheses, then some of the discrepancies between 
elasticity estimates from the household level data and aggregate data can be reconciled. Firstly, 
household level data are producing intermediate run elasticities, therefore the comparison with 
short run aggregate elasticities are not justified at all. A proper comparison would use 
intermediate elasticities from aggregate data, which are certainly higher than the short run 
estimates. Secondly, the intermediate run elasticities for private consumption, as measured by 
the household surveys, would still be higher than the intermediate run elasticities from 
aggregate models, which often contain both private and business consumption. Empirical 
research on this subject could be an interesting and significant contribution and is left for 
future exploration. 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter presents results of a gasoline demand model using a large household level panel 
dataset. The hypothesis specified in §4.4 that the price and income elasticities of different 
households depend on demographic and location characteristics of the households was the 
focus of this chapter. Price and income were interacted with several demographic variables. 
This allowed for the estimation of heterogeneous responses of individual households to a 
change in price or income. Evidence of heterogeneity was found through the significance of 
various interaction terms. In particular, a household's price and income elasticity can depend 
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on the number of vehicles owned, the number of wage earners and the location of the 
household. 
Income elasticity decreases as income increases, possibly suggesting demand satiation at a 
higher income level. Ceteris paribus, multi-car households consume more fuel compared to 
those with only one car, as income increases. Households with multiple wage earners also 
drive more than zero or single wage earner households if their income increases. Rural 
households, however, do not show any significant difference compared to urban households in 
response to an increase in their income 
Households with multiple vehicles are more price elastic than single-vehicle households. This 
could be due to their ability to switch to a more efficient secondary vehicle. Multiple wage 
earner households have higher price elasticities than single wage earner households. One 
possible explanation is that these households have greater flexibility in rearranging their travel 
patterns. Rural households are less responsive to a price change, as found in Chapter 5 already. 
In general, multi-car, multi-wage earner, urban households have the largest response to a price 
change and a single car, single (or no) wage earner, rural household has the lowest. 
The disaggregate modelling found evidence in favour of the plausible behavioural responses in 
§4.4. These differences in elasticities offer some explanation for the U-shaped price elasticity 
for income quintiles estimated with aggregate data in §5.4.5, although such U-shaped price 
elasticity for different income quintiles could not be established from the household level 
estimates. 
The chapter generates the distribution of price and income elasticity estimates for the year 
2002 CEX surveyed households. These elasticity estimates will be directly used in determining 
the distribution of burden from the tradable permit policy in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SEMIPARAMETRIC MODELLING OF GASOLINE DEMAND 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters exploited parametric regression techniques to estimate gasoline 
demand, using aggregate time series data (Chapter 5) and disaggregate household level panel 
data (Chapter 6). The aggregate model estimates indicated that the price elasticity generally 
decreases with higher income quintiles, but increases at the highest quintile. The disaggregate 
model, when incorporating an interaction term between price and income, had a restriction that 
the price elasticity could either increase or decrease linearly with income (§4.3): in Chapter 6, 
it is found that it decreases. The apparent discrepancy was discussed and a possible explanation 
was offered in Chapter 5, which has been partially supported by the findings in Chapter 6. The 
functional specifications in Chapters 5 and 6, however, are predetermined or assumed to be 
known. While statistical specification tests (e. g. the RESET test in Chapter 5) can determine if 
the chosen form explains the data well enough, the tests cannot reveal if another unknown 
functional form could have been better than the assumed one. Therefore the purpose of this 
chapter is to investigate the suitability of a flexible functional form allowing a flexible 
interaction between price and income using semiparametric modelling techniques. Comparison 
of these results with those from the previous analysis will also provide confidence in the 
overall results. 
This chapter is organised as follows. It starts with a brief introduction of different regression 
approaches (e. g. parametric, nonparametric and semiparametric) to model economic 
relationships. Since the use of semiparametric regressions is not a common practice, key 
features of the method are then briefly introduced in section 7.3. This is followed by the results 
of semiparametric estimation of gasoline demand in section 7.4. Section 7.5 concludes with a 
summary of the findings. 
7.2 Parametric, Nonparametric and Semiparametric Regressions 
The models used in the previous chapters (Chapters 5 and 6) are known as parametric models. 
A parametric model is assumed to follow a predetermined specific functional relationship of 
the dependent variable with the explanatory variables. In the previous analysis, these 
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predetermined functions were log-linear, resulting in constant elasticity functions. These 
functions are often chosen on the basis of arguments in the literature and theoretical 
justifications, although economic theory cannot always suggest a specific form (Pace 1995). In 
the cases where there are no a priori hypotheses or knowledge to choose a specific 
formulation, econometricians revert to specification tests or hypothesis tests to select the 
correct one among a few filtered options11° (Rupert et. al. 2003). In many applications, the 
choice becomes a result of how well the data can be explained by the competing functional 
forms. A logical extension (albeit, an extreme extension) of this method of model choice is a 
nonparametric technique, which allows data to determine the functional relationship between 
the dependent and the independent variables. 
Parametric models impose a fixed structural form on the relationship that is being modelled. 
These models also restrict the errors to be distributed with a particular distribution. "' 
Parametric models will generally be specified as 
Y=. f(x, ß)+E 7.1 
where x is the vector of explanatory variables, ß is the parameter vector to be estimated, error c 
is unobserved, but has a known distribution (often s N(0, aa2)), and f(. ) is the known function 
(or assumed to be the known function) to the modeller. While these structured models have 
several desirable properties for correctly specified models, especially in terms of efficiency of 
the estimates and inference, the specification is subject to uncertainty in the absence of any 
theoretical underpinning (Powel 1994, Hausman and Newey 1995, Van Heerde et. al. 2001). 
Briesch et. al. (2001) also argue that there is no guarantee that the true relationship belongs to 
any of the competing parametric forms chosen by the researcher, or, to any parametric family 
at all. 
On the other hand, nonparametric models, also known as smoothing methods, relax the 
restriction of a specific functional form and thus provide little room for any specification errors 
(Powell 1994). The relationship in a nonparametric regression is given by 
y= g(x) +E 7.2 
where, the function go is a smooth function of the predictors to be estimated from the data. 
The estimates are consistent under more general conditions than for parametric estimates (Van 
110 For gasoline demand, the competing formats in the literature are almost always log-log, semilog and 
linear specifications (see §4.2.7, §5.2.1). 
11 The name `parametric' arises from the fact that the dependent variables are assumed to come from a 
specific distribution with underlying parameters (Sprent 1993). 
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Heerde et. al. 2001). The advantage of nonparametric models, however, comes at the cost of 
efficiency of estimation (Pace 1995). To account for the flexible specification, the number of 
parameters to be estimated is high and therefore, large datasets are generally required to 
perform precise estimation in a multivariate setting (Van Heerde et. al. 2001, Yatchew 2003). 
The estimation of the model is also computationally intensive and may be impractical in a 
multivariate setting. 112 In addition, the nonparametric relationships are purely statistical 
associations, and are often difficult to interpret in an economic way (Powell 1994). Because of 
the paucity of large datasets, fast computing facilities, and the difficulty of economic 
interpretation, nonparametric approaches have not been popular in the applied economics 
literature. 13 However, Hausman and Newey (1995) report significant differences in the shapes 
of gasoline demand curves estimated with parametric and nonparametric demand curves, 
suggesting that it is useful to investigate more flexible functional forms. 
A semiparametric model is a hybrid of the previous two (Robinson 1988, Powel 1994). These 
models contain both, a fixed functional form for some predictors, as in a parametric model, and 
an unknown smooth function for other explanatory variables, which is akin to nonparametric 
models. A semiparametric model, therefore, will be 
v=. f(x, ß)+g(z)+E 7.3 
where f(. ) is the known function, while go is the unknown function and ß's are the unknown 
parameters, both to be estimated from the data. Within this broad definition, semiparametric 
models can have various forms, such as partial linear models, index models, and generalized 
additive models (Yatchew 2003). These models have the advantage of flexibility in structure 
with respect to the variable(s) of interest and efficiency of estimation for other explanatory 
factors (Van Heerde et. al. 2001). Semiparametric models can therefore be especially useful 
when the functional form with respect to one of the predictors is of specific interest but not 
precisely known. Since a nonparametric term is still present in the model, semiparametric 
models also require larger datasets and computing capabilities. However, the ability of the 
parametric term to control for other effects and the nonparametric term to model the desired 
relationship more flexibly, and the increased availability of enhanced computing capabilities to 
handle large datasets, have allowed semiparametric models to gain more acceptance in the 
applied literature. Examples include Engle et. al. (1986), Pace (1995), Bult (1993), Blundell et. 
al. (1998), Schmalensee and Stoker (1999), Yatchew and No (2001), Van Heerde et. al. (2001). 
112 This is known as the `curse of dimensionality' in the literature (Cleveland and Devlin 1988, Kweon 
and Kockelman 2004). 
' 13 Only two studies examine gasoline demand using nonparametric approach (Hausman and Newey 
1995, Coppejans 2003), two use semiparametric models (Schmalensee and Stoker 1999, Yatchew and 
No 2001). 
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7.3 Estimation of Semiparametric Models 
The estimation of semiparametric models requires the estimation of the unknown smooth 
function go in Eq. 7.3 in a nonparametric framework. Various methods exist in the literature 
for generating such a smooth univariate function, e. g. local polynomial fitting or locally 
weighted regression (Nadarya 1964, Watson 1964, Cleveland and Devlin 1988, Härdle 1990), 
series-based smoothing (Efromovich 1999) and regression splines (Härdle 1990, Ruppert et. al. 
2003, Wood 2006). Of these, regression splines are more attractive since they are 
mathematically more elegant, being a direct extension of parametric linear regressions (Rupert 
et. al. 2003). Regression splines are therefore used in this analysis. The background discussion 
on this technique, which follows, is largely based on Rupert et. al. (2003) and Wood (2006). 
Univariate regression splines are piecewise polynomial functions of the predicting variables 
connected with each other at locations known as knots. These splines act as a basis for the 
smooth function. The basis functions can be seen as elementary building blocks that determine 
how the neighbouring data points are connected to estimate the overall smooth function. As a 
very simple nonparametric example, assume that the data in Fig. 7.1 can be adequately 
modelled by the following function: 
.Y= 
g(X)+E =ß3 +ß1x+U1(x-K1)+ +u2(x-K2)+ +6 
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Fig. 7.1 Univariate smoothing with linear spline, knots are at KJ=575, and K2=600 
(source: 
Rupert et. al. 2003) 
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n0nO 
The locations xf and K2 are the locations of the knot, where the term (x-x1)+ is known as a 
truncated line and implies that the value of (x- xj) is 0, when x is less than or equal to K,, but 
beyond KI, it is a regular mathematical expression. The basis of the model are: 1, x, (x-xj)+ and 
(X-K2)+. To determine the representation of the functions, unknown ß's and u's are estimated 
from the data, using Ordinary Least Squares as long as the location and number of knots are 
known. To ensure that overfitting does not occur, a penalty term is added during estimation, 
with a parameter to guide the degree of smoothness (or roughness) of the function. Once such a 
penalty is added, the function becomes known as a penalized spline. 
Linear basis splines are not continuous, and therefore show kinks, at the knots. Numerous other 
types of basis functions have been devised to achieve continuity at knots, which would ensure 
that the function indeed is smooth. Such bases could be polynomial splines (quadratic, cubic), 
B-splines, or natural cubic splines. The choice of the basis function (and choice of the degree 
of polynomial for a polynomial basis) is subjective and may depend on the context of the 
model, numerical stability and computing resources. Rupert et. al. (2003) argue that the choice 
of knots and degree of the polynomial basis are of much less importance than the choice of the 
smoothing parameter. The apparently subjective parameters relating to knots and smoothness 
can be selected via various model selection criteria. ' 14 Using the automated knot and smooth 
selection criteria, the fit in Fig. 7.1 can become much smoother as in Fig. 7.2. 
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Fig. 7.2 Univariate smoothing with linear spline, with automatic selection of knots and 
smoothing parameter (source: Rupert et. al. 2003) 
114 Examples include Cross Validation, Generalized Cross Validation, Unbiased Risk Estimator (Wood 
2006). 
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Extending linear splines to a more general case, a smoothing equation with a spline basis can 
be written in matrix form ... 
y=Xß(3+Zu+E 7.5 
where, X contains the regular terms of the basis function (for polynomials of degree m, 1, x, x2, 
x3.... xm), Z contains the truncated part (the (x-x)+'s), ß and u are corresponding parameters, 
and E is random error, distributed normally with a variance a.. 2. The penalized spline fitting 
criteria, then, is to minimize (y - Xß - Zu)T(y - X/3 - Zu) + 22uTU, where '12uTU is the penalty 
term to restrict overfitting, which is governed by the choice of A, the smoothing parameter. ' 16 
Treating u as fixed parameters makes Eq. 7.5 an ordinary least squares regression. On the other 
hand, treating u as normally distributed random coefficients with a variance au2 results in the 
mixed model representation of the penalized regression spline. Mixed models are an extension 
of traditional parametric regression models, but contain a fixed and a random component in the 
same model. The random effects panel data model described in Chapter 6 is a special case of a 
mixed model where X was the explanatory variables, /f fixed parameters, u was randomly 
distributed parameters and Z was a matrix containing dummy variables for each household, 
such that Zu became the random intercepts for different households, the a's. 
The mixed model representation of the smooth function imposes a structure that u's are 
normally distributed, but this constraint has its own advantages. If u's are estimated as fixed 
parameters the resulting function tends to overfit the data; whereas, constraining u's to have a 
distribution with finite variance makes the function smoother (Rupert et. al. 2003). The mixed 
model representation also allows the estimation to be carried out using statistical software 
packages, such as SAS, S-Plus and R. Moreover, the estimation of the smoothing parameter A 
can be carried out directly since A has a direct correspondence with au2 and 6E2 (Rupert et. al. 
2003). Finally, the mixed model representation allows the estimation of the nonparametric 
smooth with parametric components simultaneously to estimate a semiparametric model. This 
is evident from Eq. 7.5, where the matrix X can contain additional explanatory factors other 
than the basis functions, without any extra assumptions or constraints. Similarly, other 
explanatory variables that may have a parameter vector distributed randomly can be 
accommodated by the vectors Z and u. 
Estimation of nonparametric or semiparametric models under the mixed model framework can 
be carried out by Maximum Likelihood (ML) or Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) 
115 The bold face is used to indicate the vector or matrix form of data. 
116 In a simple linear regression y= XQ + c, the fitting criteria is to minimize (y - XQ)T (y - Xß). 
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methods. Both these techniques can be used to automatically select the smoothing parameter A 
through the estimation of a2 and °E2, which are routine estimates in ML or REML methods 
available in statistical packages. Although ML estimates can be biased in small samples, in 
large samples there is little difference between the two methods (Rupert et. al. 2003). 
The univariate smoothing concept in the preceding paragraphs can be extended to a bivariate 
(or a multivariate) case in two different ways. Firstly, there could be two univariate functions 
in different variables simply added together, resulting in an additive model. If the two variables 
do not interact with each other, i. e. the smooth function of one variable does not depend on the 
other variable, then this additive model is the preferred model. The basis functions described 
above can be used directly for each smooth term. If, on the other hand, there is an interaction 
among the variables, then a simultaneous smoothing with respect to the variables is required. 
Such a bivariate flexible interaction can be modelled through a thin-plate regression basis or a 
tensor-product basis (Wood 2006, Rupert et. al. 2003), which are direct extensions of the 
univariate basis functions in two dimensions. Thin plate splines are invariant to any changes in 
the rotation of the coordinates of the explanatory variables and are especially suited for the 
geographical application, but are computationally expensive. Tensor-product basis are more 
suitable when the explanatory variables represent two different entities which could be in 
different scale or in different units (Wood 2006). They are also computationally less 
demanding as compared to thin plate regression splines. Since the variables of interest, e. g. 
price and income, represent two different entities and may have different scales associated with 
them, tensor-product bases are suited for the present analysis. "' 
The bivariate semiparametric models with tensor-product or thin plate basis can still be 
estimated under the mixed model representation through REML or ML. It is, however, 
important to note that not all forms of smoothing can be represented in the mixed model 
framework. Local polynomial fitting and series based smoothing are two such examples. 
Similarly, the mixed model representation is not the only way to estimate a semiparametric 
model with a bivariate smoothing. There are other techniques available for a bivariate or a 
multivariate smoothing along with the estimation of the parametric components, e. g. Penalized 
Iterated Reweighted Least Squares (P-IRLS, Wood 2006), backfitting (Hastie and Tibshirani 
1990, Hastie and Tibshirani 2000) or differencing (Yatchew 2003). The reason why the mixed 
model representation is so appealing over other methods in the present context is its ability to 
accommodate the panel nature of the data and to treat group specific effects as random 
parameters through Z and u. Such a model, with unit specific random effects to account for the 
117 The conversion of variables to logarithms, however, alleviates the relative scale argument, and 
computational advantages become more critical. 
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heterogeneity between the units, is known as a semiparametric mixed model (Rupert et. al. 
2003). 
7.4 Semiparametric Modelling of Gasoline Demand 
Examples of using flexible functional forms in the gasoline demand literature is sparse. 
Hausman and Newey (1995) followed a nonparametric approach to report that the results 
between parametric and nonparametric models may differ significantly. On the other hand, 
only two studies used semiparametric regression methods in estimating gasoline demand. 
Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) estimated the household gasoline demand in the USA with 
bivariate smoothing with respect to age and income jointly. They, however, reported that a 
bivariate nonparametric estimation is not necessary and concluded that additive univariate 
smooths in income and age are sufficient. Lack of price data precluded them from determining 
a price elasticity, which is the main interest of the current work. They also prefer the 
semiparametric technique to a parametric specification search. Yatchew and No (2001), on the 
other hand, modelled the interaction of gasoline price and age of household head with a 
flexible specification, with income and other demographics entering parametrically. Their 
model indicates that age and price both could have a non-linear effect on gasoline 
consumption, which could not have been revealed by a simple Cobb-Douglas type parametric 
regression. A flexible and continuous interaction between income and price, however, is still 
absent in the literature. 
Following Schmalensee and Stoker (1999) and Yatchew and No (2001), a partial linear 
specification is used to model gasoline demand. In the partial linear model, the parametric term 
in Eq. 7.3, f(x, ß) is a linear function in ß. A pure nonparametric approach has not been used 
since the computational burden would have been enormous because of the presence of the 
many explanatory factors. The semiparametric econometric model is similar to the log-linear 
parametric model (Eq. 6.9). All the explanatory factors from Eq. 6.9 except the translog price 
and income terms (lnP, lnY, lnP xlnY, (lnP)2 and (1nY)2) enter the semiparametric model in a 
parametric form. The variables of interest, logarithms of price and income (expenditure), 
interact in a flexible, nonparametric way. Thus the formulation is: 
LnG =f(demographics and parametric interactions) + g(lnP, lnY)118 7.6 
All the variables are measured for each quarter, similar to Chapter 6. This model can be 
estimated through ML, REML, P-IRLS, backfitting or differencing techniques provided that 
the dataset was not a panel dataset. The panel structure of the current dataset, however, offers 
18 Note that g(lnP) + g(lnY) would refer to an additive model with no interactions between the 
variables. 
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the opportunity to control for individual household specific heterogeneity, as in the random 
effects model in Chapter 6. And the only model that would allow a random household specific 
effects in the classical semiparametric approach is the semiparametric mixed model. "9 
7.5 Results 
7.5.1 Comparison of Semiparametric Estimation Methods with a Simple Pooled Model 
The mixed model representation of semiparametric models makes estimation more tractable 
and attractive. However, there has not been any definitive work on whether the selection of 
the smoothing parameter is better with ML or REML in a mixed model; as opposed to the 
model selection criteria used in other semiparametric models (Rupert et. al. 2003). Since the 
selection of smoothing parameter may critically affect the fit of the function in different 
methods, it is important to compare the results of mixed model based estimates with other 
methods before proceeding to a preferred specification. 
As mentioned earlier, other estimation methods cannot accommodate the random household 
effects; therefore, the comparison has to be made on the basis of the pooled model presented in 
Chapter 6 (Table 6.3). Table 7.1 presents the parameter estimates of the pooled semiparametric 
model. Three different estimation techniques have been used: 
I. P-IRLS estimation with smoothing parameter choice by GCV, 
2. ML estimation with smoothing parameter choice by ML, and 
3. REML estimation with smoothing parameter choice by REML. 
Table 7.1 Comparison of different estimation methods of semiparametric model for full 
sample, but no household specific effect 
Model type Semiparametric Parametric 
Smoothing type Bivariate Bivariate Bivariate 
Household effect None None None None 
Mixed model- Mixed model- OLS Estimation method P-IRLS ML REML 
Approximate significance of smooth term 
F statistic (p-value) 117.3 (0.000) 123.0 (0.000) 123.1 (0.000) 
Model diagnostics 
Adj. R2 0.418 0.418 0.418 0.417 
Log-likelihood -46980.39 -47003.15 -47154.04 -47004.2 
AIC 94063.58 94094.3 94396.09 94094.41 
BIC 94514.96 94484.93 94786.69 94476.17 
N 53004 53004 53004 53004 
119 In the Bayesian framework, these models have been estimated by Hastie and Tibshirani (2000). 
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The parameter estimates are almost indistinguishable for all three estimation techniques. All 
three models have similar explanatory power as evident by their adjusted R2 (all 0.418). For 
reasons explained before (§6.5.2), the Schwartz or Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) is 
chosen over the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) in comparing the models. Accordingly, the 
ML estimation results in the best model, as it has the lowest BIC of all. A comparison of the 
pooled parametric model with the semiparametric models shows that the estimates of the 
parametric parts are very similar (Appendix Q. Specific discussions on the parameter values 
are not presented here, since the purpose of this subsection is to compare the different 
estimation methods only, and the focus is not on the individual parameter estimates. 
For the nonparametric part of the semiparametric model, no parameter estimates are possible, 
therefore bivariate smooth predictions of InG are plotted with respect to the two explanatory 
variables, InY and InP, in Figs. 7.3 and 7.4.120 Fig. 7.3 depicts the predictions in a three- 
dimensional view. Visually, there appears to be no significant differences between the 
prediction performances of the three methods. Fig. 7.4 presents the plots in a contour view, 
where each curve in the plot traces a specific value of predicted InG. 12' Again, the plots are 
very similar, except at very high incomes, where the P-IRLS predictions are slightly different 
from the ML and REML predictions of the mixed model representation. That income, 
however, is relatively very high (more than US$ 162,000). In semiparametric models, the 
smooth can be affected by such outliers, and it indicates that that the performance of models at 
the higher income end could be slightly different. 
The estimation of all semiparametric models was carried out through the `mgcv' package 
(Wood 2007) in statistical platform R. 
7.5.2 Limitations of Computing Resources 
The comparison of various semiparametric estimation methods for the pooled model provides 
confidence that the semiparametric model estimation in the mixed model setup produce similar 
results as other techniques and thus the mixed model framework can be used to estimate a 
gasoline demand model semiparametrically. The next step is the estimation of the preferred 
model, one with random effects for households as well as a bivariate smooth in lnP and lnY. 
Unfortunately, this is where computing resource constraints limit the analysis as 
semiparametric and nonparametric estimation techniques are computationally intensive (§7.3). 
The addition of the random household effect to the semiparametric model substantially 
increases the computational burden. While the estimation of the pooled model could be carried 
120 Note that Y is measured on a quarterly basis. 
121 The term contour is used in the field of surveying and geography. For this case, they could be called 
iso-prediction lines. 
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lnG 
(a) Penalized Iterative Reweighted Least Square (P-IRLS) 
InG 
(b) Maximum Likelihood (ML), under mixed model representation 
lnG 
(c) Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML), under mixed model representation 
Fig. 7.3 Comparison of predictions for the pooled model for three estimation methods. 
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Fig. 7.4 Comparison of predictions for the pooled model for three estimation methods through 
contour diagram. Each line traces a fixed value of lnG. 
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out in a desktop computer with I GB memory, the model with household specific random 
effects requires computing capabilities that exceeds those available at Imperial College's High 
Performance Computing (HPC) facilities. 122 A memory as high as 80GB is available at the 
HPC, however, this is available for parallel processing through more than one processing unit. 
Unfortunately, the statistical platform R does not allow parallel processing and has to be run in 
a single processor. This resulted in the use of a maximum of 7.8GB of memory to perform the 
computation and restricted the analysis to a subsample of the available 13,251 household 
available. The maximum number of households that could be modelled with the existing 
computing facilities is 7,500. That almost half (43.4%) of the sample could not be used to 
estimate the model gives an indication of the limitation of the semiparametric approach. It is 
however, important to note that if household effects are not specifically treated and instead, a 
pooled model is estimated, all 13,251 households could have been used. 
7.5.3 Results of the Semiparametric Mixed Model Estimation 
The 7,500 households for the subsample were chosen randomly from the full dataset of 13,251 
households. With four observations for each household, the total size of the subsample thus 
becomes 30,000. Table 7.2 presents the goodness of fit results of the semiparametric model 
with random effect for the households for this subsample. 123 Results for the following five 
models are presented: 
1. Bivariate smoothing in lnP and lnY, with household specific random effects, estimated 
by ML 
2. Bivariate smoothing in lnP and lnY, with household specific random effects, estimated 
by REML 
3. Two additive univariate smooths in lnP and lnY with household specific random 
effects, estimated by ML 
4. Bivariate smoothing in lnP and lnY, without household specific random effects, 
estimated by ML 
5. Parametric translog random effects model, estimated by ML 
Like the test models presented in §7.5.1, the ML estimation of Model 1 is marginally better 
than the REML estimation of Model 2 (according to BIC). Model 3 assumes that lnY and lnP 
do not interact, and does not perform as well as the interaction model, Model 1 (through BIC). 
Model 4 ignores the panel nature of the data, and despite having similar explanatory powers 
through the adjusted R2 value, is still inferior to the theoretically more sound random 
122 http: //www3 . 
imperial. ac. uk/ict/services/teachingandresearchservices/highperformancecomputing. 
123 Parameter estimates for all these models are presented in Appendix D. 
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Table 7.2 Comparison of goodness of fit for different models 
Model type Semip arametric Parametric 
Model No. 1 2 3 4 5 
Smoothing type Bivariate Bivariate Univariate Bivariate No 
additive smoothing Household effect Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Estimation method ML REML ML ML' ML 
Approximate significance of smooth term 
F statistic 45.3 43.17 1nY 160.5 
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) 93.89 (0.000) (0.000) 
LnP 
92.42 (0.000) 
Model diagnostics 
Adj. R2 0.419 0.419 0.418 0.42 0.419 
Log-likelihood -22806.58 -22940.15 -22817.72 -26545.81 -22807.53 
AIC 45703.17 45970.29 45723.44 53179.62 45705.07 
BIC 46077.07 46344.13 46089.03 53545.21 46078.97 
N 30000 30000 30000 30000 30000 
household effects models (Models 1,2 or 3) by AIC or BIC. Predictions of lnG with respect to 
lnP and lnY are plotted in Fig. 7.5 for Models 1,3 and 4. Clearly, predictions from Models 3 
and 4 are different from those in Model 1. Unfortunately, formal LR tests developed for 
comparison of semiparametric models with parametric models and corresponding hypothesis 
testing (e. g. Self and Liang 1987, Stram and Lee 1994) perform very poorly when applied to 
penalized splines, such as the current case (Crainiceanu and Ruppert 2004, Crainiceanu et. at. 
2003, Wood 2006). In addition, the models here are not nested within each other, another 
condition for the LR test results to hold. Therefore these statistical tests are avoided, as this 
may lead to incorrect inference. Using AIC or BIC, Model 1 is superior to Models 2,3 or 4. 
Parameter estimates for the parametric part of Model 1, the preferred semiparametric model, 
are presented in Table 7.3. The findings are similar to the parametric models in Chapter 6: 
female headed, older and western households consume less gasoline whereas non-white, 
younger and southern households consumer more. Larger households consume more gasoline, 
whereas the presence of multiple children reduces consumption. Rural households consume 
more gasoline but are less responsive to a price increase than urban households. Gasoline 
demand increases with the number of automobiles in the household. Multiple vehicle-owning 
and multiple wage-earner households are more responsive to a change in gasoline price. 
Despite dropping almost half (43.4%) the observations in the semiparametric model, the 
estimates are still very similar in magnitude to the previous parametric estimates 
(Table 6.4). 
Model 1, however, cannot be directly compared with the parametric model in Chapter 6 since 
the semiparametric model contains only 56.6% of the observations used to estimate the model 
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1nG 
(a) Bivariate smooth, random household effect, ML estimation (Model 1) 
lnG 
(b) Two univariate smooths, random household effect, ML estimation (Model 3) 
lnG 
(c) Bivariate smooth, no random household effect, ML estimation (Model 4) 
Fig. 7.5 Prediction comparisons from Models 1,3 and 4 
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Table 7.3 Parameter estimates from the random effects semiparametric and parametric model 
on a sample of 7500 households 
Model type Semiparametric Parametric- translog Parametric- Model G 
Smoothing type Bivariate No smoothing No smoothing 
Household effect Random effect Random effect Random effect 
Estimation 
method 
ML ML ML 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Dfemale -0.0413 0.0109 -0.0411 0.0109 -0.0411 0.0109 
Dnonwhite 0.0242 0.0152 0.0243 0.0152 0.0242 0.0152 
Dschool 0.0118 0.0232 0.0083 0.0232 0.0085 0.0232 
Dsomecol 0.0021 0.0243 0.0008 0.0242 0.0010 0.0242 
Dcolgrad -0.0098 0.0248 -0.0101 0.0248 -0.0101 0.0248 
D1e25 0.0569** 0.0270 0.0549** 0.0270 0.0550** 0.0270 
D2544 0.0441** 0.0128 0.0449** 0.0127 0.0450** 0.0127 
Dge65 -0.2.39** 0.0148 -0.2035** 0.0146 -0.2035** 0.0148 
Lnfamsize 0.1829** 0.0173 0.1824** 0.0173 0.1824** 0.0173 
Dchildl -0.0112 0.0174 -0.0104 0.0174 -0.0104 0.0174 
Dchild2plus -0.0680** 0.0213 -0.0657*` 0.0213 -0.0657** 0.0213 
Dmidwest 0.0094 0.0168 0.0084 0.0167 0.0085 0.0167 
Dsouth 0.0749** 0.0161 0.0741** 0.0161 0.0742** 0.0161 
Dwest -0.0291* 0.0171 -0.0294 0.0171 -0.0293* 
0.0171 
Drural -1.4934 0.5311 -1.4649** 0.5310 -1.4706** 
0.5310 
DruralxLnP 0.3106** 0.0988 0.3133** 0.0988 0.3142** 0.0988 
DruralxLnY 0.0056 0.0238 0.0008 0.0238 0.0010 0.0238 
Lncar 0.20884* 0.0280 0.2082** 0.0279 0.2082** 0.0279 
DmulcarxlnP -0.1550** 0.0285 -0.1676** 
0.0284 -0.1678** 0.0284 
DmulcarxlnY 0.1029** 0.0161 0.1104*` 0.0160 0.1105`' 0.0160 
Dotherveh 0.0982** 0.0168 0.0996`* 0.0168 0.0996** 0.0168 
Lmnpg -0.4608** 0.0329 -0.4618** 
0.0328 -0.4618** 0.0328 
Lnearner 0.3753** 0.0423 0.3754** 0.0423 0.3755** 0.0423 
DmulearnxlnP -0.0936" 0.0277 -0.0959** 
0.0275 -0.0963** 0.0275 
DmulearnxlnY 0.0461** 0.0153 0.0477** 0.0152 0.0479** 0.0152 
Time 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 
Dfebruary -0.0198 0.0167 -0.0197 
0.0167 -0.0197 0.0167 
Dmarch -0.0185 0.0168 -0.0185 
0.0168 -0.0185 0.0168 
Dapril 0.0136 0.0124 0.0139 0.0124 0.0139 0.0123 
Dmay 0.0243 0.0167 0.0245 0.0166 0.0245 0.0166 
Djune 0.0063 0.0167 0.0067 0.0167 0.0067 0.0167 
Djuly 0.0178 0.0124 0.0175 0.0124 0.0175 0.0124 
Daugust 0.0240 0.0168 0.0238 0.0168 0.0238 0.0168 
statistically significant at 95%, 
* statistically significant at 90% 
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Table 7.3 (cont. ) Parameter estimates from the random effects semiparametric and parametric 
model on a sample of 7500 households 
Model type Semiparametric Parametric- translog Parametric- Model G 
Smoothing type Bivariate No smoothing No smoothing Household effect Random effect Random effect Random effect Estimation method ML ML ML 
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Dseptember 0.0458 0.0168 0.0460 0.0167 0.0460 0.0167 
Doctober 0.0388** 0.0123 0.0388** 0.0123 0.0388** 0.0123 
Dnovember -0.0103 0.0167 -0.0102 0.0168 -0.0102 0.0167 
Ddecember 0.0064 0.0167 0.0061 0.0167 0.0062 0.0167 
Intercept 5.6556 0.1186 12.9279** 4.1636 20.1571 ** 4.1575 
LnY -- 0.7438** 0.2428 -0.8730** 0.2224 
LnP -- -4.3459`* 1.5473 -5.7943`* 1.5559 
LnPxLnY -- 0.2273** 0.0439 0.5495** 0.0558 
(LnP)2 -- 0.1967 0.1530 0.1982 0.1530 
(LnY)2 -- -0.0904** 0.0080 -- 
LnPx(LnY)2 -- -- -0.0180** 0.0016 
Approximate significance of smooth term 
F statistic (p-value) 45.3 (0.000) 
Model diagnostics 
Adj. R2 0.419 0.419 0.419 
Log-likelihood -22806.58 -22807.53 -22807.28 
AIC 45703.17 45705.07 45704.57 
BIC 46077.07 46078.97 46078.47 
N 30000 30000 30000 
statistically significant at 95%, T statistically significant at 90% 
in Chapter 6. Therefore the parametric model in Eq. 6.9 is estimated on the same sample as the 
semiparametric models for a comparison (Model 5). Parameter estimates of Model 1 and 
Model 5 are almost identical (Table 7.3). Goodness of fit diagnostics are also strikingly similar 
(adjusted R2 equals 0.419 in both cases, AIC is 45703 vs. 45705, BIC is 46077 vs. 46079). 
Hastie and Tibshirani's (1990) approximate F-test for the adequacy of the parametric model in 
representing the semiparametric model depends on the difference in the R2 values of the 
semiparametric and the parametric model. 124 This yields an F statistic of 2.39, which has a p- 
smaller )dfres, r arger , where 
dfres refers to the 124 The test statistic is defined as: F= 
(RI z arger -Rz 
(1- RI 
arg er 
)(dfres, l arg er - 
dfres, sma!! er ) 
residual degrees of freedom of corresponding models, larger and smaller refer to the semiparametric 
and the parametric model respectively. The statistic is has an approximate F-distribution with degrees of 
freedom: (dfressmarter dfres, larger) and dfres, larger" 
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value of 0.022 for F (6.47,29948.53). 125 This implies that the semiparametric model is not a 
significant improvement over the parametric model at the 99% confidence level. Furthermore, 
Rupert et. al. (2003), quote an unpublished work by Crainiceanu to report that this p-value is 
smaller than the true p-value, because of the approximations involved. It can therefore be 
concluded that there is no significant difference between the two models. 
For the nonparametric part of Model 1, the predictions of Ingas with respect to lnprc and lnexp 
are plotted in a three-dimensional view in Fig. 7.6, while all other explanatory variables are at 
their mean value. Since the dependent and the independent variables are all in logarithmic 
scales, the slopes of the surface along the two horizontal axes directly gives elasticities for 
predicted gasoline demand corresponding to those variables. Thus, it is possible to calculate 
the slope of the surface along lnP at a given lnY to obtain the predicted price elasticity at that 
income. The gridlines parallel to the lnP axis, are always almost straight lines in the prediction 
figures, indicating little change in price elasticities with price. The slope of the surface along 
lnP, however, changes at different income levels, indicating possible changes in predicted 
price elasticities, although the change is visually not very discernible. Predicted income 
elasticity, on the other hand, clearly changes at higher income. At very high income, the slope 
is even negative, indicating at very high income gasoline demand decreases with an increase in 
income. This is also confirmed by the parametric model through the negative coefficient of 
(In y)2, which implies income elasticity decreases with increasing income (Table 7.3). 
lnG 
Fig. 7.6 Predictions of the bivariate smooth with random household effect for the subsample 
(Model 1) 
125 Although adjusted R2 is equal, there is subtle difference in unadjusted R2 because of different degrees 
of freedom in the two models. Residual degrees of freedom, Df es, smaller= 30000-45 = 29955, 
Dfres, larger = 
30000-51.47 = 29948.53. 
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Figs. 7.7 and 7.9 clarify these findings by presenting the predictions in two dimensions. In Fig. 
7.7, the predicted InG (gasoline consumption) is plotted against lnP (price) for different InY 
(income) values. The calculation of slopes of each of the curves allows the determination of 
the price elasticities of predicted gasoline demand at that income (expenditure) level. Starting 
from lower income levels (the bottom curve) each successive solid line represents a higher 
income, whereas starting from the top curve, going downwards, the successive dashed lines 
represent higher incomes. This is because of the quadratic effect of income on gasoline 
consumption, where consumption increases and then decreases as income increases (Fig. 7.6). 
Clearly, at low to medium income ranges (represented by the solid lines), the slopes and thus 
calculated price elasticities are smaller for higher income at the average price. For high income 
groups, however, the predicted price elasticities become higher (slopes of dashed lines steeper 
than those for the solid lines at average price levels). 
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Fig. 7.7 Predictions of lnG with respect to lnP for Model 1, slopes of the curves are predicted 
price elasticities 
Following the visual trends of the calculated price elasticities in Fig 7.7, Fig. 7.8 presents the 
calculated absolute values of the predicted price elasticities at different income levels for an 
average price. That these calculated price elasticities decreases with income and then increases 
again beyond a threshold expenditure is clearly visible in Fig. 7.8, which is consistent with the 
previous finding of a U-pattern to price elasticities with income estimated by the aggregate 
model (§5.4.5). Thus, model G (Eq. 6.10), which allows for price elasticities to have a 
quadratic shape with income, appears to be a more plausible functional form for the 
disaggregate dataset (§6.5.4). The differences in elasticity estimates between the translog 
model and Model G, however, are insignificant, as found in Table 6.5 earlier. Parameter 
estimates of Model G on the smaller subsample of 7500 households are also presented in Table 
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7.3, which shows there are no differences in goodness-of-fit statistics. The approximate F-test, 
described earlier also cannot differentiate between the semiparametric model and Model G. 126 
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Fig 7.8 Variation of predicted price elasticity (in absolute value) with income (quarterly 
expenditure) from the semiparametric model. 
The expenditure at which the absolute value of predicted price elasticities starts increasing is 
US$ 25,658 per quarter (US$ 102,632 per year, Fig. 7.8). In the 2002 CEX sample, however, 
only 5.27% of households have quarterly expenditures higher than this amount. The average 
quarterly expenditure of the highest income quintile in the sample is US$ 22,956 (US$ 91,824 
per year), after which the range of predicted absolute price elasticities consistently decreases 
with higher expenditure (Fig. 7.8). Therefore, based on average expenditures of the five 
quintiles in year 2002, the U-shape could not be established (Table 7.4). It should be noted that 
the effect of rural location, multiple wage earner or multiple vehicle owning households are not 
incorporated in the table. Their effects have been estimated parametrically separately and may 
not be combined with the calculated elasticities from the model predictions. These predicted 
elasticities are, therefore, for illustrative purposes only. Although, 43.4% of the sample had to 
be discarded to estimate the semiparametric model, the explanatory power is similar to the 
larger model in Chapter 6 (0.417 vs. 0.419). 
Table 7.4 Predicted price elasticities for average quarterly expenditure for the expenditure 
quintiles in year 2002 
1st quintile 2i' quintile 3r° quintile 4' quintile 5`° quintile 
Expenditure quintiles -0.63 -0.47 -0.37 -0.29 -0.21 
126 The F-test results between Model G and the semiparametric model are same as those between the 
translog model and the semiparametric model since the R2 of the translog model and Model G are the 
same. 
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InY (Y) 
Fig. 7.9 presents the predicted lnG against lnY for different prices. lnG therefore varies 
quadratically with lnY, with lower predicted income elasticities at higher income. This is 
similar to the findings from both the parametric functional forms, Eq. 6.1 and 6.10. 
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Fig. 7.9 Predictions of lnG with respect to lnY (Y is quarterly expenditure) for Model 1, slopes 
of the curves are predicted income elasticities 
The visual shape and predicted price elasticities suggest a parametric model similar to Model 
G (Eq. 6.10) could be true, although there still is no statistical difference between the base 
translog model and Model G. The elasticities estimated from Model G and the base translog 
model are also similar. It is also noted that the translog model is the accepted functional form 
in the literature for disaggregate studies. The welfare calculations in Chapter 8 (§8.3) therefore 
make use of the elasticity estimates from the translog model (Eq. 6.1). 
7.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined the semiparametric modelling of gasoline demand to model a 
flexible interaction between price and income and to further examine the robustness of the 
parametric estimates of the previous chapter. The penalized tensor-product basis was used to 
model the flexible interaction in a mixed model framework. Because of computational 
constraints, the semiparametric model was estimated for a smaller random subsample of 7,500 
households, and comparison with the parametric model was based on this Subsample. It is 
found that the semiparametric and the parametric models produced very similar parameter 
estimates for the parametric terms. The associated goodness of fit diagnostics were also 
similar. A visual inspection of and subsequent calculation of predicted elasticities from the 
semiparametric mixed model also confirmed that there is an interaction between price and 
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income, suggesting the absolute value of price elasticity decreases with an increase in income, 
and then increases with income once a given threshold is reached. This finding is similar to the 
U shape found from the aggregate demand model in Chapter 5. Income elasticity clearly 
decreases with higher income, which is similar to the finding of the parametric model. All 
these results indicate that the Model G representation of price and income in the parametric 
model presented in Chapter 6 is appropriate to describe gasoline demand at the household 
level. However, it was found earlier that the differences in elasticities and goodness-of-fit 
statistics were insignificant between Model G and the base model. The elasticity estimates 
from the more established translog model (Eq. 6.1) in Chapter 6 are therefore used directly for 
the analysis of burden from a tradable permit policy in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 8 
WELFARE ANALYSIS 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, it was noted that the distribution of burden 127 from a policy induced price change 
could be an important consideration for policy makers. For gasoline taxation, it is argued that 
the policy is regressive, especially for low-income vehicle-owning households. The public 
acceptability of a policy may also often hinge on the distributional impact (Santos and Rojey 
2004, Mayeres and Proost 2004). This chapter therefore focuses on the distribution of burden 
of a tradable permit policy and the impact on different socio-economic groups. Since different 
permit allocation strategies would affect the burden distribution differently, various permit 
allocation strategies (following Table 2.1) are analysed. As summarised in §3.4, the welfare 
analysis is carried out in a partial equilibrium framework where only direct effects of rising 
gasoline prices are considered to contribute to the change in welfare. In order to incorporate 
the behavioural response of households, the gasoline demand models from Chapters 5 and 6 
are used in modelling the distribution of the changes in welfare, as a result of a tradable permit 
policy. A 15% reduction in gasoline consumption and therefore carbon emissions is chosen in 
order to carry out the distributional analysis for the households in the year 2002, the most 
recently available dataset. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 8.2 presents the welfare model and results using 
the findings of the aggregate gasoline demand model, with the assumption of a representative 
household as described in Chapter 5. Only vertical equity is analysed in this section. The 
representative household assumption may not capture subtle differences in the distributions 
and therefore a more elaborate analysis of the changes in welfare is presented in section 8.3 
using household level data and the disaggregate model estimates of Chapter 6. In addition to 
investigating vertical equity, the horizontal distribution of burden within similar groups is also 
investigated in this section. Section 8.4 presents a sensitivity analysis of the disaggregate 
analysis using alternate hypothetical reduction scenarios (25% and 35%). Effects of revenue 
127 Burden is the negative changes in welfare. 
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neutrality, and possible lack of participation in the permit market is also analysed in the 
sensitivity analysis. The final section summarises the findings of the chapter. 
8.2 Welfare Analysis from the Aggregate Model Results 
This section uses the aggregate gasoline demand model estimates from Chapter 5 to estimate 
the changes in welfare for a representative household for each income quintile. This section 
begins with the methodology to calculate the changes in welfare and the distribution of the 
changes, followed by a comparison of the performance of the different measures to calculate 
burden. The effect of equivalence in allocation units is discussed in §8.2.3, followed by the 
results of different allocation strategies in §8.2.4. The final two subsections put the aggregate 
analysis results in the context of the literature and summarize the findings. 
8.2.1 Methodology 
In the partial equilibrium analysis of a gasoline tax, the reduction in gasoline consumption, or 
carbon emissions from personal transport, depends on the aggregate demand and the amount of 
tax imposed (Fig. 2.1). Conversely, in a tradable permit policy, the price of the carbon permits 
is determined by the specified amount of reduction in gasoline or carbon consumption and the 
aggregate demand curve (§2.3.1). For a hypothetically chosen reduction, the corresponding 
price for the carbon permits can be determined from the aggregate demand curve in Eq. 5.2 
(§2.3.1). Once the price of permits is determined, the post-policy price of gasoline (P2) 
becomes (P1+T). Post policy fuel consumption (G2; ) for representative households from 
different income quintiles can then be found by substituting the new market price P2 into the 
individual demand equations, for which the parameters are already estimated in Table 5.2. 
Finally, with P2, G2i, income elasticity (fy, ) and price elasticity (ßp; ) known, the changes in 
welfare are calculated. 
The log linear demand specification in Eq. 5.2 gives rise to the following expression for the 
change in consumer surplus due to an increase in price from P1 to P2. 
AC'S1 = 
PGt` 
- 
(p2 
I+QPi 
8.1 
1+ ßPi , Pi 
Following Hausman (1981) or King (1983), the corresponding CV is: 
1 
1 
-YqYi 
lýß 
Z,. 
}+Y,; fly; 8.2 cvi = Yi (G1, - P2 G1 - 'ii ßr; 
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Added to the changes in welfare is the opportunity cost of the permits, i. e. the income accrued 
to the households if the permits are sold in the market. Since the ability to bear a burden is 
different for different households, this change in welfare is divided by the annual expenditure 
which allows the relative burden to be determined. This is then compared for different socio- 
economic groups. 
In the following sections, the distribution of relative burdens among households is presented 
for a hypothetical 15% reduction in carbon emissions or gasoline consumption. 128 Utilising the 
aggregate price elasticity, this corresponds to a gasoline permit price (T) of US$ 1.20 per 
gallon. This is also equivalent to implementing a tax of US$ 1.20 per gallon of gasoline and 
recycling the revenue lump sum to different allocation units in the population following the 
allocation strategies discussed in Table 2.1. This 15% reduction corresponds to a carbon tax 
equivalent of US$ 500 per ton of carbon, which is much higher than the optimal carbon tax 
reported in National Research Council (2002) of US$ 50 per ton. The very high estimate is the 
result of the relative price inelastic nature of gasoline demand. Also, by considering only one 
sector of the economy the gains possible from inter-sector trading are not captured. However, 
the optimal level of reduction and the resulting price is not the focus of this research. 
8.2.2 Comparison of Different Measures and Responses 
Table 8.1 presents the changes in welfare using various welfare measures and responses. 
Results are presented for CV with different elasticities for different groups (Table 8.1, a) and 
the same elasticity for all groups (Table 8.1, b). ACS measures for different elasticities are also 
presented for a comparison (Table 8.1, c). Finally, in order to compare with other studies on 
the incidence of the gasoline tax, results are presented for ACS assuming no change in 
household gasoline demand (Table 8.1, d). The first three measures in Table 8.1 (a, b, c) are for 
a per capita based allocation of permits with a 15% target reduction in emissions. For the no 
demand response, however, a permit policy cannot be evaluated since by assumption there is 
no reduction in demand. Therefore, the analysis was done for a tax of US$ 1.20 per gallon and 
subsequent recycling of the tax receipts on a per capita basis to each household (Table 8.1, d). 
Any policy would be progressive if successively higher income groups bear an increasingly 
higher relative burden, and proportional, if all had the same relative burden as the national 
average (§3.2.1). Results presented in Table 8.1 are for both, representative households with 
128 The 15% reduction leads to a permit price, which is nearer to the external costs of personal road 
transport use in the USA. The external cost is US$ 1.02 per gallon (National Research Council 2002), 
which leads to a 13.5% reduction using aggregate elasticities. It is rounded up to 15% for the analysis. 
The reduction is still much smaller than the 80% required to stabilize the climate system (§1.2, Stem 
2007). 
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and without vehicles in each income quintile. The weighted average of the burdens for 
households with and without vehicles, the weights being the percent of households owning or 
not owning a vehicle, are also shown. Since a substantial proportion of the households in the 
lowest income quintile do not own a vehicle, a household owning a vehicle in the lowest 
income quintile represents only 64% of all households in that quintile. Conversely, a household 
without a car represents the remaining 36% of the households in that quintile. At the highest 
income quintile, the proportion of households owning at least one car increases up to 98%. 
The relative burdens as measured by the CV with varying elasticities for different income 
quintiles show that households owning at least one car in the lowest income quintile are less 
well off than those in the immediately higher income quintile (Fig. 8.1, Table 8.1, a, 1). Thus, a 
trading policy is regressive between these two quintiles. The policy is then generally 
progressive for vehicle-owning households, although the fourth quintile which represents the 
middle to upper-middle incomes has a relatively greater burden than the highest income group. 
For households with vehicles, the absolute changes in welfare, measured by CV with varying 
elasticities for the income quintiles, is strictly progressive between the 2°d and the highest 
income quintile, as shown in Table 8.2 (1). The regressivity between the 4th and 5th income 
quintile in Table 8.1 (a, 1) is a result of the presence of expenditure outliers in the 5th income 
quintile. The outlier households have very high expenditures, which pull up the average 
Table 8.1 Relative welfare changes for different income quintiles: Comparison of various 
welfare measures and demand response behaviour, all permits distributed equally to all 
1St 
quintile 
Ratio of welfare change to expenditure (%) 
2° rd 45 
quintile quintile quintile quintile 
Average 
a. CV-valying elasticity 
1. Households with car -0.179 -0.060 -0.422 -0.560 -0.479 -0.452 
2. Households without car 3.715 3.399 2.784 2.268 1.482 2.437 
3. Weighted average 1.017 0.311 -0.293 -0.493 -0.447 -0.168 
b. CV same elasticity 
1. Households with car -0.225 0.005 -0.349 -0.535 -0.476 -0.452 
2. Households without car 3.715 3.399 2.784 2.268 1.482 2.437 
3. Weighted average 0.986 0.369 -0.222 -0.468 -0.443 -0.168 
c. ACS-varying elasticity 
1. Households with car -0.179 -0,042 -0.409 -0.550 -0.479 -0,438 
2. Households without car 3.715 3.399 2.784 2.268 1.482 2.437 
3. Weighted average 1.017 0.327 -0.280 -0.482 -0.447 -0.156 
d. ACS-no demand response 
1. Households with car 0.003 0.257 -0.177 -0.420 -0.415 -0.312 
2. Households without car 4.370 3.999 3.275 2.668 1.744 2.867 
3. Weighted average 1.345 0.658 -0.038 -0.346 -0.379 0.000 
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Fig. 8.1 Relative welfare change for households with vehicles in different reported income 
quintiles: Comparison of various welfare measures and demand response behaviour, all 
permits distributed equally to all 
Table 8.2 Absolute welfare change (CV with varying elasticities only) for different income 
quintiles, all permits distributed equally to all 
Change in welfare (US$) 
Ist 2 3'd 4 5` Average 
quintile quintile quintile quintile quintile 
1. Households with car -35.92 -16.32 -154.43 -284.59 -393.09 -188.86 
2. Households without car 586.43 749.33 814.49 912.23 1009.97 814.49 
3. Weighted average 188.13 83.21 -105.98 -248.69 -365.03 -68.47 
expenditure of the group, resulting in a smaller relative burden in the highest income quintile 
as compared to the 4th quintile. 
The relative burden (CV) is strictly progressive for households without a vehicle, with 
successively higher relative gain accruing to successively lower income quintiles (Table 8.1, a, 
2). This corresponds to a welfare gain of US$ 586 for the lowest income quintile to US$ 1,009 
for the highest income quintile (Table 8.2,2). The tradable permit system thus provides a 
significant incentive not to drive a vehicle and rewards those who do not drive. The wealthiest 
households gain more, as the average household in that quintile is larger than that in the lower 
income quintiles, therefore being allocated more permits. However, households in the lowest 
income quintile still benefit more as a proportion of their income, as shown in Table 8.1 (a, 2). 
Combining all households, the policy is progressive for the lowest four quintiles. These results, 
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which show subtle differences between sub-groups, clearly presents more information than a 
summary measure such as the Suits index (1977) or the Kakwani index (1978). 129 
Assuming the same elasticity for every group (Fig. 8.2, Table 8.1, b) does not change the 
overall progressive nature of tradable permits for all households together. However, the 
relative burdens for individual groups could be different. For example, for households with 
cars, there is a reversal of sign in the changes in welfare for the 2°d income quintile, although 
the difference is negligible (Fig. 8.1, Table 8.1, a, 1 and b, 1). Using the same elasticity for all 
groups also overestimates the burden share for the vehicle-owning households in the lowest 
income quintile (Table 8.1, a, 1 and b, 1). Similarly, a single elasticity underestimates the 
relative burden for the 3 `d and the 4"' income quintiles. This indicates that the use of a single 
elasticity for all households may distort the estimates of relative burden for individual groups 
of vehicle-owning households. The effects on households without cars are the same in these 
two cases since the elasticities do not enter their formulation of welfare change (Table 8.1, a, 2 
and b, 2), and their welfare increase is only due to the lump-sum transfer they receive in the 
form of free permits. 
The third measure is ACS with different elasticities for different groups (Fig. 8.1, Table 8.1, c). 
The trend of progressivity or regressivity and relative burdens for different groups are the same 
as measured by CV with different elasticity for different income groups (Table 8.1, a). This 
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Fig. 8.2 Relative welfare change for all households in different reported income quintiles: 
Comparison of various welfare measures and demand response behaviour, all permits 
distributed equally to all 
129 No summary measure is presented since only average behaviour of each group is calculated in the 
aggregate analysis. Summary measures for progressivity are presented in the disaggregate analysis. 
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finding thus supports Willig's (1976) postulate that ACS can be used to measure the change in 
welfare instead of CV for all practical purposes. It is also important to note that the effect of 
different welfare measures of CV and ACS (Fig 8.1, Table 8.1, a, c) on calculating relative 
burdens is less than the effect of different elasticities (Table 8.1, a, b). In the disaggregate 
analysis of welfare (§8.3) this finding will be utilized to simplify the calculations. 
The last measure is ACS with no demand response for a gasoline tax and subsequent recycling 
back of the revenue (Fig 8.1, Table 8.1, d). Quantitatively, the no demand response case shows 
less welfare loss (and higher welfare gain), which is in apparent contradiction to the hypothesis 
that ignoring the behavioural response would overstate the burden (§3.3.4). The previous 
explanation considers the welfare effects of the tax or tradable permit induced price increases 
only. Here, however, the additional effect of a free permit allocation is estimated, which is 
equivalent to recycling back the tax receipts to the consumers. Thus, if there is no consumption 
response to the price change, the recycled tax receipts equal PJEGP2 (Fig. 8.3) the aggregate 
loss in welfare is zero, and every household shares the benefit of no net welfare loss. On the 
other hand, the demand response case is associated with a dead weight loss (CDE in Fig. 8.3) 
to society, which is shared by the households (e. g. -0.168 with CV, different elasticities and 
0.00 for ACS no demand response in the column `average' of Table 8.1). The revenue 
available for recycling in this case is P1 DCP2. 
P2 
U 
a 
Pi 
Quantity demanded 
Fig 8.3 Revenue available for recycling in the no demand response and demand response case 
8.2.3 Need Based Permit Allocation Strategies 
As mentioned in §3.3.6, the travel need and therefore gasoline demand of different household 
members could be different, especially if the household contains children. 
130 Accordingly, two 
130 §3.3.6 discusses equivalence scales based on individual need to travel and economies of scale 
in 
travel needs. The permit allocation strategies in this section focus on differences in needs between adults 
and children only. There could be other difference in need tool, e. g. urban and rural households 
(§2.5.3). 
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allocations, one with children receiving no permits (V) and another with children receiving 
half the number of permits of an adult (VI) are compared with a per capita (I) based allocation 
in Table 8.3. Among these, an per adult (V) is the only allocation strategy that is progressive 
among the four lowest quintiles for households with vehicles (Table 8.3, V, 1). This is in 
contrast with the other two allocations, where the households with vehicles of the lowest 
income quintile always suffer higher relative burden than those in the 2 "d income quintile. 
Table 8.3 Effect of need based permit allocation strategies on relative welfare changes 
1st 
quintile 
Ratio of welfare change to expenditure (%) 
2° 3r 4 5' 
quintile quintile quintile quintile 
Average 
1. Per capita basis 
1. Households with car -0.179 -0.060 -0.422 -0.560 -0.479 -0.452 
2. Households without car 3.715 3.399 2.784 2.268 1.482 2.437 
3. Weighted average 1.017 0.311 -0.293 -0.493 -0.447 -0.168 
V. Per adult basis 
1. Households with car -0.111 -0.135 -0.539 -0.584 -0.509 -0.452 
2. Households without car 3.802 3.306 2.637 2.238 1.447 2.437 
3. Weighted average 1.092 0.234 -0.411 -0.517 -0.476 -0.168 
VI. Combination basis 
1. Households with car -0.150 -0.092 -0.473 -0.571 -0.492 -0.452 
2. Households without car 3.752 3.359 2.720 2.255 1.467 2.437 
3. Weighted average 1.049 0.278 -0.344 -0.503 -0.459 -0.168 
8.2.4 Other Permit Allocation Strategies 
Table 8.4 shows the effect of different permit allocation strategies on the distribution of 
relative burden. Of those allocation strategies analyzed for all households, only one is 
progressive over the lowest four quintiles: an equal allocation to every individual (Fig. 8.4, 
Table 8.4, I, 3). If permits are calculated on a per capita basis, but the government retains the 
permits of those without vehicles (Table 8.4, II, 3), then the policy is regressive for all 
households over the two lowest income quintiles, but progressive up till the 4th quintile. 
Allocation of permits on a per vehicle basis (Table 8.4, IV, 3) makes the policy progressive 
over the lowest three income quintiles when all households are considered. When all 
households are considered, only a per capita based allocation for all (Table 8.4, I, 3) and a per 
capita allocation for only households with vehicles (Table 8.4, III, 3) generate positive 
benefits 
for the lowest and the second lowest income quintiles (1.017,0.311 and 0.152,0.279 
respectively). For the other two allocations (Table 8.4, II, 3 and IV, 3), the two 
lowest income 
quintiles suffer a welfare loss (-0.124, -0.054 and -0.132, -0.161 respectively). 
If the policy maker is concerned about the regressivity among the households with vehicles 
alone, then only one allocation generates positive benefits for the vehicle-owning 
households 
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of the lowest two income quintiles: when permits are distributed to the vehicle-owning 
households only, on a per capita basis over the members of the households with vehicles (Fig. 
8.5, Table 8.4, III, 1). Although the representative households with vehicles in the two lowest 
income quintile have positive benefits, the allocation strategy is still regressive between the 
two lowest quintiles since the ratio of welfare gain to expenditure is higher for the 2nd income 
quintile. 
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Fig. 8.4 Effect of different allocation strategies for all households (changes in welfare in CV) 
Table 8.4 Effect of need based permit allocation strategies on relative welfare changes 
Ratio of welfare change to expenditure (%) 
1st 2° Fd th 5t Average 
quintile quintile quintile quintile quintile 
I. Per capita basis 
1. Households with car 
2. Households without car 
3. Weighted average 
II Permits calculated on ap 
-0.179 
3.715 
1.017 
er capita basis, 
-0.060 -0.422 
3.399 2.784 
0.311 -0.293 
government retains the 
-0.560 
2.268 
-0.493 
permits of 
-0.479 -0.452 
1.482 2.437 
-0.447 -0.168 
those without vehicles 
1. Households with car -0.179 -0.060 -0.423 -0.560 -0.479 -0.452 
2. Households without car 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Weighted average -0.124 -0.054 -0.406 -0.547 -0.471 -0.407 
III. Permits only for households with vehicle , on ap er capita 
basis 
1. Households with car 0.220 0.312 -0.120 -0.315 -0.311 -0.186 
2. Households without car 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Weighted average 0.152 0.279 -0.115 -0.308 -0.306 -0.168 
IV. Per vehicle basis 
1. Households with car -0.190 -0.181 -0.259 -0.248 -0.212 -0.254 
2. Households without car 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3. Weighted average -0.132 -0.161 -0.248 -0.242 -0.208 -0.229 
ö 
1.2 
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Considering all households in a quintile (weighted average of households with or without 
vehicles), the lowest income quintile benefits more from a policy of equal permits to every 
individual (Table 8.4, I, 3). This is because a large share of households in that quintile does 
not own a vehicle and these households benefit from the free permits (Table 8.4, I, 2). 
Wealthier households bear less of a relative burden for both allocations that distribute the 
permits only to households with vehicles (Table 8.4, III, 3 and IV, 3), especially for a per- 
vehicle basis allocation (Table 8.4, IV, 3). Allocation on a per-vehicle basis (Table 8.4, IV, 1) 
makes the strategy reasonably proportional between vehicle-owning households. 
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Fig. 8.5 Effect of different allocation strategies for households with vehicles (changes in 
welfare in CV) 
When the permits are calculated on a per capita basis, but the government retains the permits 
of the households without vehicles (Table 8.4, II, 3), the average burden over all households 
becomes the highest. This is expected since the government receipts are not directly available 
to consumers and are lost to the households. The average burden of this allocation, however, is 
not directly comparable with the average burdens of other allocation strategies, since the 
government does not retain permits in other strategies. 
An equal allocation to every individual, with or without the government retaining any permits 
(Table 8.4, I, 1 and II, 1), results in the same relative burden for households with vehicles. 
Since households without vehicles do not benefit if the government retains their permits (Table 
8.4, II, 2), those who do not drive are essentially subsidizing the carbon-emitting households. 
This is also true for the other two allocation strategies where only households without vehicles 
do not gain anything (Table 8.4, III, 2 and IV, 2). Such allocation strategies therefore violate 
the polluters pay principle (§2.4.3). 
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For all the allocation strategies mentioned above, the highest income quintile always has lower 
relative burden than the fourth income quintile, although their absolute change in welfare is 
higher. As explained in §8.2.2, this is because the average expenditure, and therefore the 
lifetime income, of the wealthiest group is relatively high due to the presence of large 
expenditure outliers in this group. 
8.2.5 Comparison with Other Work 
The only other work that models the incidence of a gasoline tax with different elasticities for 
different groups is by West and Williams (2004). Their analysis includes an estimate of the 
welfare effects of returning gasoline tax revenues to households as a lump-sum payment (based 
on number of adults in the household). A per-adult based allocation is therefore re-analysed 
here for a permit price of US$1.02 and the result is presented along with West and Williams' 
(2004) results in Fig. 8.6.13' The results are not strictly comparable. Firstly, they used 
expenditure quintiles, whereas the aggregate welfare results in this work is for reported income 
quintiles. Secondly, West and Williams' (2004) study contains only one and two adult 
households, so the expenditure quintiles do not represent the US population distribution as a 
whole. Thirdly, their measure of welfare change is equivalent variation, whereas here it is 
compensating variation (§3.3.1). Still, the general shape of the distribution remains the same: 
both are progressive for the lowest four quintiles. This is in spite of the different pattern of 
elasticities by income group found in their work as compared to the U-pattern found in the 
aggregate estimates here. This suggests that the relative changes in burden are more dependent 
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Fig. 8.6 Comparison of distribution of burden with existing literature 
131 West and Williams (2004) consider a tax increase of US$1.02 over existing taxes. 
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on the transfer of revenue than the actual differences in elasticity estimates between income 
groups. 
8.2.6 Summary of Aggregate Welfare Analysis 
The welfare analysis using the aggregate demand model is applicable for an average 
representative household in each income quintile, which is a common assumption in time- 
series econometric modelling. The analysis indicates that there could be significant differences 
in individual group-wise estimates of relative burden if the same elasticity is used for all 
groups although the general pattern of distribution remains the same. Use of ACS to measure 
burden does not alter the results, and can be safely used to proxy for CV. Estimates with no 
demand response (zero price elasticity) underestimate the relative welfare loss or overestimates 
the relative welfare gain, and therefore should be avoided in distributional analysis. 
Among the various allocation strategies discussed, the only strategy which is progressive over 
the lower income quintiles for households with vehicles is the per adult based allocation (V). 
For all other allocations, vehicle-owning households in the lowest income quintile bear a 
higher relative burden than the immediately higher quintile. Considering all households, two 
allocations are progressive over the lower income quintiles: per capita (I) and per vehicle based 
(IV). 
Although it was possible to differentiate the relative welfare changes between households with 
and without vehicles and to determine a reasonable picture of the distribution in general, the 
representative household framework fails to acknowledge that within each quintile there could 
be a wide variation in the distribution of welfare. The framework is also limited in that the 
average representative household contains fractional numbers of persons, adults, children or 
vehicles. In reality, these are all discrete numbers for each household. These limitations can be 
overcome by considering every household as an individual entity through a disaggregate 
analysis, the subject of the next section. 
8.3 Welfare Analysis from the Disaggregate Model 
This section discusses the disaggregate modelling of burden distribution using the elasticity 
estimates from Chapter 6. The section starts with a description of the methodology to 
determine the burden, followed by a sensitivity analysis to understand the effect of equivalence 
of household sizes in grouping the households on the distribution of burden. This is followed 
by the vertical equity analysis for different need based allocation units and other allocation 
strategies. §8.3.4 and §8.3.5 present the horizontal equity results for need based allocation 
units and different allocation strategies. This is followed by further investigation into the 
175 
horizontal equity among different socio-economic groups for a per-capita allocation strategy. 
The final subsection summarizes the findings of the disaggregate analysis. 
8.3.1 Methodology 
The distribution of elasticities of gasoline demand with respect to price for various households 
in the micro dataset of the 2002 CEX survey was presented in §6.6. Determining aggregate 
elasticity from the disaggregate model is, however, not straight forward. The existing approach 
in the literature is to use the mean price and mean income to determine the aggregate average 
elasticity as done in §6.5.7. This approach is similar to the representative household 
framework, where the representative household has a mean expenditure level and faces a mean 
gasoline price. The disaggregate elasticity estimates in §6.6, however, are more extensive than 
existing gasoline demand models and are dependent on various other explanatory variables 
which have discrete values, e. g. dummies for rural location, multiple vehicles and multiple 
earners. Therefore, a particular value needs to be assigned for these dummies and thus the 
elasticity at a mean price and mean expenditure level would be the representative elasticity for 
those types of households only. This makes the direct estimation of one elasticity for the whole 
country from the disaggregate model difficult. 
An iterative approach is followed to determine the permit prices to generate a 15% reduction in 
gasoline consumption. First, for an assumed permit price the gasoline consumption of each 
household is determined and summed to calculate the total consumption. The reduction is then 
calculated and the process is iterated until the reduction in consumption converges to the target 
15%. This results in a carbon permit price of US$ 0.627 per gallon of gasoline. At the mean 
price of gasoline this represents an aggregate price elasticity of -0.45, which is higher than the 
result from the aggregate gasoline demand models. 132 This is not surprising, since the 
disaggregate model tends to estimate intermediate run elasticities (§6.7). The permit price for 
the aggregate model (US$ 1.20) is higher, since the 15% reduction takes place in a smaller 
time frame because the price elasticity estimated from the aggregate model is short-run. 
Determination of CV is more difficult for the translog disaggregate model than the constant 
elasticity Cobb-Douglas model. Both Hausman (1981) and King (1983) derived expressions 
for CV for the linear or the Cobb-Douglas demand functions, but did not derive the same for 
the translog function because of the complexities involved in calculating closed form solution 
of the underlying differential equation (Hausman 1981, Slesnick 1998). Since the aggregate 
model previously showed that there is no appreciable difference in welfare measures between 
132 The aggregate elasticity of -0.45 is marginally different from the mean value of -0.469 or median of 
-0.473 of the distribution of elasticities in §6.6. 
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CV and L\CS, ACS is chosen to calculate the changes in welfare for every household using the 
elasticities estimated earlier in §6.6 (Fig. 6.2). Every household in this analysis therefore has 
different price elasticities depending upon its income, vehicle holding, location and number of 
earners. 
8.3.2 Sensitivity of Equivalent Household Groups 
In the aggregate analysis, the income quintiles were already fixed by the data used and there 
was no scope to group the households otherwise. The disaggregate analysis however requires 
the arranging of the individual households into groups of similar well being. As mentioned in 
§3.3.7, the doubly parametric equivalence scale of (adult+ 0.4children) 0.5 is used to determine 
the equivalent expenditure of the households and then to group the households. In order to test 
the sensitivity of the distribution of relative burden to the choice of equivalence scale, results 
are also presented for two other equivalence scales: per capita basis and (Famsize) 0.5 . 
All these 
results are for the per capita allocation (Table 2. I, I). 
The choice of equivalence scale does affect the distribution of welfare (Fig. 8.7, Table 8.5). As 
long as children are treated accounted as equal to adults in grouping the households, the lower 
income households show a higher relative welfare gain (3.0 and 2.9 vs. 2.7). Fig. 8.3 plots the 
cumulative burden with respect to cumulative expenditure, where both have been equivalized 
following the equivalent scales, and the equivalent expenditure is then ranked in ascending 
order. The differences are clearly visible. The area between the equal burden line and 
respective burden share curve represents the diversion from proportionality and, following 
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Suits (1977), may be taken as a summary measure of progressivity (§3.2.4). The reported 
measure of progressivity in Table 8.5 and all the following tables in this chapter, however is 
half what a Suits (1977) index would have measured, since the division by 0.5 in the Suits 
index (1977) is dropped here. 133 The progressivity index for the policy is therefore different for 
the different grouping strategies (Table 8.5). Using no equivalence scale to generate similar 
levels of well being would overestimate the progressivity of a policy (Fig. 8.8). 
The distribution of burden within each decile, i. e. the horizontal equity is also affected by the 
choice of equivalent scales to group the households (Table 8.5). The proportion of households 
Table 8.5 Effect of equivalence scales on relative welfare changes of the households 
PES type Double parametric Single parametric Single parametric 
Weight for I 1 1 
adults 
Weight for 0.4 1 1 
children 
Yý 0.5 0.5 1 
With No car All With No car All With No car All 
car car car 
Ratio of mean welfare change to expenditure (%) 
Decile 1 2.016 3.876 2.740 2.279 4.172 2.997 2.287 4.712 2.850 
Decile 2 0.831 2.352 1.169 0.990 2.258 1.250 0.723 2.262 0.901 
Decile 3 0.350 1.737 0.520 0.385 1.515 0.526 0.176 1.642 0.294 
Decile 4 -0.009 1.110 0.091 0.007 1.007 0.082 -0.031 1.170 0.050 
Decile 5 -0.126 0.689 -0.082 -0.159 0.804 -0.103 -0.189 0.794 -0.138 
Decile 6 -0.239 0.652 -0.202 -0.237 0.461 -0.208 -0.329 0.698 -0.286 
Decile 7 -0.381 0.281 -0.359 -0.357 0.291 -0.333 -0.419 0.390 -0.386 
Decile 8 -0.338 0.362 -0.320 -0.389 0.366 -0.369 -0.444 0.472 -0.416 
Decile 9 -0.368 0.239 -0.356 -0.397 0.238 -0.381 -0.042 0.278 -0.403 
Decile 10 -0.252 0.005 -0.247 -0.276 -0.019 -0.271 -0.330 0.036 -0.320 
Progressivity 0.557 0.493 0.374 
Proportions of households with p ositive benefits (%) 
Decile 1 79.33 95.75 86.85 81.38 96.25 88.09 88.93 97.99 91.96 
Decile 2 69.72 91.99 75.22 73.42 92.84 78.10 77.08 93.47 80.20 
Decile 3 62.81 90.53 66.65 64.74 87.78 68.05 65.77 91.10 69.68 
Decile 4 53.73 84.80 56.99 54.85 84.95 57.73 57.33 89.24 61.27 
Decile 5 47.34 84.06 52.15 49.52 85.71 52.19 49.08 83.79 52.25 
Decile 6 45.47 79.22 47.13 45.88 79.87 47.61 42.41 84.19 45.53 
Decile 7 37.59 78.03 39.29 37.44 75.00 39.16 35.60 77.78 38.75 
Decile 8 35.96 79.81 37.42 34.02 79.44 35.57 31.23 82.42 33.94 
Decile 9 32.56 71.25 33.55 30.02 75.79 31.41 26.04 80.37 28.85 
Decile 10 29.04 59.15 29.73 26.42 57.58 27.08 20.62 68.25 22.54 
All 47.48 89.76 52.50 47.48 89.76 52.50 47.48 89.76 52.50 
133 There is no benefit in dividing the index by 0.5. 
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Fig. 8.8 Effect of equivalence scale in grouping the households on progressivity calculation'34 
with positive welfare gain from the policy is higher if children and adults are treated the same, 
while deriving the deciles of households (91.96% and 88.09% for single parametric vs. 86.85% 
for double parametric, decile 1). The differences are even higher when only vehicle-owning 
households are considered (88.93% and 81.38% for single parametric vs. 79.33% for doubly 
parametric, decile 1). Conversely, for the wealthiest decile, a doubly parametric equivalence 
scale results in more households with positive welfare gain (29.73% for double parametric vs. 
27.08% and 22.54% for single parametric, decile 10). The dependence of progressivity or 
distribution of welfare on equivalence is contradictory to West and Williams (2004) who report 
their results were not sensitive to the choice of equivalence scales. It is however important to 
note that the general shape of distribution remains similar for all types of equivalence. To 
accommodate the economies of scale as well as the differences in needs of adults and children, 
the doubly parametric equivalence scale is chosen for future calculations (§3.3.7). 
8.3.3 Vertical Equity: Need Based Permit Allocation Strategies 
Fig. 8.9 and Table 8.6 present the results for different permit allocations to adults and children. 
As in the aggregate analysis, the focus is on three strategies: everyone gets an equal amount 
(I), every adult gets an equal amount (V) and every child gets half of what every adult gets 
(VI). All three permit allocation strategies are strictly progressive for the lowest seven deciles 
for vehicle-owning, non-vehicle-owning or all households. Households in successively higher 
134 A positive number on the vertical axis represents burden (negative welfare change). The same is true 
for all the following figures plotting cumulative burden shares. Although welfare losses have been 
preceded with negative signs throughout this dissertation, for plotting purposes it is more common 
practice to plot burdens as positive. See §3.2.3. 
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deciles share successively higher burden among these deciles. This is in contrast with the 
aggregate analysis, where the per adult allocation was the only allocation that was progressive 
over the lowest two vehicle-owning quintiles. 135 Recent tax incidence literature suggests that 
the gasoline tax is progressive when all households are taken together, but regressive among 
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Fig. 8.9 Effect of different need-based permit allocation strategies on distribution of mean 
welfare change to expenditure (all households) 
Table 8.6 Distribution of relative welfare changes in different need-based allocation strategies 
I. Per person basis V. Per adult basis VI. Combination basis 
Permits for 
1 1 
adults 
1 
Permits for 
1 0 0.5 
children 
With With With 
No car All No car All No car All 
car car car 
Ratio of mean welfare change to exp enditure (%) 
Decile 1 2.016 3.876 2.740 2.057 4.063 2.838 2.034 3.955 2.782 
Decile 2 0.831 2.352 1.169 0.908 2.284 1.214 0.864 2.323 1.188 
Decile 3 0.350 1.737 0.520 0.354 1.689 0.518 0.352 1.717 0.519 
Decile 4 -0.009 1.110 0.091 0.000 1.148 0.102 -0.005 1.126 0.096 
Decile 5 -0.126 0.689 -0.082 -0.119 0.830 -0.067 -0.123 0.749 -0.076 
Decile 6 -0.239 0.652 -0.202 -0.271 0.660 -0.232 -0.253 0.656 -0.215 
Decile 7 -0.381 0.281 -0.359 -0.374 0.382 -0.348 -0.378 0.324 -0.354 
Decile 8 -0.338 0.362 -0.320 -0.342 0.421 -0.322 -0.340 0.387 -0.321 
Decile 9 -0.368 0.239 -0.356 -0.386 0.276 -0.372 -0.376 0.255 -0.363 
Decile 10 -0.252 0.005 -0.247 -0.256 0.043 -0.250 -0.253 0.021 -0.248 
Progressivity 0.557 0.881 0.669 
135 Note that in the aggregate analysis, the quintiles are reported income quintiles, but in the disaggregate 
analysis, the deciles are equivalized e xpenditure deciles . 
Hence the results are not stri ctly comparable. 
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vehicle-owning households with lower incomes (Poterba 1990). This was also found for the 
per capita allocation in the aggregate analysis of welfare (§8.2.3). However, the disaggregate 
analysis shows that the tradable permit policy is progressive even among the vehicle-owning 
households of lower expenditure deciles ('with car' for all strategies in Table 8.6). Vehicle- 
owning households of the three lowest deciles still benefit from the policy more on average. 
This is one of the major findings of the disaggregate analysis, that any need based allocation, 
where permits are distributed to all households is progressive among lower income households 
with as well as without vehicles. The result also highlights that the representative household 
assumption may lead to erroneous conclusions in analysing the distributional burdens. 
Among the three strategies, the per adult allocation (V) is still the most progressive policy 
based on the summary measure (0.881 in Table 8.6 and Fig. 8.10). An equal per capita 
allocation (I) yields the lowest progressivity of the three allocations (0.557). Since the 
aggregate burden is the same in all three allocation strategies, the progressivity index could be 
used for comparison. For an adult based allocation (V), the households in the lowest decile 
benefit the highest (highest positive welfare change to expenditure ratio) and those in the 
highest decile lose the maximum (-0.250), indicating higher progressivity. Between deciles 7 
to 10, however, none of the allocations are strictly progressive or regressive. 136 The highest 
decile still faces a lower relative burden than the immediately lower one, since the total 
expenditure of the highest decile is pulled up by the expenditure outliers in that group. 
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Fig. 8.10 Effect of need based permit allocation on vertical equity, expenditure is ranked 
according to double parameterised equivalence scale for all three cases 
136 Note that when making comparisons between deciles, the summary measure for progressivity is not 
used, only the relative welfare changes are compared between the deciles. 
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That the adult based allocation is most progressive is a result of the lower number of children 
per household in the lowest income deciles. For every adult in the two lowest deciles, there are 
0.33 and 0.34 children in a household, whereas the numbers are 0.39 and 0.37 for the two 
highest deciles. 
8.3.4 Vertical Equity: Other Permit Allocation Strategies 
Table 8.7 and Figs. 8.11 and 8.12 present the results for various other allocation strategies as 
outlined in Table 2.1. A per capita based allocation (I) generates the highest benefit to the 
lowest expenditure decile (2.740), whereas any other allocation generates much less benefit to 
the lowest decile (1.042,1.305 and 0.413). Thus a per capita allocation (I), and, based on the 
results of §8.3.3, a per adult allocation (V) appear to be the most progressive. All the allocation 
strategies are also progressive for the bottom 7 deciles when only vehicle-owning, non vehicle- 
owning or all households are considered. 
Allocation to only vehicle-owning households on a per capita basis (III) is the next most 
progressive allocation. Households without vehicles do not benefit from this allocation, but 
vehicle owners are allocated the entire pool of permits, thus allowing vehicle-owning 
households to enjoy the maximum benefit. Vehicle-owning households up to the 5r" decile 
benefit from the allocation on average. For other allocation strategies, vehicle-owning 
households from only the lowest three deciles have an average positive gain. 
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A per vehicle allocation (IV) and a per capita allocation with government retaining the permits 
of those without vehicles (II) both register similar progressivity numbers (0.132 and 0.133). 
The two burden concentration curves clearly cross each other, making it the classic 
indeterminate case of Suits (1977), when the allocations cannot be compared (Fig. 8.5). Also, 
the aggregate burden is much higher when the government retains the permits of those without 
vehicles (II). Table 8.7 shows that the per vehicle allocation (IV) has lower relative benefit for 
the lower deciles and also lower relative loss for the higher deciles, making the policy closer to 
proportional. As mentioned in §3.2.7, these subtle distinctions within the distributions cannot 
be ascertained from one summary index alone. 
For the allocation strategies where the permits are available to only vehicle-owning 
households, households without vehicles face a nearly proportional loss in welfare. The loss 
occurs because some of these households may have gasoline consumption from rented 
vehicles, yet they do not benefit at all from the allocation of the free permits. 
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Fig. 8.12 Burden share for different permit allocation strategies 
8.3.5 Horizontal Equity: Need Based Permit Allocation Strategies 
Earlier, Table 8.6 presents the ratio of total change to total expenditure of each decile as the 
mean relative welfare change for the decile. Within each decile, however, there could be a 
wide variation of changes in welfare, as was partially discerned by the division of each decile 
into vehicle-owning and vehicle non-owning households. Measures for horizontal equity 
capture such distributions within each group. The very few studies available on horizontal 
equity of income distribution use Gini index, standard deviation, coefficient of variation, mean 
184 
logarithmic deviation and such statistical measures to determine the distribution of absolute 
income (§3.4.7). On the other hand, the interest here is in the distribution of the relative 
welfare change rather than the absolute welfare change, since absolute change does not take 
into account the ability of a household to bear the burden (negative welfare change). Therefore, 
the distribution of the relative burdens is measured through the simple statistical measure of 
dispersion, standard deviations. 13' Since relative burdens for some households could be very 
high (especially because of very low reported expenditure), the outlier relative welfare changes 
are censored to the 0.5th and 99.5th percentile values for the calculation of standard deviation. 
The results are presented in Table 8.8. A per capita allocation (Table 8.8, I) consistently shows 
marginally higher within-decile variation than other need based allocation units. Therefore, if 
the policy goal is to keep within-group variations as small as possible (for fairness, see §3.2.1 
and §3.2.4), then a per capita based allocation should be avoided. 
Table 8.8 Standard deviations of relative welfare changes for different deciles in the need 
based permit allocation strategies 
I. Per person basisa V. Per adult basisa VI. Combination 
basisa 
Permits for adults 1 1 1 
Permits for children 1 0 0.5 
Decile 1 2.775 2.650 2.605 
Decile 2 1.914 1.720 1.740 
Decile 3 1.618 1.508 1.504 
Decile 4 1.471 1.384 1.389 
Decile 5 1.277 1.220 1.218 
Decile 6 1.156 1.109 1.108 
Decile 7 1.089 1.047 1.052 
Decile 8 0.902 0.863 0.869 
Decile 9 0.810 0.784 0.788 
Decile 10 0.510 0.499 0.499 
a The serial numbers follow the allocation strategies discussed in Table 2.1 
Since most of the estimates for relative burden are very small (less than unity), large outliers 
adversely affect the mean of relative welfare changes. The mean of the relative burdens also 
does not have any intuitive meaning. Therefore, the medians of the individual groups' 
distributions of relative welfare changes are presented in Table 8.9. For a per capita allocation 
(I), a median value of 1.759 for the vehicle-owning households in the lowest decile implies that 
50% of the vehicle-owning households of this decile has a welfare gain to expenditure ratio 
137 A commonly used measure, mean logarithmic deviation cannot be used, since welfare losses are 
indicated by a negative sign, and logarithms of negative numbers do not exist. Coefficient of variation, 
which is a more common measure for dispersion with two different means (the case here) is not a 
reliable measure, since for the middle deciles the mean relative change is very small, which increases the 
value of the coefficient of variation many fold. See Appendix E, decile 4, for an example. 
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higher than 1.76. On the other hand, 50% of the households without vehicles of this decile 
have a relative welfare gain larger than 3.412. The corresponding median relative welfare gain 
for the two other allocation strategies are higher for all deciles. The per adult based permit 
allocation (V) generates higher relative gains for the median households of all deciles 
compared to a per capita based allocation (I). 
The positive median value at the lower deciles indicates that for both types of households (with 
or without vehicles), more than 50% of the households would have a positive change in 
welfare. Another number of interest, the proportion of households with positive welfare gains, 
is also presented in Table 8.9. Although there are no large differences in this proportion among 
Table 8.9 Horizontal distribution of relative welfare change for each decile in need based 
permit allocation strategies 
I. Per person basisa V. Per adult basisa VI. Combination basisa 
Permits for 
1 1 1 
adults 
Permits for 
1 0 0.5 
children 
With With With 
No car All No car All No car All 
car car car 
Medians of the ratio of welfare chan- eýto exp enditure (%) 
Decile 1 1.759 3.412 2.600 2.117 3.987 3.102 1.977 3.802 2.857 
Decile 2 0.794 1.893 1.214 1.045 2.373 1.447 0.967 2.169 1.354 
Decile 3 0.405 1.411 0.559 0.519 1.817 0.711 0.490 1.620 0.675 
Decile 4 0.119 1.093 0.225 0.211 1.429 0.313 0.198 1.252 0.295 
Decile 5 -0.003 0.912 0.053 0.092 1.214 0.149 0.059 1.046 0.115 
Decile 6 -0.111 0.766 -0.071 -0.058 0.998 -0.011 -0.054 0.883 -0.023 
Decile 7 -0.232 0.628 -0.201 -0.173 0.839 -0.144 -0.187 0.714 -0.157 
Decile 8 -0.214 0.525 -0.196 -0.180 0.677 -0.148 -0.172 0.584 -0.156 
Decile 9 -0.246 0.375 -0.236 -0.243 0.500 -0.231 -0.235 0.432 -0.222 
Decile 10 -0.172 0.128 -0.165 -0.159 0.179 -0.153 -0.163 0.162 -0.158 
Proportions of households with p ositive benefits (%) 
Decile 1 79.33 95.75 86.85 84.57 96.17 89.88 83.69 96.38 89.50 
Decile 2 69.72 91.99 75.22 75.87 93.93 80.33 73.83 93.28 78.64 
Decile 3 62.81 90.53 66.65 65.96 91.45 69.49 65.41 91.69 69.04 
Decile 4 53.73 84.80 56.99 59.29 88.15 62.32 57.40 86.32 60.44 
Decile 5 47.34 84.06 52.15 54.14 86.96 56.30 51.98 85.99 54.23 
Decile 6 45.47 79.22 47.13 47.75 83.77 49.52 46.78 81.17 48.47 
Decile 7 37.59 78.03 39.29 40.82 78.79 42.42 39.59 79.55 41.27 
Decile 8 35.96 79.81 37.42 39.30 85.58 40.84 37.88 82.69 39.37 
Decile 9 32.56 71.25 33.55 33.44 73.75 34.47 33.11 71.25 34.09 
Decile 10 29.04 59.15 29.73 30.12 67.61 30.97 29.04 64.79 29.85 
All 47.48 89.76 52.50 50.83 91.48 55.66 49.58 90.97 54.49 
a The serial numbers follow the allocation strategies discussed in Table 2.1 
186 
the three allocations for higher deciles, some variations are noted in the lower deciles. For 
example, a per adult allocation (V) would generate positive benefit to 3% and 5% more 
households in the lowest and the 2nd lowest deciles than a per capita allocation (I). 
8.3.6 Horizontal Equity: Other Permit Allocation Strategies 
Table 8.10 presents the standard deviation of the distribution of relative burden among the 
households within each decile under different allocation strategies. The per vehicle allocation 
(IV) is less dispersed in the lower deciles and more dispersed in the higher deciles as compared 
to other allocations. A per capita based allocation (I) results in a wider variation in the relative 
burdens in the lower deciles. This is because a significant number of households (those without 
vehicles) gain from the allocation, whereas in the other three allocations, these households do 
not have any positive gain. For higher deciles, the differences in within group variation of 
relative burdens is negligible among all allocations except for the per vehicle based allocation 
(IV). Thus, from a fairness perspective, a per vehicle based allocation (IV) is more equitable 
than other allocation strategies for the lower deciles, but the other three are more equitable at 
higher deciles. 
Table 8.10 Standard deviations of relative welfare changes for different deciles for other 
permit allocation strategies 
1. Per person 
basis 
II. Permits 
calculated on 
per capita basis, 
govt retains 
III. Per capita 
vehicle owners 
only 
IV. Per vehicle 
Decile 1 2.775 2.264 2.418 2.085 
Decile 2 1.914 1.767 1.850 1.725 
Decile 3 1.618 1.540 1.592 1.571 
Decile 4 1.471 1.430 1.462 1.469 
Decile 5 1.277 1.266 1.289 1.335 
Decile 6 1.156 1.143 1.159 1.242 
Decile 7 1.089 1.088 1.100 1.145 
Decile 8 0.902 0.896 0.905 0.993 
Decile 9 0.810 0.807 0.813 0.865 
Decile 10 0.510 0.509 0.512 0.548 
Table 8.11 depicts medians of the relative burdens and the proportions of households with 
welfare gains from the different allocation strategies. There is a significant difference in the 
proportions of households with a positive change in welfare depending on the allocation 
selected. The per capita based allocation (I) clearly generates the highest proportion of 
households with positive gains. In the lowest income (expenditure) decile, 86.85% of the 
households gain from a per capita based allocation (I), whereas for other three allocations the 
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proportion is only 42.99%, 44.91% and 39.87%. A per capita based allocation to vehicle- 
owning households (III) results in 82.86% households in the lowest decile having positive 
gains, as compared to a 79.33% for a per capita based allocation to all (I). A per vehicle based 
allocation (IV) results in the lowest proportion of vehicle-owning households in the lowest 
income (expenditure) decile with positive gains (73.56%). A per vehicle based permit 
allocation (IV), however, generates the highest benefit to the higher deciles, with 47.37% of 
vehicle-owning households in the highest decile gaining from the strategy as opposed to 
29.04%, 29.04% and 33.22% for the other allocations. 
The proportion of households with positive benefits within each decile does not show a wide 
variation from decile to decile (range is 39.87% to 49.44%) with a per vehicle allocation (IV). 
This also indicates that this allocation is more proportional than others, a finding earlier 
established through the analysis of vertical equity (§8.3.3). The per capita based allocation (I), 
the most progressive of the allocations, clearly shows a wider variation from decile to decile 
(range is 29.73% to 86.85%). A per capita based allocation (I) therefore clearly benefits the 
households in the lower decile, whether they own a vehicle or not. 
8.3.7 Horizontal Equity: Further Investigation into the Per Capita Permit Allocation Strategy 
As mentioned in §3.4, single summary numbers presented in the tables earlier in this chapter 
can miss the subtle features in the distribution of relative burdens. Fig. 8.13 graphically depicts 
the distribution of relative burdens for different deciles with histograms. The distributions are 
only for the per capita allocation strategy (I). The relative changes in welfare are more widely 
distributed for successively lower income (expenditure) deciles. Not only does the lowest 
decile have more households with positive benefits but the number of households with high 
relative gains is also higher than any other decile. While the progressivity of the per capita 
allocation strategy (I) comes at a cost to the households from higher deciles, the relative loss of 
most individual households in higher deciles are lower than the relative gain of many 
individual households in the lower deciles. For example, in deciles 9 and 10 there are a very 
small number of households with relative loss more than 3%, whereas in deciles 1 and 2 there 
are a significant number of households with a relative gain higher than 3%. 
In addition to the expenditure deciles, the distribution of burden based on socio-economic 
classifications were also investigated. Results for some of these are presented in Table 8.12 for 
a per capita based allocation (I). Among the different family structure categories, families with 
children benefit more from the per capita allocation. This is because, families with children get 
permits for the presence of children, yet the presence of children generally reduces the Table 
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Fig. 8.13 (Cont) Distribution of relative burdens within different income (expenditure) deciles 
for a per capita based permit allocation strategy (I) 
consumption of gasoline. 73.24% of single parent households benefit from the policy, whereas 
for multiple adult families with children the proportion is nearly 64.5%. 
A higher proportion of households with female heads benefit from a per capita based allocation 
(I). Also, more households with non-white heads benefit as compared to those households with 
white heads. On average, households without vehicles clearly benefit from the policy, 
upholding the polluters pay principle. 
The proportion of rural households with a welfare loss (56.70%) is higher than that of the 
urban households (46.59%) since rural households not only use more fuel, but also are less 
responsive to a change in gasoline price. The average relative welfare loss is also higher for 
rural households than for urban households. 
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8.12 Summary welfare change statistics for different types of households for a per capita based 
permit allocation strategy (I) 
Family type 
Ratio of mean 
welfare change to 
expenditure 
(%) 
Medians of ratio of 
welfare change to 
expenditure 
(%) 
Proportions of 
households with 
positive benefits 
(%) 
Single adult, no child -0.312 -0.069 46.02 
Single parent 0.556 0.701 73.24 
Minimum two adult, no child -0.325 -0.112 44.28 
Minimum two adult, with children 0.161 0.316 64.50 
Male head -0.186 -0.051 47.65 
Female head 0.026 0.193 57.67 
White head -0.155 -0.003 49.92 
Non-white head 0.292 0.496 65.04 
Urban -0.066 0.072 53.41 
Rural -0.434 -0.182 43.30 
Vehicle owner -0.179 -0.049 47.48 
Non-vehicle owner 1.505 1.942 89.76 
8.3.8 Summary of Disaggregate Welfare Analysis 
The disaggregate welfare analysis shows that the equivalence scale in determining the deciles 
of the income groups is a very important factor in the analysis of welfare. The per capita based 
allocation (I) is still clearly progressive, and the per adult based allocation (V) is even more 
progressive among the lower deciles, when all households are considered. One significant 
difference from the aggregate analysis is that any need based allocation (per capita, per adult or 
children receive half what adults receive) is progressive among the vehicle-owning 
households. Similar to the aggregate analysis, the per vehicle based allocation (IV) is the most 
proportional through the disaggregate analysis as well. 
The disaggregate analysis allows further investigation into the distribution of the relative 
burdens within each decile. A per capita allocation shows higher within-decile variation than a 
per adult based allocation (V) for all deciles. On the other hand, a per-vehicle allocation (IV) 
results in the smallest dispersion among the lower deciles and the highest dispersion among the 
higher deciles. A per capita allocation (I) allows in 52.5% of the households to benefit from the 
allocations whereas a per vehicle based allocation (IV) benefits 45.31 % of the households. 
Understanding these distributional effects can help in designing policies or allocation strategies 
that could be more publicly acceptable. The proportion of households benefiting 
from a policy 
could also be taken as a proxy for public acceptability: if a policy benefits more 
households, it 
could be more acceptable (Mayeres and Proost 2004). Although 52.5% 
benefit from the per 
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capita based allocation (I), and the allocation strategy appears to be publicly acceptable, there 
is no clear divide in the proportion of winners and losers. Also, the other 47.4% of households 
who stand to lose from the policy, have an average quarterly expenditure of US$ 11,786 (US$ 
47,144 annually), which is 45% higher than the average of the households benefiting from the 
policy. Since the wealthier households could possibly be politically more powerful, public 
acceptability may not result in political acceptability. On the other hand, the average 
expenditure of the households benefiting and not benefiting from a per vehicle based allocation 
(IV), is almost similar (US$ 39,324 and US$ 39,584 annually), although only 45.3% of 
households benefit from this allocation strategy. The political acceptability of the per capita (I) 
and per vehicle (IV) based allocation therefore could be very different from public 
acceptability. 
The choice between fairness (horizontal equity) and social justice (vertical equity) as a 
measure of equity, however, may result in an alternative allocation strategy. For example, a per 
adult based allocation is the most progressive and thus would ensure higher vertical equity, 
whereas the per vehicle based allocation results in less within decile dispersion of relative 
welfare changes for lower income (expenditure) deciles, which ensures distributive fairness 
among those deciles. 
8.4 Sensitivity Analysis for Disaggregate Analysis 
8.4.1 Revenue Neutrality 
All the analysis on relative welfare changes above do not consider that a reduction in the 
consumption of gasoline will reduce tax receipts to government, equivalent to the rectangle S 
in Fig. 8.14. In the general equilibrium studies, it has been a common practice to evaluate a 
P2 
P1 
PO 
Quantity demanded 
3 
Fig. 8.14 Loss of revenue to the government (S) due to the pre-existing taxes (PI-PO), when a 
tradable permit policy is implemented 
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policy in a revenue neutral framework (§2.3.2). In this framework, the government requires a 
certain stream of revenue, and the policies are evaluated such that the revenue stream to the 
government remains unaffected. In the tradable permit policy, this can be achieved, if the 
government retains a certain proportion of the permits, which would allow it to recover the lost 
revenue. This would, however, mean that the initial allocation of permits to every household 
will now be smaller, although the market price of the permits remain the same. It is easy to 
visualize that, in such a case, the relative burden for each type of household will be higher than 
if all the permits were distributed to households. This scenario is different from the previously 
analysed ones (§8.2.4 and §8.3.3) where the permits of only those without vehicles were 
retained by the government. 
The weighted average tax on gasoline in the USA in 2002 was 37.5 cents per gallon (FHWA 
2006). At the initial consumption level for the year 2002 households in the sample, the total tax 
receipt is US$ 2,541,155. For a 15% reduction in emission of carbon, and therefore 
consumption of fuel, tax receipt falls to US$ 2,159,795, a shortfall of US$ 381,360. At a 
market price of the permits of 62.7 cents per gallon for a 15% reduction (§8.3.1) the 
government needs to retain 608,230 gallons of gasoline worth of permits. The rest are then 
distributed to the general members of the public. Only a per capita based permit allocation (I), 
is analysed here for the revenue neutral strategy. 
The results are presented in Table 8.13. The average loss for the households in each decile is 
smaller than the no revenue neutrality case, since not all the permits are available to 
households, although the distribution of burden still remains progressive. The proportions of 
households gaining from the revenue neutral allocation are also smaller. 
Table 8.13 Effect of revenue neutral permit allocation 
Reduction All permits allocated Revenue neutral 
With car No car All With car No car All 
Ratio of mean welfare change to exp enditure (%) 
Decile 1 2.016 3.876 2.740 1.539 3.415 2.270 
Decile 2 0.831 2.352 1.169 0.509 2.056 0.853 
Decile 3 0.350 1.737 0.520 0.093 1.502 0.266 
Decile 4 -0.009 1.110 
0.091 -0.218 0.934 -0.116 
Decile 5 -0.126 0.689 -0.082 -0.303 
0.552 -0.256 
Decile 6 -0.239 0.652 -0.202 -0.390 
0.526 -0.352 
Decile 7 -0.381 0.281 -0.359 -0.506 
0.182 -0.482 
Decile 8 -0.338 0.362 -0.320 -0.443 
0.279 -0.424 
Decile 9 -0.368 0.239 -0.356 -0.450 
0.171 -0.437 
Decile 10 -0.252 0.005 -0.247 -0.297 -0.031 -0.292 
Progressivity 0.557 0.217 
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Table 8.13 (cont) Effect of revenue neutral permit allocation 
Reduction All permits allocated Revenue neutral 
With car No car All With car No car All 
Proportions of households with p ositive benefits Llo) 
Decile 1 79.33 95.75 86.85 74.97 95.05 84.17 
Decile 2 69.72 91.99 75.22 63.70 90.83 70.40 
Decile 3 62.81 90.53 66.65 56.22 88.91 60.74 
Decile 4 53.73 84.80 56.99 47.88 82.37 51.50 
Decile 5 47.34 84.06 52.15 43.57 81.64 46.09 
Decile 6 45.47 79.22 47.13 40.33 77.27 42,15 
Decile 7 37.59 78.03 39.29 31.72 77.27 33,64 
Decile 8 35.96 79.81 37.42 30.12 79.81 31.77 
Decile 9 32.56 71.25 33.55 27.32 66.25 28.31 
Decile 10 29.04 59.15 29.73 23.91 57.75 24.68 
All 47.48 89.76 52.50 41.81 88.46 47.35 
8.4.2 Other Reduction Quantities 
For a further comparison of the distribution of welfare changes, 25% and 35% reductions in 
emissions and gasoline consumption are analyzed. Even larger reductions would likely have 
significant general equilibrium effects and also cause fundamental changes in travel behaviour, 
thus the results may not be reliable. The results are presented in Fig. 8.15 and Table 8.14. At 
higher reduction levels, the lower deciles benefit more at the expense of a higher burden for the 
higher deciles. This is because the permit prices are higher at larger levels of reduction and the 
benefit of the higher permit price accrues to lower income groups more. The summary 
progressivity measures, however, indicate that the policy is more proportional at higher 
reduction quantities. Although the lower deciles gain more as a proportion of their income, 
they gain less as a proportion of total burden, making higher reduction policies more 
proportional. This is where the Suits (1977) type progressivity indices may not be reliable. 138 
What could be more important from the perspective of a policy maker is the distribution of 
households with positive welfare gain. As compared to a 15% reduction in emissions, a 25% 
reduction results in only 0.48% more households in the lowest income (expenditure) decile 
bearing a welfare loss, instead of a gain. Similarly, a 35% reduction results in 0.99% more 
households in the lowest decile bearing a welfare loss. Therefore, a significant reduction is 
possible without forcing too many households in the lowest deciles to lose from the extra 
reduction. The higher reduction in emissions however causes more households in the higher 
138 A closer inspection also reveals that the tax-rate independency of the Suits (1977) type progressivity 
index may not hold when different behavioural responses for different households are included. For the 
present case, the Suits type measure of progressivity is normalized with respect to aggregate 
burden. 
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Table 8.14 Effect of different reduction quantities 
0.8 0.9 1 
Reduction 15% 25% 35% 
With No car All With No car All With No car All 
car car 
Ratio of mean welfare change to expenditure (%) 
Decile 1 2.016 3.876 2.740 3.627 
Decile 2 0.831 2.352 1.169 1.409 
Decile 3 0.350 1.737 0.520 0.509 
Decile 4 -0.009 1.110 0.091 -0.160 
Decile 5 -0.126 0.689 -0.082 -0.380 
Decile 6 -0.239 0.652 -0.202 -0.593 
Decile 7 -0.381 0.281 -0.359 -0.855 
Decile 8 -0.338 0.362 -0.320 -0.768 
Decile 9 -0.368 0.239 -0.356 -0.821 
Decile 10 -0.252 0.005 -0.247 -0.572 
Progressivity 0.557 
Proportions of households with p ositive benefits L/o) 
Decile 1 79.33 95.75 86.85 78.56 
Decile 2 69.72 91.99 75.22 67.73 
Decile 3 62.81 90.53 66.65 60.48 
Decile 4 53.73 84.80 56.99 51.37 
Decile 5 47.34 84.06 52.15 47.47 
Decile 6 45.47 79.22 47.13 43.28 
Decile 7 37.59 78.03 39.29 34.79 
Decile 8 35.96 79.81 37.42 32.89 
Decile 9 32.56 71.25 33.55 29.22 
Decile 10 29.04 59.15 29.73 25.35 
All 47.48 89.76 52.50 44.88 
car 
7.144 4.996 5.654 11.349 7.871 
4.311 2.054 2.060 6.803 3.114 
3.171 0.835 0.602 4.983 1.139 
1.998 0.032 -0.477 3.091 -0.160 
1.202 -0.294 -0.842 1.786 -0.698 
1.141 -0.521 -1.193 1.701 -1.073 
0.437 -0.811 -1.614 0.547 -1.540 
0.613 -0.731 -1.467 0.877 -1.405 
0.381 -0.796 -1.556 0.492 -1.513 
-0.056 -0.563 -1.114 -0.220 -1.097 
0.365 0.269 
95.61 86.37 77.74 95.47 85.86 
91.60 73.63 66.33 91.09 72.45 
90.30 64.60 58.63 88.91 62.82 
83.59 54.76 49.95 82.98 53.42 
83.09 49.82 45.22 81.64 47.62 
78.57 45.02 40.93 75.97 42.66 
78.03 36.61 32.32 76.52 34.18 
79.81 34.45 30.48 79.81 32.12 
67.50 30.19 26.14 65.00 27.13 
57.75 26.09 21.37 57.75 22.19 
89.30 50.15 42.58 88.63 48.04 
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deciles to switch from welfare gainers to welfare losers; 3.64% more and 7.54% more of the 
households in the highest decile suffer a welfare loss for a reduction of 25% and 35% 
respectively. 
8.4.3 Non participation in the Market 
The preceding results are valid when all households participate in the transaction of the 
permits, i. e. everyone sells their excess permits at the given market price. It may however be 
possible, that some environmentally conscious households decide not to sell their excess share 
of the permits and retire them (warm glow effect, §2.5.1). Some environmentally conscious 
groups also may enter the market, buy permits and retire them. In addition, households 
receiving a marginally higher amount of permits than they require may decide that the benefits 
of selling their excess permits is not much and may not sell the permits in the markets. In all 
three cases, the total amount of permits available in the market is smaller than it would have 
been if all the permits were available in the market. This would drive the price of permits 
higher. At this higher price some of the households previously not selling, may now decide to 
sell. The equilibrium quantity of the permits available at the market can be determined through 
an iterative process once the reservation sales amount is known for each household. The 
reservation sales amount is defined as the minimum sales receipts that would make the 
households sell their excess permits. In the absence of any estimates in the literature for the 
reservation sales amount, a scenario analysis procedure is followed. 139 Two scenarios are run 
assuming the reservation sales amount is US$ 10 and US$ 20 for every household. 140 
The distribution of relative changes in welfare for the two reservation amounts is compared 
with that of a fully participated market in Table 8.15. The lower households benefit more for a 
higher reservation amount. At the higher reservation amount, more permits are withdrawn 
from the market, making the permits more expensive. Since households in the lower decile on 
average have surplus permits, they gain more from higher reservation prices. If the permits are 
withdrawn from the market, the proportion of households not benefiting from the policy may 
differ substantially. For a US$ 20 reservation amount, more than 5% more households in every 
decile cease to benefit. These extra households losing out are the households that decided not 
to sell their permits in the market, as well as those that have to face an increased price of 
permits. Despite lower decile households gaining more for a higher reservation sales amount, 
the progressivity measure decreases since the total burden increases. 
139 It could be possible to estimate a reservations sales amount based on contingent valuation studies. 
This is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
140 It is plausible that the reservation sales amount depends on each household's income level and could 
be assumed to be a fixed proportion of income. For simplicity, only absolute amounts are used here. 
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Table 8.15 Effect of non -participation in the permit market 
Reduction Efficient market Reservation US$ 10 Reservation US$ 20 
With No car All With No car All With No car All 
car car car 
Ratio of mean welfare change to expenditure (%) 
Decile 1 2.016 3.876 2.740 2.041 3.938 2.780 2.108 4.102 2.884 
Decile 2 0.831 2.352 1.169 0.840 2.390 1.184 0.858 2.493 1.221 
Decile 3 0.350 1.737 0.520 0.352 1.763 0.525 0.356 1.835 0.537 
Decile 4 -0.009 1.110 0.091 -0.012 1.126 0.090 -0.018 1.172 0.088 
Decile 5 -0.126 0.689 -0.082 -0.130 0.700 -0.085 -0.142 0.726 -0.095 
Decile 6 -0.239 0.652 -0.202 -0.244 0.662 -0.207 -0.259 0.686 -0.220 
Decile 7 -0.381 0.281 -0.359 -0.389 0.285 -0.365 -0.408 0.292 -0.384 
Decile 8 -0.338 0.362 -0.320 -0.345 0.367 -0.326 -0.361 0.382 -0.341 
Decile 9 -0.368 0.239 -0.356 -0.375 0.241 -0.362 -0.392 0.246 -0.379 
Decile 10 -0.252 0.005 -0.247 -0.256 0.005 -0.251 -0.268 0.006 -0.263 
Progressivity 0.557 0.548 0.522 
Proportions of households with p ositive benefits (%) 
Decile 1 79.33 95.75 86.85 76.91 95.12 85.25 71.73 93.59 81.74 
Decile 2 69.72 91.99 75.22 67.64 91.09 73.44 61.28 90.31 68.45 
Decile 3 62.81 90.53 66.65 60.44 89.15 64.41 54.56 87.53 59.11 
Decile 4 53.73 84.80 56.99 51.44 83.28 54.79 46.95 81.46 50.57 
Decile 5 47.34 84.06 52.15 48.02 82.61 50.30 42.93 79.71 45.36 
Decile 6 45.47 79.22 47.13 43.82 77.92 45.50 39.22 75.32 41.00 
Decile 7 37.59 78.03 39.29 35.72 77.27 37.47 31.86 73.48 33.61 
Decile 8 35.96 79.81 37.42 34.05 78.85 35.54 30.28 76.92 31.83 
Decile 9 32.56 71.25 33.55 30.82 66.25 31.73 26.89 61.25 27.77 
Decile 10 29.04 59.15 29.73 26.95 57.75 27.65 23.20 57.75 23.98 
All 47.48 89.76 52.50 45.48 88.71 50.61 40.86 87.04 46.34 
8.4.4 Effect of Different Elasticities 
Table 8.16 shows the distribution of relative burden when all households are assumed to have 
the same price elasticity. The general pattern of distribution is similar if different elasticities 
are assumed for different households, although there could some difference between similar 
deciles. The relative gain is underestimated for lower deciles and relative loss is 
underestimated for higher deciles, if it is assumed that all households have the same elasticity. 
This is similar to the findings of the aggregate welfare analysis as well. The proportion of 
households with positive gain is also underestimated for lower deciles and overestimated 
for 
higher deciles. Thus assuming the same elasticity would show the policy is less progressive 
than it actually is (0.557 vs. 0.507) 
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Table 8.16 Effect of the same and different elasticities for different households 
Reduction Different elasticity for different 
households 
Same elasticity for all households 
With car No car All With car No car All 
Ratio of mean welfare change to expenditure CIO 
Decile 1 2.016 3.876 2.740 1.917 3.855 2.671 
Decile 2 0.831 2.352 1.169 0.769 2.345 1.120 
Decile 3 0.350 1.737 0.520 0.305 1.731 0.480 
Decile 4 -0.009 1.110 0.091 -0.044 1.108 0.058 
Decile 5 -0.126 0.689 -0.082 -0.148 0.694 -0.102 
Decile 6 -0.239 0.652 -0.202 -0.251 0.658 -0.213 
Decile 7 -0.381 0.281 -0.359 -0.386 0.291 -0.362 
Decile 8 -0.338 0.362 -0.320 -0.334 0.369 -0.315 
Decile 9 -0.368 0.239 -0.356 -0.354 0.251 -0.342 
Decile 10 -0.252 0.005 -0.247 -0.229 0.023 -0.225 
Progressivity 0.557 0.507 
Proportions of households with p ositive benefits (%) 
Decile 1 79.33 95.75 86.85 77.39 95.61 85.73 
Decile 2 69.72 91.99 75.22 68.24 91.60 74.01 
Decile 3 62.81 90.53 66.65 61.52 90.53 65.53 
Decile 4 53.73 84.80 56.99 52.98 85.11 56.35 
Decile 5 47.34 84.06 52.15 48.91 84.54 51.26 
Decile 6 45.47 79.22 47.13 45.30 79.22 46.97 
Decile 7 37.59 78.03 39.29 37.82 78.03 39.51 
Decile 8 35.96 79.81 37.42 36.16 80.77 37.64 
Decile 9 32.56 71.25 33.55 33.15 73.75 34.18 
Decile 10 29.04 59.15 29.73 30.74 59.15 31.39 
All 47.48 89.76 52.50 47.21 89.76 52.26 
8.4.5 Effect of Censoring the Elasticities 
In §6.6 the price and income elasticities were censored at the 0.5" and the 99.5th centile values 
since price elasticities were becoming positive, or income elasticities were becoming negative 
for some extreme values of price and income available in the sample. These censored 
elasticities have been used to analyze the distribution of changes in welfare in this chapter. A 
sensitivity analysis is carried out to check if the censoring had any adverse effect on the 
welfare distribution. Table 8.17 presents the mean changes in welfare for three cases, when no 
censoring takes place in the elasticities, censoring takes place (i. e. the households with extreme 
elasticities are assigned the nearest 0.5th or 99.5`h centile values) and when the extreme (beyond 
0.5th an 99.5th percentile) households are dropped. Clearly, there is no appreciable change in 
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the means of the three options. The censored option for the calculations is followed above 
since this option keeps the price elasticities negative and income elasticities positive for all 
households. 
Table 8.17 Effect of censoring price and income elasticities 
Censoring options No. of Mean change in Standard error 
observations welfare (US$) 
No censoring of elasticities 31325 -124.419 116.402 
Censoring at 0.5`h and 99.5t1 percentile 31325 -124.410 116.383 
Observations beyond 0.5`x' and 99.5`" 31013 -124.532 116.053 
percentile dronned 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter presented the results for the burden distribution for the tradable permit policy in 
the road transport sector. Elasticity estimates from the aggregate and disaggregate gasoline 
demand model in Chapters 5 and 6 have been used for the analysis. Because of the differences 
in the elasticity estimates between the aggregate and disaggregate gasoline demand models, the 
permit prices were different for the analysed hypothetical 15% reduction in gasoline 
consumption and carbon emissions. Both aggregate and disaggregate models, however, give a 
similar shape for the average relative welfare change by reported income quintiles or 
expenditure deciles for all households. Aggregate analysis using the average household to 
represent a group, however, is found to be deficient to analyse distributional burdens for a few 
allocation strategies, as compared to the disaggregate analysis. Disaggregate analysis of burden 
is therefore a better approach to modelling burden from a tradable permit policy. The per adult 
based allocation (V) is the most progressive of all the allocation strategies analysed, both, by 
the aggregate as well as the disaggregate analysis. The disaggregate analysis also showed that 
all the allocation strategies are progressive over the lower expenditure deciles, both for 
vehicle-owning households and all households together. Households that do not own a vehicle, 
and therefore do not emit carbon from vehicles on a regular basis, benefit more from a per 
capita (I) or per adult (V) based allocation. On the other hand, the per vehicle allocation (IV), 
although still progressive, is the most proportional of all allocation strategies examined. 
Burden calculations with no demand response on the consumers' side underestimate the loss in 
welfare for a personal tradable permit policy. Burden calculations using the same elasticity for 
different household types results in a similar shape for the distribution of burden, although for 
individual quintiles (aggregate analysis) or deciles (disaggregate analysis) the numbers could 
be different. Assuming the same elasticity for all households overestimates the welfare loss for 
lower income (expenditure) deciles and underestimates it for the higher deciles. 
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The chapter also conducted sensitivity analysis with disaggregate data for different reduction 
quantities, revenue neutrality, and non-participation in the market by the permit selling 
households for a per capita based allocation (I). A higher reduction leads to a higher gain for 
lower income (expenditure) deciles at the expense of a higher loss for higher deciles. A 
revenue neutral allocation still keeps the policy progressive, although all deciles share a higher 
burden than if all the permits were distributed to the members of the public. If some 
households do not sell their extra permits, then households in the lower income (expenditure) 
groups benefit more in proportion to their income (expenditure) and households in the higher 
deciles suffer more welfare loss, although non-participation makes the policy slightly less 
progressive. 
The distributional analysis shows that for any of the discussed allocation strategies, the 
tradable permit policy clearly remains progressive for the vehicle-owning as well as for all 
households. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 Introduction 
This dissertation investigates personal tradable carbon permits for the road transport sector. 
Such a tradable permit policy would increase the perceived price of gasoline and thus may 
affect different households in different ways. The principal focus of the dissertation is 
therefore on the distributional analysis of relative changes in welfare for various households. 
This chapter summarizes the major conclusions of the thesis. It begins, in section 9.2, by 
reviewing some specific conclusions that emerge from the various analyses undertaken. 
Section 9.3 identifies the contribution of the research to existing knowledge. This is followed 
by a discussion of the limitations of the research in section 9.4. Section 9.5 discusses the policy 
implications of the research findings and draws attention to some practical issues regarding the 
implementation of tradable carbon permits. The chapter ends with a discussion of some 
possible directions for future research. 
9.2 Specific Conclusions 
Fig. 9.1 describes the organization and content of the various chapters in this dissertation and 
their interrelations. The flowchart shows major findings and corresponding motivations for 
successive chapters. Chapter 2 reviews the issues associated with tradable permits, identifies 
the advantages and disadvantages, puts it in the context of personal road transport and notes 
that the distributional burden could be important for determining the best permit allocation 
strategy. Chapter 3 reviews the measurement of distribution of changes in welfare and 
identifies that different price responses for different households could have important impacts 
on distribution. Chapter 4 reviews the literature on modelling demand for gasoline, which 
proxies for demand for carbon for personal transport, and argues that price responses indeed 
could be different for various households, identifying the need for modelling heterogeneity in 
responses of the households. Chapters 5,6, and 7 estimate models of gasoline demand for 
different socio-economic groups using a variety of different econometric techniques. Chapter 8 
utilizes these price responses to determine the distribution of welfare change. The following 
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paragraphs elaborate on the flowchart and summarize the conclusions of the dissertation on a 
chapter by chapter basis. 
Chapter 2: Tradable Permits: A Review of Theory and Practice 
This chapter reviewed the existing literature on tradable permits with special focus on its 
application in the personal road transport sector. The major findings from previous literature in 
this area are: 
1. A tradable permit policy would be more effective than gasoline taxes in reducing 
carbon emissions produced by the road transport sector. Emission taxes may fail to 
effectively curb pollution due to the presence of other demographic factors such as 
growth in income, vehicle ownership or population. A policy of tradable permits, on 
the other hand, sets the emission cap first, and ensures that total emissions do not 
exceed the target amount. 
2. Personal tradable permits would provide direct incentives to individual decision 
making units (households) to reduce carbon emissions. Economic incentives work 
better in such downstream approaches, and this also upholds the polluters pay 
principle. Personal tradable permits have the potential to act as a buffer to reduce the 
effects of variability in crude oil prices, especially large price spikes. The policy could 
also be more efficient than taxes in dealing with inflation. The price of permits would 
fall if oil prices increase, keeping the overall price of gasoline constant. 
3. The acceptability of a policy often depends on distributional concerns about the 
burdens induced. A personal tradable permits strategy would address the distributional 
concerns directly. An effective allocation strategy could ensure a fair distribution of 
burden amongst households. Thus a personal tradable permit policy could potentially 
be more progressive than upstream allocation strategies. 
4. The tradable permit policy for personal road transport, however, could be associated 
with significant administration costs, which would increase the transaction costs. 
Chapter 3: A Review of Methods of Equity Measurement 
This chapter reviewed various methods and indexes available to measure the impact of a policy 
on welfare and how it plays out at the level of individual households. The significant findings 
are as follows: 
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5. Equity has two dimensions: vertical and horizontal. The vertical equity dimension 
deals with unequal treatment of dissimilar individuals, and is in line with the polluters 
pay principle. The horizontal equity dimension, on the other hand, is concerned with 
equal treatment of individuals that are deemed equal by some standard. While studies 
have examined the incidence of gasoline taxes on vertical equity, horizontal equity has 
not been analyzed previously. 
6. There are various measures available to determine the progressivity or regressivity of a 
tax system. These measures, however, may not be directly applicable to a tradable 
permit system, which includes the welfare loss due to price rises as well as welfare 
gain from the free allocation of permits. Index measures with a simple numerical value 
also fail to capture the subtleties in the distribution of burden across different socio- 
economic groups. 
7. The majority of studies on the incidence of gasoline or other emission taxes do not 
consider the price response of households such that they reduce their consumption of 
fuel. Furthermore, the possibility of different responses from different households may 
also affect the burden of distribution. 
Chapter 4: A Review of the Literature on Fuel Demand Modelling 
Existing techniques for modelling gasoline demand are reviewed in this chapter. Various issues 
related to the econometric modelling of gasoline demand are described and plausible 
behavioural responses of different types of households are explored. The following conclusion 
is drawn from this review chapter: 
8. Although there is a plethora of literature on gasoline demand modelling, there is a lack 
of studies that attempt to model gasoline demand across different socio-economic 
groups. There is however ample evidence from different studies that gasoline demand 
can vary across socio-economic or location-specific groups. The literature review 
suggests that demand responses could differ depending upon income, rural or urban 
location and vehicle ownership of the households. 
Chapter 5: Modelling Gasoline Demand using Aggregate Data 
This is the first analytical chapter of the dissertation. The chapter focuses on modelling 
gasoline demand using aggregate time series data for different income quintiles. A major 
assumption is that there is an average household representative of each quintile. A model for 
urban and rural households was also developed. The major conclusions are as follows: 
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9. The income and price elasticities for representative households of different income 
quintiles are statistically different. Results show that the price elasticity decreases with 
higher income quintiles, reaches a minimum and increases again, following a U- 
pattern. This result is not consistent with those of other studies, which used only 
disaggregate data. 
10. The unique finding of a U-shape could be the result of having a larger proportion of 
urban and multiple vehicle households in the highest income quintile. It is also 
possible that households in the higher income quintiles can cut back their gasoline 
consumption easily since a larger proportion of their travel could be discretionary. 
11. Representative households of the lowest and the highest income quintile were found to 
be income inelastic in their gasoline consumption. For the lowest income quintile, this 
is possibly because extra income is spent on other necessities rather than additional 
travelling. For the highest income quintile this could possibly be explained by demand 
satiation. 
Chapter 6: Modelling Gasoline Demand using Disaggregate Data 
This chapter builds on the empirical analysis of chapter 6 by relaxing the assumption of 
representative households. It develops a household level gasoline demand model to test some 
hypotheses regarding the price responses of households using a highly disaggregate dataset. 
The major findings are: 
12. The magnitudes of the price elasticity of gasoline depend on various demographic 
factors. It appears to decrease with higher household income but increases if more than 
one vehicle is owned, which possibly reflects the ease with which these households 
can own and use more fuel efficient vehicles. Multiple wage earner households also 
have a higher price elasticity. Households in rural areas are less responsive to a price 
increase, which could reflect the limited availability of alternative transport modes. 
13. The income elasticity of gasoline demand decreases with higher income, possibly an 
indication of demand satiation. Elasticities of multiple vehicle and multiple wage 
earning households are also higher. 
14. Rural, single vehicle, single earner (or no earner) households are the least responsive 
to a rise in the price of gasoline. On the other hand, urban, multiple vehicle, multiple 
earner households are the most price responsive. Households with the highest income 
elasticities are located in rural areas with multiple earner and multiple vehicle 
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holdings. The lowest income elasticity is observed among households in urban areas, 
with single vehicle holding and zero or single earner. This comparison is valid for 
households which are similar in all other aspects. 
15. Explanations are offered to reconcile the major differences in the literature between 
the price elasticity estimates of aggregate and disaggregate models . 
14' Much of the 
gasoline demand literature using household level data interprets the estimated price 
elasticities as short run responses. 142 It is, however, argued here that price elasticities 
from disaggregate models are more intermediate to long run. There was some evidence 
in favour of this argument from the dynamic econometric estimation, but the evidence 
is not statistically verifiable since some of the specification tests could not be 
performed. It is also argued that disaggregate elasticities are higher because they use 
household gasoline consumption, whereas aggregate data often includes usage by the 
commercial sector, which reduces the price elasticity estimates. 
Chapter 7: Semiparametric Modelling of Gasoline Demand 
This chapter extends the disaggregate gasoline demand model of Chapter 6 and focuses on a 
flexible functional form and interaction between price and income. Semiparametric models in a 
mixed model representation were employed for this purpose. Computing resources presented a 
significant obstacle in the estimation of this model and estimations were carried out on 56.5% 
of the disaggregate sample. The major findings are as follows: 
16. The price elasticities calculated from the predictions of gasoline consumption from the 
semiparametric model support the U-shaped price elasticity with income, although it 
cannot rule out that the translog representation of the disaggregate model in Chapter 6 
was a valid representation. The semiparametric model confirms the general 
conclusions of the disaggregate models in Chapter 6, although parameter estimates 
varied slightly since the model was estimated on a smaller sample. 
Chapter 8. Welfare Analysis 
The last analytical chapter of the thesis deals with the distribution of burden for various 
allocation strategies, along with some sensitivity analysis. The major conclusions are: 
141 Price elasticities from disaggregate models are higher than those estimated from aggregate models. 
142 Short run is defined as the period when no capital investment is made, for personal transport this may 
be taken as the period when households do not buy new vehicles or change residential location, or no 
major changes in infrastructure takes place. Long run is when these adjustments have taken place. 
The 
definitions of short, intermediate and long run, however, are still at the discretion of the researcher's 
judgment as there is no consensus about their stipulated timeframes. 
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17. Burden calculations with no demand response from the consumers' side underestimate 
(overestimate) the loss (gain) in welfare for a personal tradable permit policy or a tax 
policy with lump sum revenue recycling. This is because, with no demand response 
there is no dead-weight loss. On the other hand, for a tax policy without recycling 
having no demand response would overestimate the welfare loss of individual 
households. It is therefore important to consider the demand response of households in 
evaluating policy-induced burdens. 
18. For representative households, the burden distribution shape is almost the same 
whether the price elasticity is constant or varying across groups. Thus, incorporating 
different price elasticities for different income groups does not significantly alter 
conclusions, although it is still the theoretically correct approach. Disaggregate 
distributional analysis shows that assuming the same elasticity for all groups 
overestimates relative welfare loss for lower deciles and underestimates for higher 
deciles, thus resulting in lower progressivity, although the differences are not great. 
19. For representative households in the aggregate analysis, however, the effect of 
different elasticities on burden calculations is found to be more important than the 
effect of different burden measures, e. g. changes in consumer surplus or compensating 
variation, indicating that the choice of measure could be less important than modelling 
the behaviour correctly in assessing the distributional impacts. 
20. In the disaggregate analysis, equivalence scales for grouping households have a 
significant impact on the measure of progressivity of the policy. The same allocation 
reports lower progressivity when a single parametric equivalence is applied, as 
opposed to when a doubly parametric equivalence is applied to group the households. 
21. Considering permit allocation strategies which are based on needs, for all households, 
a per adult based permit allocation is the most progressive and a per person based 
permit allocation is the least progressive. An allocation where children receive half of 
what adults receive lies in between these two. 
22, Considering other permit allocation strategies for all households, the per vehicle based 
permit allocation is the most proportional, whereas the per capita (and, therefore, per 
adult, as found above) is the most progressive. More than 47% of households in the 
richest income decile benefit positively from a per vehicle permit allocation, as 
opposed to 29% for a per capita permit allocation. It is possible that households in the 
higher income deciles are politically more powerful, and therefore the political 
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acceptability of a per vehicle based permit allocation could be greater than for a per 
capita based permit allocation. 
23.53.4% of urban households benefit from a per capita permit allocation, whereas the 
proportion is 43.3% for rural households. On average, rural households also suffer a 
higher relative welfare loss than urban households. 
24. Under the condition of revenue neutrality to the government, the per capita permit 
allocation remains progressive. The gains to households in the lower income deciles 
are reduced and the losses to the higher income deciles are larger in comparison to 
when all permits are distributed. 
25. A higher reduction target in emissions would make the policy less progressive. The 
extra reduction does not necessarily mean more households suffer a welfare loss. A 
25% reduction, instead of 15%, would cause only 0.48% more households in the 
lowest income decile to suffer a loss in welfare. This, naturally comes at a cost to 
higher income deciles, since 3.64% more households in the richest decile would suffer 
a welfare loss. Households in each decile, however, would face more loss on average. 
This indicates it may be prudent to implement the policy with a lower emission 
reduction target and then subsequently have more stringent targets. 
26. There may not be one allocation strategy that is best at delivering both horizontal and 
vertical equity. Although the per adult based permit allocation ensures the highest 
vertical equity (and thus social justice), the per vehicle based permit allocation 
generates the highest horizontal equity (i. e. fairness). 
27. Permit prices, when converted to equivalent carbon prices, are very high (by one order 
of magnitude) than the estimated prices of carbon. This is a result of two factors: 
firstly, permit prices are directly a result of the relatively price-inelastic nature of 
gasoline demand, and secondly, any efficiency benefits from trading across different 
sectors are missing since only road transport is considered. A trading scheme including 
all household energy use may bring down the price of permits and thus lower the 
welfare cost of reduction. 
9.3 Contribution to Existing Knowledge 
9.3.1 Gasoline Demand Modelling with Response Heterogeneity 
In order to carry out the distributional analysis, gasoline demand models have been developed 
that can model different elasticities for different households. The elasticity estimates 
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determined for different socio economic groups or different household types alone is an 
important contribution, irrespective of the policy being analyzed (e. g. the same elasticities can 
be used for a carbon tax policy as well). The use of aggregate time series data to model 
gasoline demand for different socio-economic groups is also a novel addition to the gasoline 
demand literature, since previous studies in this area have used only disaggregate data. 
The disaggregate model showed that price and income elasticities may vary from household to 
household depending not only on income or on urban or rural location, as discussed in the 
literature, but also on other demographic characteristics, e. g. vehicle holdings and the presence 
of multiple earning members in the household. Interactions of price and income with various 
demographic characteristics of households have been introduced innovatively in this regard. 
The disaggregate model also allows each household to have different responses to a change in 
price or income depending on their demographic characteristics. This is also a novel approach. 
The disaggregate model in this research could partially explain some of the results from the 
aggregate model. The semiparametric model also generated a similar pattern of price 
elasticities as for the aggregate model. The thesis also offers explanations to reconcile the 
differences in price elasticities derived from disaggregate and aggregate models, which has 
been an unexplored issue in the gasoline demand literature. 
9.3.2 Distributional Analysis of the Tradable Permit Policy 
The research endeavours to generate a complete picture of distributional issues associated with 
a tradable permit policy using US data. Existing distributional models, which are derived only 
for gasoline taxes, often do not consider the demand response of households. There are only a 
few studies that consider a single response for an entire country and even fewer studies that 
consider different responses for different groups. This research provides extensive new 
knowledge on the how different elasticities for different household types can affect the 
distribution of burden from a tradable permit policy. 
Different permit allocation strategies have been considered in order to identify the most 
progressive allocation strategy. In addition to analyzing vertical equity, as is common in the 
gasoline tax incidence literature, the distributional analysis also focuses on horizontal equity, 
the distribution of the burden or gain within various similar groups. The dataset used for this 
analysis was highly disaggregate providing a far richer modelling framework to examine 
distributional burdens. 
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9.4 Limitations of the study 
9.4.1 Transaction Costs 
One of the most important limitations of the distributional analysis in this dissertation is the 
exclusion of transaction costs. The most significant costs are the administration and monitoring 
costs by the government. There are very rough estimates available for the capital cost 
involvement for administering such a policy in Australia (BTCE 1998) and the UK (Watters et. 
al. 2006). These two studies could be a starting point for further research to incorporate 
transaction costs. 
Whether the tradable permit policy remains progressive when administrative costs are included 
depends on how the extra revenue is collected to cover the costs. If the extra revenue is also 
collected via a progressive tax structure (e. g. the income tax), the tradable permit policy could 
become even more progressive. 
9.4.2 General Equilibrium Effects 
This analysis had only considered the partial equilibrium effects associated with a tradable 
permit policy, as modelled by increases in the price of gasoline. The welfare effects, thus only 
consider the first order effects of how the price and how the permit allocation strategy affects 
households. Secondary or general equilibrium effects, however, could be substantial. These 
include employment effects, if some groups are more likely to face reduced employment 
prospects due to the increase in travel costs; effects of the policy on other goods, and how this 
will affect consumption decisions for these goods; the impact on freight transport if they are 
also included in the trading scheme; and, the interaction with other policies to reduce carbon 
emissions, including economy-wide trading. These issues are important, however, 
consideration of all secondary effects was beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
9.4.3 Effect of Income 
The price of carbon permits in the welfare analysis depends only on the reduction quantities 
and price elasticities. However, possible increases in income may result in higher demand for 
gasoline and thus increase the price of permits more than estimated, which is not included in 
the analysis. A sensitivity analysis can be carried out with various projected income growth 
paths and the resulting welfare distribution. Intuitively, a higher permit price would make the 
policy more progressive as found from the sensitivity analysis carried out using different 
reduction amounts, which also led to higher permit prices. 
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9.4.4 Effect on Mobility 
The research focused on the distributional burden resulting from the direct welfare change 
through a rise in the price of gasoline and the gain from free permits. The implicit assumption 
in such an approach is that the welfare of households depends only on the consumption of 
gasoline. This ignores the possibility that a reduction in gasoline consumption can have a 
significant impact on the mobility of households. The reduction in mobility could significantly 
affect the households' accessibility to opportunities, especially for the poorer and rural 
households and thus have an effect on well being of the households. Estimating the welfare 
impacts of these effects is a rich area for further research 
9.4.5 Other External Effects 
Associated with reduced carbon and gasoline consumption is reduced travel. Reductions in 
travel could have important local benefits other than the benefits of carbon emissions 
mitigation. Most important among these local benefits are reductions in congestion and adverse 
local air quality impacts. Distribution of these possible benefits is not included in the analysis 
since the effects depend on specific local contexts. 
9.4.6 Gasoline Demand Models 
The aggregate data series for 20 years was a small dataset to model gasoline demand with 5 
parameters. While a larger time series data would have been better to generate more reliable 
estimates, no such data is available that would allow estimation of effects for different income 
groups. Although the disaggregate dataset had data on thousands of households, it was limited 
with only four observations across the time dimension. The gasoline price that each household 
faced could also have some error, since within state there could be spatial variations in prices, 
which could not be accommodated. Similarly the average fuel economy of the vehicles in the 
households could have some error, since information was lacking on how much each vehicle 
was driven, which affects the average fuel economy of the fleet. The goodness of fit statistics 
in the disaggregate models also did not allow the choice of a single best model. Limitations on 
data availability and data quality are, however, a common occurrence in econometric studies 
and no remedy was possible in these cases. 
9.5 Policy Implications 
9.5.1 Permit Prices 
The single most important outcome for policy makers from this dissertation is the high 
estimated price of carbon permits, which is one order of magnitude higher than the optimal 
213 
prices estimated elsewhere and the permit prices of the current European Trading Scheme 
(ETS). The high price from the estimates is a result of the relatively inelastic price elasticity of 
gasoline demand in the USA and having single sector trading within only the personal road 
transport sector. But it also suggests that to achieve relatively small reductions in carbon 
emissions from the personal road transport sector, the price needs to be higher than current 
economy wide trading schemes and carbon tax estimates (e. g. NRC 2002, Stern 2007). 
In this regard, it is important to note that in the USA the external costs of transport (including 
climate change damages) has been estimated as US$ 1.02 per gallon (NRC 2002), which is 
higher than the estimated permit price of US$ 0.63 per gallon for a 15% reduction in 
emissions. The current tax on gasoline, however is US$ 0.41 per gallon, which is much less 
than the permit price for a 15% reduction. In the UK, on the other hand, the tax on gasoline is 
much higher at USD 5.03 per gallon. 143 Parry and Small (2005) find that the gasoline tax in the 
USA is too low to cover marginal social costs, while in the UK it is too high. Therefore, based 
on their reasoning it is certainly too high to cover carbon costs only. The Eddington Report 
(Eddington 2006) recommends that marginal social costs be focused on all relevant costs, but 
that each requires its own pricing strategy. This would mean introducing a congestion charge, 
but at the same time drastically reducing the current gasoline tax. However, from a perspective 
of trying to further reduce carbon emissions from the transport sector, this appears counter- 
productive. While it may be cheaper to reduce emissions from other sectors, this raises the 
question of whether there should be some equity in the reduction of carbon across sectors. 
The very high estimated price for carbon in the personal road transport sector could potentially 
be reduced if trading among other sectors, especially for other household carbon emissions, is 
included. This would also bring a larger proportion of total emissions under the emission `cap'. 
The lower price of permits, higher coverage of emissions, and better flexibility offered to 
households in making their decision may make such a downstream permit proposal more 
attractive than a proposal for road transport alone. 
9.5.2 Other Policy Issues 
In the presence of shifting demographic characteristics (e. g. increasing income), a tradable 
permit approach could be more effective than a gasoline tax in achieving a target reduction. An 
additional advantage of the tradable permit policy is that permits can act as a buffer to stabilize 
gasoline prices faced by the consumers during sudden increases in world oil prices. This is 
because the price of permits will fall if the underlying price of gasoline increases. A tradable 
permit policy can also be efficient when the price of oil increases in the world market. 
A 
143 Using 2007 taxes and conversion rates at www. xe. com on November 2,2007. 
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gasoline tax will always add a constant amount (or proportion) to the prices, even if the prices 
are higher than that required to achieve a target reduction. 144 The price of permits in this case 
will become zero, making it more efficient. Considering the trend of higher oil prices for the 
past few years, tradable permits could become an attractive option in the presence of 
uncertainty in future prices 
Also, the additional benefits of reduced congestion and local air quality improvement from 
cutting carbon emissions and thus reduced travel145 could be significant and make the policy 
beneficial as a whole, even with the high permit price. Energy security is also an important 
issue. An economy-wide carbon tax, which is an efficient policy for carbon mitigation, may 
not have the same impact on personal transport and transport induced local air quality or 
congestion since most of the carbon emissions reduction will take place in other sectors of the 
economy, instead of from personal road transport. Once these additional benefits are 
considered, and it is noted that gasoline taxation is a contentious issue, tradable permits could 
have a feasible future. 
In addition to affording a certainty in emissions reduction, a per capita based tradable permit 
policy is clearly a progressive strategy benefiting those households from lower income groups 
more. The policy also benefits those households that are less carbon intensive in their travel 
behaviour, upholding the polluter pays principle. Although the per capita based permit 
allocation is progressive in general, and more than half the households gain from the policy, 
the public acceptability and political feasibility may depend on the political power of the other 
half, who could lose. A per vehicle permit allocation could be a suitable allocation strategy in 
this case, although it violates the polluter pays principle. 
The selection of allocation strategy for permits may also have some adverse distributional 
consequences, especially for rural households, who tend to drive more because of a lack of 
alternate transport modes. An equal permit allocation to everyone may put these households in 
a disadvantageous position. It may therefore be required to consider issuing different amounts 
of permits to different groups reflecting their need for travel. There could also be other 
household types that would be important from a policy maker's perspective (e. g. vulnerable 
groups). 
The cost of administering a tradable permit policy for personal road transport alone, could be 
significant. Many countries are considering issuing secure national identity cards. These could 
serve as a means of tracking permit allocations. Technologically, this is feasible, but politically 
144 The reduction in emissions, however, will be higher than the target reduction. 
145 However, if the households switch to new, more fuel efficient vehicles, travel need not be reduced 
and the benefit of reduction in congestion may not happen. 
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the implementation of identity cards remains controversial. This controversy is due to the 
ability to add exactly this type of additional information, in this case "tracking" carbon usage. 
Cost is also a significant issue, with estimates in the UK ranging up to £5.4 billion (US$10.8 
billion). 146 Waters et. al. (2006) put the initial costs of a tradable carbon permit in the transport 
sector at £594.1 million (US$ 1.2 billion). This, however, includes additional investments in 
public transport and lost revenue for the government (£370.2 million, US$ 740.4 million). The 
administrative operational and capital costs therefore were estimated to be £223.9 million (US$ 
447.8 million) in the UK. The costs would possibly be much higher in the USA because of the 
larger infrastructure requirement. 
A tradable carbon permit policy in just the personal road transport sector, which translates into 
a gasoline permit, could also have other significant issues related to monitoring and 
enforcement. While monitoring at the retail store level is possible and would reduce the 
requirement to monitor every household, fuel in retail stores are also sold to the commercial 
sector. In the absence of any policy to cover the commercial sector, it could be difficult to keep 
track of the fuel consumption for private and commercial use. Monitoring and enforcement are 
therefore two critical issues in implementing the policy. 
9.6 Future Research Directions 
The limitations of section 9.4 and the policy implications discussed in section 9.5 identify 
significant avenues for further research. Future research should attempt to rectify some of the 
current limitations, thus the issues previously discussed in section 9.4 are all potential 
directions for future research. Modelling the transaction costs, effects of rising income in the 
future and incorporating local benefits and other secondary effects are important research areas 
in this regard. In addition, the following research topics could further enhance the 
understanding of tradable carbon permits in the personal road transport sector, and the entire 
household sector, in general. 
9.6.1 Public Acceptability and Political Acceptability 
The research shows that 52.5% households would benefit from a per capita based allocation of 
carbon permits. For a per adult based permit allocation, the percentage is even higher at 55.7%. 
Although the results of the distributional analysis may be seen as a rough proxy for public 
acceptance (based on Mayeres and Proost 2004), the political acceptance of the policy could 
depend upon the political power wielded by households that stand to lose if the policy is in 
146 http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/uk_politics/6033687. stm 
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effect. Thus political acceptability could vary based on policy design and detailed analysis of 
these issues can help to illuminate these issues. 
9.6.2 Design and Implementation Issues 
The current research did not look into the various policy implementation issues. These may 
include identifying the government bodies to administer and monitor the process, setting up the 
market, electronic transfers of permits between households, etc. The research also assumes that 
adequate enforcement is possible and leakages to other sources can be curbed. However this 
could be difficult to administer since commercial vehicles also use the same gasoline. These 
design and implementation issues need to be further investigated. 
9.6.3 Extension to All Downstream Energy Consumption 
As mentioned before, a tradable permit policy in just the road transport sector results in a very 
high permit price. This is because of the relative inelastic nature of gasoline demand. The 
tradable permit policy can be extended to include all household energy (or carbon) use where 
elasticities could be larger. Such a policy would allow households more flexibility in managing 
the trade-off between transport and domestic energy use, and it would possibly be a more 
economically efficient policy since trading among different sectors is allowed. The modelling 
approach in this dissertation can be extended to evaluate the distributional analysis of such 
policies as well. Price elasticities of household energy use and transport energy use can be 
determined econometrically and used to determine the projected carbon price. There is an 
immediate research need in this topic, considering that such a trading policy is already being 
discussed at the government level in the UK (Miliband 2006). 
9.6.4 Taxes with Revenue Recycling 
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that carbon or gasoline taxes with recycling is the preferred 
approach in theory because of efficiency gains. This dissertation does not compare the 
distributional analysis of the tradable permit approach to a gasoline tax with revenue recycling 
via lowering other taxes. West and Williams (2004) however have shown that a lump sum 
return from gasoline taxes (similar to a tradable permit policy) is more progressive than 
returning the revenue through a proportional reduction in the income tax rate. Their results are 
directly applicable here, although various other progressive reductions in income tax rates can 
be investigated and compared in the future. 
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Table A: State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado 
1997 Jan 130.9 156.0 136.1 127.4 134.4 142.8 
1997 Feb 130.9 158.4 141.6 126.8 139.0 142.4 
1997 Mar 128.8 15 3.8 143.7 125.4 141.4 138.2 
1997 Apr 128.3 149.4 145.6 123.8 146.7 138.3 
1997 May 126.5 149.7 142.6 123.4 142.7 135.4 
1997 Jun 126.7 151.5 13 9.6 123.2 138.6 137.7 
1997 Jul 124.9 152.6 13 5.0 121.8 135.2 137.5 
1997 Aug 127.8 152.5 13 6.7 124.0 142.6 139.9 
1997 Sep 130.5 154.8 145.0 124.9 153.6 141.9 
1997 Oct 127.8 154.3 146.6 121.0 152.5 141.0 
1997 Nov 125.7 154.4 144.5 119.3 146.5 141.3 
1997 Dec 124.0 155.0 140.0 116.7 142.3 140.7 
1998 Jan 119.7 148.8 13 3.1 113.4 135.8 134.5 
1998 Feb 115.3 142.9 124.0 109.1 124.0 124.0 
1998 Mar 111.3 13 3.6 116.5 106.0 115.9 116.6 
1998 Apr 109.2 131.6 119.7 106.2 119.7 119.4 
1998 May 110.6 134.3 125.6 108.8 129.7 122.7 
1998 Jun 112.3 135.2 122.9 108.8 128.1 127.7 
1998 Jul 109.9 134.7 118.7 106.7 125.7 123.9 
1998 Aug 108.7 134.6 116.3 104.8 125.3 122.0 
1998 Sep 106.5 131.6 114.7 103.3 123.2 120.6 
1998 Oct 107.5 13 3.8 113.7 104.0 122.9 121.3 
1998 Nov 106.8 134.6 111.7 100.9 124.3 119.8 
1998 Dec 104.0 127.6 110.2 96.2 124.7 112.4 
1999 Jan 100.8 117.0 109.9 94.8 123.2 109.6 
1999 Feb 100.2 121.2 105.8 94.2 122.0 109.4 
1999 Mar 101.4 123.4 113.5 97.4 128.2 109.9 
1999 Apr 114.8 134.6 131.4 112.3 168.8 126.3 
1999 May 114.5 133.4 143.7 114.2 156.6 130.7 
1999 Jun 112.3 13 5.1 13 2.4 111.5 143.7 127.0 
1999 Jul 116.7 136.0 132.4 117.4 149.3 131.1 
1999 Aug 122.7 143.5 13 4.5 122.4 160.8 143.2 
1999 Sep 127.0 143.3 132.2 126.7 151.8 147.5 
1999 Oct 127.8 142.8 134.3 128.0 147.3 145.7 
1999 Nov 126.4 142.0 134.7 127.1 143.5 140.9 
1999 Dec 13 0.9 145.4 13 9.9 130.4 146.8 142.8 
2000 Jan 131.9 145.4 13 8.1 131.2 143.4 139.4 
2000 Feb 13 8.0 147.9 140.3 140.2 148.9 142.6 
2000 Mar 156.3 164.7 166.1 155.6 183.2 160.5 
2000 Apr 154.5 170.7 170.0 149.5 184.0 158.8 
2000 May 150.2 164.6 157.4 149.3 169.9 157.5 
2000 Jun 155.1 162.6 154.0 156.6 169.6 170.8 
2000 Jul 15 8.5 172.9 162.3 157.5 182.2 176.6 
2000 Aug 150.7 173.8 160.6 147.3 177.3 169.1 
2000 Sep 154.0 178.3 167.6 153.9 191.2 172.2 
2000 Oct 153.0 183.4 169.7 151.8 188.9 172.1 
2000 Nov 152.7 187.1 172.7 152.3 186.4 172.6 
2000 Dec 149.2 184.2 16 8.5 147.7 176.6 167.4 
xxi 
Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month Alabama Alaska Arizona Arkansas California Colorado 
2001 Jan 147.5 178.5 158.7 148.7 166.4 160.3 
2001 Feb 151.8 179.8 160.2 152.9 172.6 163.0 
2001 Mar 147.6 174.9 160.9 144.5 178.4 159.2 
2001 Apr 15 5.2 171.6 163.7 155.5 184.9 171.2 
2001 May 166.9 183.3 179.9 170.7 211.3 194.3 
2001 Jun 161.6 188.1 180.5 163.9 212.1 194.2 
2001 Jul 145.8 189.1 168.1 147.1 198.6 176.1 
2001 Aug 141.1 17 8.4 146.2 141.1 167.6 162.3 
2001 Sep 150.4 180.1 155.5 156.8 176.6 182.7 
2001 Oct 139.4 182.8 153.8 140.1 168.3 170.2 
2001 Nov 126.9 186.9 144.1 126.8 150.4 147.2 
2001 Dec 116.1 170.3 124.0 117.4 124.0 130.1 
2002 Jan 118.4 166.3 123.1 120.4 128.1 130.6 
2002 Feb 117.4 165.1 122.8 119.9 138.9 129.9 
2002 Mar 128.3 152.8 130.0 133.2 154.1 140.1 
2002 Apr 146.2 164.9 146.2 146.1 170.7 155.5 
2002 May 146.6 171.1 152.9 146.9 169.8 159.7 
2002 Jun 142.3 172.2 156.0 144.0 171.2 155.8 
2002 Jul 141.9 171.1 156.1 145.1 170.4 161.5 
2002 Aug 144.3 173.3 154.5 146.4 171.4 164.6 
2002 Sep 145.1 172.7 153.6 147.1 168.5 160.9 
2002 Oct 149.4 170.8 150.1 152.3 161.6 165.8 
2002 Nov 149.3 177.6 154.4 153.4 170.9 167.0 
2002 Dec 144.4 174.1 147.4 148.5 161.6 156.6 
0 
xxii 
Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month CTa Delaware DCb Florida Georgia Hawaii 
1997 Jan 160.3 13 7.9 132.8 127.2 119.2 157.0 
1997 Feb 158.8 136.5 130.4 126.6 117.7 158.1 
1997 Mar 154.8 133.4 127.9 123.9 115.2 156.1 
1997 Apr 152.4 130.7 126.6 122.7 114.0 155.9 
1997 May 150.1 128.3 124.2 120.7 112.4 152.5 
1997 Jun 151.0 129.1 123.7 121.0 113.8 152.5 
1997 Jul 146.2 127.0 123.4 117.9 112.6 151.6 
1997 Aug 15 3.2 13 3.4 129.0 122.1 116.9 154.5 
1997 Sep 157.6 137.2 129.3 123.8 118.2 161.4 
1997 Oct 152.6 134.7 126.1 121.5 113.7 160.3 
1997 Nov 149.3 131.9 123.7 118.2 111.2 158.0 
1997 Dec 146.8 129.5 122.5 115.5 108.0 157.3 
1998 Jan 146.5 126.0 119.1 111.1 103.6 154.4 
1998 Feb 140.6 119.3 114.5 106.4 98.9 151.8 
1998 Mar 134.4 113.9 110.6 103.0 96.2 147.9 
1998 Apr 133.1 112.8 111.4 103.4 96.0 147.2 
1998 May 134.7 114.5 113.5 106.1 97.8 149.5 
1998 Jun 136.9 115.6 113.4 106.8 99.7 147.3 
1998 Jul 131.0 114.5 111.1 105.4 97.7 146.4 
1998 Aug 127.2 112.7 110.1 103.1 95.0 145.5 
1998 Sep 124.7 110.9 108.1 101.2 94.2 144.1 
1998 Oct 128.0 112.1 108.6 102.5 96.8 143.0 
1998 Nov 130.2 113.0 106.8 102.4 96.3 144.0 
1998 Dec 128.5 109.0 103.1 98.9 92.0 143.7 
1999 Jan 125.0 105.2 99.6 96.3 89.0 142.9 
1999 Feb 122.4 103.5 99.2 95.1 86.8 141.7 
1999 Mar 121.7 102.7 102.6 96.1 89.4 137.7 
1999 Apr 13 5.2 118.4 116.4 111.3 105.7 145.4 
1999 May 13 8.8 122.4 118.5 113.0 106.0 146.8 
1999 Jun 13 6.9 120.1 117.2 111.0 104.8 140.6 
1999 Jul 140.5 123.7 118.2 114.8 109.9 138.9 
1999 Aug 149.3 132.2 125.5 120.9 116.3 140.0 
1999 Sep 154.2 135.9 130.4 123.9 119.1 139.2 
1999 Oct 158.8 138.3 130.9 125.8 119.1 140.2 
1999 Nov 15 6.7 13 6.6 131.1 124.5 119.4 137.9 
1999 Dec 160.9 139.8 133.1 128.6 122.6 142.3 
2000 Jan 161.2 13 8.7 13 5.1 128.3 122.6 141.6 
2000 Feb 162.7 141.0 140.1 135.6 130.3 146.4 
2000 Mar 181.9 15 8.4 15 8.1 151.2 147.2 166.4 
2000 Apr 181.1 156.3 157.6 146.8 145.2 176.6 
2000 May 177.4 155.4 154.0 143.7 144.5 170.5 
2000 Jun 188.7 167.2 156.5 148.8 150.8 168.7 
2000 Jul 189.4 17 5.3 163.9 153.1 151.3 178.2 
2000 Aug 183.9 170.3 15 8.2 144.6 143.7 178.3 
2000 Sep 184.6 170.8 161.8 149.7 147.4 182.5 
2000 Oct 181.4 166.2 154.8 147.9 146.0 184.8 
2000 Nov 182.1 167.6 156.5 147.2 144.6 189.8 
7000 Dec 179.8 160.8 148.5 143.1 137.5 192.2 
a Connecticut 
b District of Columbia 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month CTa Delaware DCb Florida Georgia Hawaii 
2001 Jan 171.0 155.3 147.0 143.8 138.5 186.1 
2001 Feb 170.8 156.1 149.5 146.5 141.5 188.3 
2001 Mar 167.3 150.8 149.9 141.2 136.4 188.7 
2001 Apr 173.6 161.2 165.5 148.9 146.6 187.1 
2001 May 199.3 185.0 179.9 162.4 158.6 196.4 
2001 Jun 202.5 177.8 169.0 159.6 155.7 201.3 
2001 Jul 190.8 161.6 15 6.6 144.5 141.9 193.1 
2001 Aug 166.4 148.8 149.8 134.8 134.3 187.7 
2001 Sep 165.9 153.0 153.3 142.9 143.6 193.1 
2001 Oct 158.4 144.5 137.1 134.3 132.0 193.2 
2001 Nov 146.1 129.2 129.9 122.5 116.3 189.1 
2001 Dec 132.0 118.3 119.8 110.0 107.0 171.3 
2002 Jan 13 0.9 121.2 120.1 110.7 110.5 161.7 
2002 Feb 129.7 121.6 117.7 111.0 109.5 156.5 
2002 Mar 140.5 131.2 13 5.3 123.2 121.6 151.4 
2002 Apr 160.2 149.0 152.0 146.0 139.2 160.7 
2002 May 164.4 152.7 154.5 147.1 137.4 163.9 
2002 Jun 161.9 147.4 145.9 142.3 134.6 164.5 
2002 Jul 162.0 148.1 148.0 140.8 135.5 166.9 
2002 Aug 167.6 153.2 147.2 142.0 137.4 168.6 
2002 Sep 167.5 153.1 148.1 142.3 137.2 169.4 
2002 Oct 166.0 151.7 151.6 147.7 142.5 170.6 
2002 Nov 172.3 155.6 153.0 150.0 141.6 
175.1 
2002 Dec 168.3 152.0 154.8 143.1 135.3 
165.2 
a Conn ecticut 
b Distr ict of Columbia 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky 
1997 Jan 139.3 142.7 132.1 129.5 126.5 127.8 
1997 Feb 140.5 13 9.4 129.1 127.7 125.7 126.7 
1997 Mar 142.9 13 5.4 125.7 126.1 123.7 127.1 
1997 Apr 143.2 134.5 125.4 124.6 122.9 128.1 
1997 May 143.1 13 6.1 128.1 128.3 124.7 128.3 
1997 Jun 143.5 137.6 128.0 130.7 127.0 127.8 
1997 Jul 140.2 13 5.2 124.6 127.4 124.1 123.7 
1997 Aug 141.8 139.7 130.0 130.0 126.7 126.9 
1997 Sep 147.4 138.9 129.3 131.9 126.5 127.4 
1997 Oct 146.8 133.6 124.0 127.6 121.9 123.7 
1997 Nov 144.9 131.0 122.4 125.0 118.5 121.4 
1997 Dec 142.4 127.6 117.6 120.9 114.5 118.5 
1998 Jan 134.6 120.4 112.4 114.3 109.0 112.6 
1998 Feb 126.5 117.9 110.2 110.8 107.7 109.0 
1998 Mar 120.9 115.3 108.3 110.1 106.2 107.0 
1998 Apr 119.5 118.0 110.8 109.6 106.1 109.9 
1998 May 126.2 123.8 115.7 112.6 108.4 114.2 
1998 Jun 127.8 123.5 114.4 112.1 108.3 114.0 
1998 Jul 127.4 123.5 112.3 112.0 108.8 110.7 
1998 Aug 128.1 119.8 108.4 108.9 106.2 106.1 
1998 Sep 127.4 117.7 107.7 106.6 103.8 104.1 
1998 Oct 126.2 117.6 107.4 106.2 103.1 106.1 
1998 Nov 126.3 115.0 105.4 103.2 100.3 
104.4 
1998 Dec 118.8 109.2 101.3 98.5 94.0 
98.9 
1999 Jan 113.0 108.9 99.4 98.1 94.6 
97.9 
1999 Feb 112.7 105.9 96.9 98.6 
94.5 95.2 
1999 Mar 114.5 111.5 103.2 101.8 
97.6 102.4 
1999 Apr 133.8 127.3 116.0 116.1 112.4 
116.7 
1999 May 139.3 128.9 116.1 116.2 
113.5 117.4 
1999 Jun 13 8.5 126.7 115.3 115.2 
110.7 116.3 
1999 Jul 143.0 130.5 120.2 118.1 
118.6 120.6 
1999 Aug 152.3 137.0 126.2 125.3 
125.0 126.7 
1999 Sep 154.4 141.2 129.8 128.3 
127.3 131.1 
1999 Oct 154.0 13 9.3 126.7 125.8 
126.3 129.4 
1999 Nov 147.6 140.2 129.0 124.7 
125.3 130.5 
1999 Dec 146.6 142.3 131.4 129.9 
129.6 134.6 
2000 Jan 144.8 145.7 137.4 132.2 
129.4 136.1 
2000 Feb 148.3 154.5 146.3 
142.3 140.4 144.2 
2000 Mar 168.5 167.9 158.8 
156.4 153.8 154.5 
2000 Apr 173.8 165.1 150.3 
149.0 145,2 149.0 
2000 May 164.2 178.7 15 8.7 154.0 
150.2 153.2 
2000 Jun 165.5 206.0 180.6 177.2 
175.9 165.4 
2000 Jul 172.1 174.9 161.3 163.7 
158.9 158.7 
2000 Aug 171.7 157.5 149.8 
150.4 149.3 145.8 
2000 Sep 177.7 171.6 163.2 163.4 
161.6 159.2 
2000 Oct 179.9 170.5 160.6 161.3 
156.3 156.5 
2000 Nov 176.4 172.7 163.6 159.3 
152.3 157.1 
2000 Dec 168.7 165.3 154.7 
150.1 141.7 148.1 
xxv 
Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky_ 
2001 Jan 156.0 159.4 156.8 152.6 146.9 150.6 
2001 Feb 156.8 156.8 153.8 154.4 152.4 149.6 
2001 Mar 158.1 150.0 148.7 147.5 145.1 144.2 
2001 Apr 15 8.7 174.4 169.8 161.5 160.9 159.6 
2001 May 173.9 203.5 195.4 189.2 184.4 179.8 
2001 Jun 179.5 182.3 170.2 169.1 167.6 165.2 
2001 Jul 173.7 153.3 146.8 148.5 143.9 143.0 
2001 Aug 15 8.5 166.6 15 9.4 158.1 154.4 149.2 
2001 Sep 169.5 185.8 174.6 173.1 171.2 158.7 
2001 Oct 168.7 153.0 136.6 142.5 140.6 134.0 
2001 Nov 157.8 137.8 131.2 131.4 127.2 128.6 
2001 Dec 134.0 127.8 122.0 120.9 118.1 118.9 
2002 Jan 129.0 123.7 121.7 121.2 121.4 120.8 
2002 Feb 128.0 122.2 118.7 120.3 123.4 117.1 
2002 Mar 133.9 139.3 133.9 135.7 134.5 129.4 
2002 Apr 152.8 156.6 147.9 149.8 147.3 144.4 
2002 May 15 5.2 15 8.9 151.3 145.1 147.6 145.4 
2002 Jun 154.3 157.1 150.0 145.1 146.2 144.6 
2002 Jul 156.8 155.5 150.7 148.6 153.5 145.6 
2002 Aug 162.2 156.9 149.9 150.4 153.7 145.6 
2002 Sep 161.8 156.7 151.4 151.1 152.3 147.6 
2002 Oct 15 8.8 161.0 157.1 155.0 159.2 
152.4 
2002 Nov 161.8 159.3 149.0 149.4 154.1 
147.0 
2002 Dec 155.7 148.4 145.0 143.0 146.4 
145.7 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month Louisiana Maine Maryland MAa Michigan MNb 
1997 Jan 130.1 138.3 139.7 140.1 132.4 139.8 
1997 Feb 129.8 137.0 137.7 139.4 129.1 137.9 
1997 Mar 128.6 135.5 135.7 135.1 124.4 136.5 
1997 Apr 128.5 133.1 133.1 133.6 123.7 135.3 
1997 May 126.5 132.4 131.3 131.4 128.3 137.5 
1997 Jun 127.0 134.0 131.3 131.8 128.0 139.0 
1997 Jul 124.8 131.5 13 0.1 130.1 126.6 135.7 
1997 Aug 127.2 13 8.1 13 5.0 136.8 137.0 138.9 
1997 Sep 129.7 142.2 138.0 140.9 133.1 141.4 
1997 Oct 127.6 13 8.0 134.6 138.1 128.5 137.8 
1997 Nov 126.1 134.8 131.9 135.2 124.5 135.3 
1997 Dec 124.1 131.9 129.5 132.0 118.1 130.7 
1998 Jan 120.2 128.3 125.8 126.9 114.3 124.4 
1999 Feb 115.5 122.0 120.9 121.2 114.0 120.5 
1998 Mar 111.7 115.4 116.2 114.4 113.1 119.3 
1998 Apr 110.4 115.1 115.9 112.5 113.9 119.4 
1998 May 111.5 118.5 118.6 114.0 120.0 123.6 
1998 Jun 112.1 120.5 119.6 114.8 118.7 124.6 
1998 Jul 111.3 119.2 118.2 113.7 117.8 121.7 
1998 Aug 109.1 117.2 115.4 112.3 112.7 118.6 
1998 Sep 107.8 115.3 113.1 110.3 111.0 117.1 
1998 Oct 108.1 116.2 113.7 111.4 111.2 117.2 
1998 Nov 107.4 115.5 112.2 112.5 108.2 112.1 
1998 Dec 103.5 112.4 107.6 110.9 102.0 108.5 
1999 Jan 100.7 108.3 105.8 107.7 100.5 108.0 
1999 Feb 100.8 104.7 104.2 105.1 99.1 107.2 
1999 Mar 100.7 104.5 104.6 103.3 106.1 110.6 
1999 Apr 116.6 120.7 119.1 119.9 123.1 127.2 
1999 May 118.2 124.4 121.2 122.9 124.6 127.0 
1999 Jun 117.1 121.6 120.2 121.4 124.3 125.2 
1999 Jul 120.2 125.2 123.6 125.3 128.2 127.7 
1999 Aug 126.8 137.4 129.1 133.4 132.5 134.6 
1999 Sep 130.0 141.8 133.0 137.6 137.0 139.2 
1999 Oct 132.5 149.7 134.1 141.7 133.3 136.8 
1999 Nov 130.9 146.5 133.3 140.2 136.6 136.4 
1999 Dec 134.7 145.4 136.9 144.0 138.6 138.6 
2000 Jan 134.2 142.6 13 5.5 144.0 144.1 141.3 
2000 Feb 140.6 147.8 140.8 146.8 152.9 152.5 
2000 Mar 15 8.1 167.0 15 6.3 164.4 163.9 162.1 
2000 Apr 156.0 157.6 153.8 164.6 154.8 155.0 
2000 May 151.8 157.4 153.1 160.2 161.2 161.1 
2000 Jun 156.4 168.5 160.6 169.7 200.5 181.7 
2000 Jul 158.6 171.7 169.2 177.4 178.0 163.4 
2000 Aug 15 0.1 165.2 161.0 173.1 155.5 162.7 
2000 Sep 155.3 169.3 163.4 174.1 169.6 172.8 
2000 Oct 153.2 169.9 160.7 171.6 168.0 166.5 
2000 Nov 15 3.6 172.5 161.6 172.6 167.6 164.7 
2000 Dec 149.0 168.2 155.5 169.5 157.8 161.0 
a Massachusetts 
b Minnesota 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month Louisiana Maine Maryland MAa Michigan MNb 
2001 Jan 148.9 159.2 154.0 162.4 160.1 167.4 
2001 Feb 151.5 160.0 15 8.3 162.1 155.4 167.6 
2001 Mar 145.6 156.9 152.8 158.6 151.6 157.6 
2001 Apr 155.1 161.5 164.7 164.9 173.0 170.7 
2001 May 168.0 179.0 181.9 188.9 203.6 198.0 
2001 Jun 161.3 174.1 176.4 190.9 185.4 177.0 
2001 Jul 145.7 157.5 164.0 176.9 157.3 159.7 
2001 Aug 13 9.1 149.5 152.4 156.5 161.9 174.1 
2001 Sep 147.6 159.5 155.2 155.9 180.1 180.1 
2001 Oct 13 8.6 15 6.2 146.8 150.9 143.9 145.6 
2001 Nov 127.3 142.6 135.3 139.5 137.1 138.1 
2001 Dec 116.3 127.6 124.9 125.4 125.3 125.2 
2002 Jan 117.5 131.2 125.3 126.5 125.3 126.7 
2002 Feb 116.8 131.9 124.3 126.5 125.7 124.9 
2002 Mar 127.8 13 5.4 134.5 134.8 139.0 143.9 
2002 Apr 146.8 152.6 153.7 153.8 154.3 156.5 
2002 May 147.7 156.1 155.6 157.1 157.5 154.4 
2002 Jun 143.8 152.5 152.7 154.4 158.2 152.0 
2002 Jul 143.1 153.9 152.3 154.5 160.4 159.9 
2002 Aug 144.0 159.6 153.4 159.6 156.9 162.2 
2002 Sep 144.4 158.4 153.0 159.4 157.5 160.3 
2002 Oct 149.1 159.1 154.1 158.7 165.5 166.9 
2002 
2002 
Nov 
Dec 
149.9 
144.6 
166.8 
162.7 
154.7 
151.6 
165.4 
162.4 
159.3 
152.0 
157.0 
151.2 
a Massachusetts 
b Minnesota 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month MSa Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada NHb 
1997 Jan 132.0 126.6 146.8 136.5 151.1 136.8 
1997 Feb 132.0 123.0 146.5 135.1 155.0 136.0 
1997 Mar 129.7 119.7 147.2 134.3 151.6 133.5 
1997 Apr 129.3 119.6 147.2 131.7 148.1 131.5 
1997 May 127.7 123.1 145.9 134.2 143.0 129.9 
1997 Jun 128.0 128.0 146.7 136.5 139.2 131.0 
1997 Jul 126.5 123.9 145.0 133.1 132.3 128.8 
1997 Aug 12 8.5 127.8 145.6 135.3 143.2 136.7 
1997 Sep 130.1 128.4 148.9 136.3 152.4 139.1 
1997 Oct 127.5 120.0 149.7 131.2 156.2 135.3 
1997 Nov 126.2 117.7 148.1 128.1 148.2 131.8 
1997 Dec 122.2 112.9 144.6 124.5 141.6 128.8 
1998 Jan 118.7 106.1 139.8 118.2 136.8 124.7 
1998 Feb 115.2 105.3 133.7 115.8 129.3 118.0 
1998 Mar 111.7 102.7 129.1 116.2 119.4 111.7 
1998 Apr 111.3 105.3 129.2 113.7 120.5 111.7 
1998 May 113.1 108.7 129.9 116.1 129.6 115.2 
1998 Jun 113.5 108.6 130.7 116.0 129.8 116.2 
1998 Jul 112.4 109.2 131.1 116.3 128.3 114.8 
1998 Aug 109.1 103.6 131.1 114.4 125.7 112.9 
1998 Sep 108.1 102.2 130.3 113.0 123.6 111.5 
1998 Oct 109.6 102.4 127.9 112.1 121.5 112.7 
1998 Nov 108.9 98.7 125.5 109.1 123.2 113.0 
1998 Dec 104.9 91.1 117.7 104.4 122.6 111.0 
1999 Jan 102.6 93.3 109.3 101.8 122.9 107.1 
1999 Feb 101.4 92.2 108.0 101.3 120.2 104.3 
1999 Mar 102.3 96.1 108.9 104.8 122.6 103.0 
1999 Apr 114.8 111.4 127.8 119.1 142.4 120.5 
1999 May 115.3 113.6 141.4 119.7 156.1 123.4 
1999 Jun 113.4 111.8 140.1 118.6 150.1 121.1 
1999 Jul 119.9 117.0 145.4 123.7 156.4 124.5 
1999 Aug 122.8 122.2 148.6 129.3 161.0 133.2 
1999 Sep 127.5 125.6 150.5 132.0 157.9 137.3 
1999 Oct 129.6 123.6 149.5 131.1 156.2 141.6 
1999 Nov 126.9 123.3 149.4 128.7 152.4 139.1 
1999 Dec 131.2 128.0 149.7 132.6 157.9 142.0 
2000 Jan 135.4 128.2 146.8 135.3 153.6 141.5 
2000 Feb 141.7 13 8.8 152.5 145.1 158.9 144.5 
2000 Mar 158.2 153.8 171.8 159.0 186.7 162.2 
2000 Apr 157.5 146.9 173.8 153.6 183.6 160.3 
2000 May 153.9 152.8 167.2 158.1 170.9 156.5 
2000 Jun 157.7 171.1 166.6 179.4 170.7 166.6 
2000 Jul 159.8 15 8.3 171.4 166.9 183.0 173.2 
2000 Aug 155.4 149.2 170.1 154.3 184.0 168.3 
2000 Sep 159.6 159.3 174.2 165.1 194.9 170.1 
2000 Oct 157.7 154.0 183.0 163.3 191.7 168.2 
2000 Nov 15 8.9 151.6 180.9 161.3 188.5 169.0 
2000 Dec 15 5.9 141.7 180.1 153.3 181.1 166.5 
a Mississippi 
b New Hampshire 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month MSa Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada NH° 
2001 Jan 151.6 147.9 160.6 154.4 172.4 158.6 
2001 Feb 155.4 148.9 161.4 158.8 177.4 159.1 
2001 Mar 151.8 144.4 15 8.4 151.5 182.5 156.1 
2001 Apr 15 8.4 161.2 162.8 165.0 183.7 161.8 
2001 May 170.2 182.4 184.0 189.2 195.8 184.6 
2001 Jun 165.1 162.9 180.0 172.5 193.8 186.0 
2001 Jul 153.0 142.1 175.3 151.0 177.8 173.0 
2001 Aug 144.5 150.0 169.8 159.4 158.6 153.7 
2001 Sep 152.2 160.7 172.3 176.2 177.9 154.4 
2001 Oct 139.0 133.1 168.1 150.0 172.6 151.5 
2001 Nov 124.8 121.7 150.6 134.8 159.9 139.3 
2001 Dec 119.2 114.2 134.7 124.2 138.6 125.0 
2002 Jan 121.1 117.2 133.7 125.3 139.3 126.2 
2002 Feb 120.1 116.7 13 3.9 123.7 141.6 125.8 
2002 Mar 13 0.6 13 0.7 145.2 138.7 147.2 132.6 
2002 Apr 148.5 145.0 155.8 153.1 162.2 151.2 
2002 May 148.9 145.8 163.4 152.7 164.1 153.9 
2002 Jun 145.9 144.2 162.5 150.2 167.1 150.4 
2002 Jul 145.0 146.6 162.5 154.7 167.0 150.8 
2002 Aug 145.8 147.0 163.0 154.7 164.4 155.5 
2002 Sep 148.4 145.1 160.3 153.4 162.9 154.5 
2002 Oct 152.0 152.4 157.1 159.2 159.1 153.0 
2002 Nov 153.4 147.5 162.3 156.6 165.9 159.8 
2002 Dec 149.4 141.8 155.4 148.5 157.6 156,6 
a Mississippi 
b New Hampshire 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month 
1997 Jan 
1997 Feb 
1997 Mar 
1997 Apr 
1997 May 
1997 Jun 
1997 Jul 
1997 Aug 
1997 Sep 
1997 Oct 
1997 Nov 
1997 Dec 
1998 Jan 
1998 Feb 
1998 Mar 
1998 Apr 
1998 May 
1998 Jun 
1998 Jul 
1998 Aug 
1998 Sep 
1998 Oct 
1998 Nov 
1998 Dec 
1999 Jan 
1999 Feb 
1999 Mar 
1999 Apr 
1999 May 
1999 Jun 
1999 Jul 
1999 Aug 
1999 Sep 
1999 Oct 
1999 Nov 
1999 Dec 
2000 Jan 
2000 Feb 
2000 Mar 
2000 Apr 
2000 May 
2000 Jun 
2000 Jul 
2000 Aug 
2000 Sep 
2000 Oct 
2000 Nov 
2000 Dec 
a New Jersey 
b New Mexico 
North Carolina 
NJa NMb 
133.5 136.6 
132.3 137.4 
128.2 131.9 
125.4 131.8 
123.0 132.0 
125.4 133.6 
123.4 132.1 
129.4 133.3 
135.3 136.3 
132.2 134.1 
128.6 133.9 
125.1 133.0 
120.0 127.7 
113.6 122.7 
108.2 116.0 
108.0 115.4 
109.9 115.7 
111.4 116.5 
110.5 115.1 
109.6 114.4 
108.3 111.8 
109.2 110.6 
110.4 110.2 
108.5 108.6 
105.4 105.4 
102.9 104.5 
100.3 105.9 
115.9 127.0 
118.1 128.2 
118.1 124.8 
118.3 128.3 
124.0 135.1 
129.5 138.2 
131.8 141.2 
131.9 139.0 
135.1 141.1 
137.5 139.1 
139.4 142.0 
157.3 158.8 
159.4 159.0 
154.0 154.9 
161.8 162.4 
172.3 169.5 
167.2 162.3 
166.3 166.1 
163.5 165.1 
162.0 164.5 
159.0 159.2 
North Dakota 
New York NC° ND° Ohio 
143.8 131.9 141.8 132.0 
143.0 130.9 140.5 129.1 
138.6 131.2 138.1 128.0 
136.4 129.7 135.9 128.9 
135.1 127.4 136.4 130.8 
136.3 127.4 139.5 129.2 
134.8 125.3 136.5 126.5 
140.2 130.0 137.9 135.5 
145.8 131.6 139.2 131.6 
141.7 129.2 135.1 128.3 
138.5 127.4 134.2 126.5 
135.0 124.6 131.6 120.3 
130.4 120.2 124.8 117.7 
124.1 114.8 118.8 116.5 
117.7 110.2 118.2 114.4 
117.1 110.2 120.5 115.8 
119.1 112.7 120.6 121.3 
120.1 112.6 121.5 120.9 
118.6 110.7 121.2 118.1 
117.0 108.9 119.9 113.6 
115.7 107.1 117.5 112.0 
117.1 109.0 117.2 113.9 
117.8 108.1 115.0 110.1 
114.9 103.9 108.7 104.6 
109.9 100.4 108.0 105.5 
107.2 98.9 108.0 101.0 
106.7 100.9 109.2 110.8 
125.8 115.8 119.4 125.0 
129.0 117.1 124.3 124.5 
126.8 115.1 121.8 124.3 
137.5 118.3 126.0 128.6 
146.0 125.1 132.0 132.0 
151.0 128.9 134.9 138.3 
154.9 130.2 135.5 132.5 
152.7 129.9 134.0 138.4 
156.3 134.2 136.3 140.4 
155.6 133.6 137.9 142.9 
157.4 140.9 148.1 151.4 
176.6 158.0 158.7 160.6 
176.2 154.6 150.8 152.6 
170.1 151.9 158.6 159.2 
178.4 157.7 177.0 186.5 
188.3 160.8 164.0 162.2 
180.9 151.0 158.2 152.0 
182.9 157.2 169.0 165.6 
181.5 155.8 165.2 162.2 
179.3 156.0 162.5 165.4 
176.2 151.1 161.5 155.2 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month 
2001 Jan 
2001 Feb 
2001 Mar 
2001 Apr 
2001 May 
2001 Jun 
2001 Jul 
2001 Aug 
2001 Sep 
2001 Oct 
2001 Nov 
2001 Dec 
2002 Jan 
2002 Feb 
2002 Mar 
2002 Apr 
2002 May 
2002 Jun 
2002 Jul 
2002 Aug 
2002 Sep 
2002 Oct 
2002 Nov 
2002 Dec 
a New Jersey 
b New Mexico 
North Carolina 
NJa NMb 
151.7 152.9 
152.2 154.1 
149.0 149.7 
154.0 159.1 
178.5 176.5 
181.0 174.0 
171.9 159.1 
152.8 154.3 
149.5 166.2 
142.6 154.5 
130.9 142.0 
117.1 128.0 
115.9 129.5 
116.9 128.2 
124.7 132.3 
144.5 146.5 
149.0 149.7 
146.3 147.4 
146.1 150.1 
151.1 152.2 
150.8 153.6 
149.9 157.0 
156.6 157.4 
154.2 151.3 
North Dakota 
New York NC' NDd Ohio 
160.1 150.8 160.2 159.5 
160.7 153.9 162.0 154.1 
157.3 147.2 155.3 150.6 
163.2 156.9 172.2 168.5 
185.7 169.3 195.8 192.7 
185.6 161.0 173.8 167.4 
174.8 148.0 155.8 150.7 
157.8 142.2 165.1 160.5 
159.6 153.7 176.2 171.0 
154.6 141.8 144.9 136.0 
144.2 130.1 133.6 132.4 
130.0 120.5 124.3 126.2 
129.8 123.2 125.9 124.6 
129.0 123.9 126.4 123.7 
134.0 131.4 141.7 138.3 
154.0 149.9 157.1 150.2 
157.7 151.0 158.0 155.5 
156.1 146.9 155.6 154.6 
155.5 145.0 159.7 155.8 
160.8 146.6 161.7 153.4 
161.4 147.3 161.3 155.0 
161.0 152.3 164.2 159.7 
166.6 154.0 162.3 152.3 
162.9 147.9 155.2 149.4 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month OKa Oregon PAb RI° Sc, SDe 
1997 Jan 122.2 139.0 137.3 145.8 123.8 134.3 
1997 Feb 120.3 142.9 135.8 144.5 123.1 133.9 
1997 Mar 119.2 141.8 131.5 141.0 121.5 132.5 
1997 Apr 118.2 145.2 129.1 139.0 120.3 131.6 
1997 May 121.2 141.9 13 2.4 137.0 118.7 136.4 
1997 Jun 123.4 140.0 133.1 137.7 118.1 138.1 
1997 Jul 119.6 135.9 131.2 135.7 116.3 134.2 
1997 Aug 124.0 145.6 13 5.6 143.6 121.6 136.5 
1997 Sep 124.0 154.5 139.5 147.8 123.4 138.5 
1997 Oct 117.5 152.8 13 5.1 143.5 119.6 135.3 
1997 Nov 115.9 147.2 131.3 139.4 116.4 133.7 
1997 Dec 110.5 141.3 128.3 135.5 113.3 128.7 
1998 Jan 106.3 130.3 123.6 130.5 109.1 122.9 
1998 Feb 103.0 121.6 116.3 124.8 104.7 120.0 
1998 Mar 103.3 114.6 112.1 118.9 102.3 117.8 
1998 Apr 103.5 117.0 113.0 117.2 103.0 117.8 
1998 May 107.0 124.7 116.7 120.0 105.1 120.7 
1998 Jun 107.2 125.8 118.2 121.3 104.6 121.3 
1998 Jul 106.9 125.3 116.2 120.4 102.4 120.6 
1998 Aug 104.2 124.4 114.7 118.4 101.0 120.2 
1998 Sep 101.8 123.3 112.6 115.6 99.5 118.2 
1998 Oct 103.1 122.5 113.7 116.8 101.1 114.8 
1998 Nov 98.2 123.8 113.0 117.8 100.0 111.7 
1998 Dec 91.1 122.0 107.3 116.0 96.1 107.7 
1999 Jan 91.4 118.8 104.7 111.9 92.1 104.5 
1999 Feb 92.8 114.4 102.9 109.3 91.1 104.0 
1999 Mar 96.0 121.6 102.7 108.8 94.1 104.8 
1999 Apr 112.5 151.8 120.8 125.7 110.7 123.9 
1999 May 112.2 148.3 122.8 128.0 112.0 125.3 
1999 Jun 109.6 148.4 120.1 125.7 109.8 123.9 
1999 Jul 113.9 15 5.2 124.8 130.3 113.7 127.4 
1999 Aug 120.2 160.6 13 3.4 138.2 120.5 133.7 
1999 Sep 124.6 156.0 137.5 142.7 124.1 136.9 
1999 Oct 122.5 153.4 139.7 145.6 124.3 139.2 
1999 Nov 119.7 146.6 13 7.6 144.1 123.8 136.1 
1999 Dec 123.6 149.5 141.4 147.6 127.5 140.0 
2000 Jan 126.5 148.6 139.9 147.4 127.4 141.1 
2000 Feb 138.1 152.4 143.6 150.5 135.1 150.2 
2000 Mar 152.7 174.8 162.1 168.4 153.1 165.3 
2000, Apr 142.5 174.8 157.8 168.0 148.7 160.9 
2000 May 146.8 164.0 15 5.2 163.6 146.4 162.3 
2000 Jun 167.4 163.2 165.1 172.0 152.8 183.4 
2000 Jul 15 3.0 17 8.4 170.3 179.9 157.2 176.5 
2000 Aug 142.1 179.2 161.6 176.5 148.8 163.6 
2000 Sep 155.1 188.1 166.3 176.7 152.4 172.0 
2000 Oct 15 0.2 18 5.7 164.7 174.7 150.1 171.5 
2000 Nov 148.0 179.9 165.5 175.9 149.0 172.2 
2000 Dec 137.1 173.9 160.7 172.6 143.5 163.4 
a Oklahoma South Carolina 
b Penns ylvania e Sout h Dakota 
Rhode Island 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month OKa Oregon PAb RI SCd SDe 
2001 Jan 141.0 160.1 154.5 164.5 143.6 160.3 
2001 Feb 142.6 163.0 156.3 165.3 146.5 164.2 
2001 Mar 13 6.7 164.1 151.0 161.6 139.3 159.5 
2001 Apr 154.0 161.9 160.7 168.1 151.9 167.8 
2001 May 177.2 174.2 17 8.4 192.9 164.4 195.4 
2001 Jun 15 8.2 180.7 175.2 194.8 157.5 186.6 
2001 Jul 13 7.4 174.6 161.1 181.1 143.3 164.3 
2001 Aug 148.4 163.4 149.1 159.5 136.4 167.6 
2001 Sep 162.2 184.3 153.5 159.1 145.8 182.0 
2001 Oct 129.0 179.1 142.5 154.5 136.0 158.0 
2001 Nov 120.2 162.4 131.3 144.4 123.7 142.9 
2001 Dec 111.4 138.7 123.4 130.9 113.8 130.9 
2002 Jan 114.9 134.4 125.9 132.1 115.9 129.0 
2002 Feb 112.8 13 2.6 124.2 131.6 114.1 130.2 
2002 Mar 127.1 140.7 132.3 139.7 125.2 140.4 
2002 Apr 140.0 156.4 149.2 159.1 142.2 152.6 
2002 May 139.5 159.3 149.8 163.2 142.8 153.6 
2002 Jun 136.0 162.6 147.0 159.5 139.3 153.9 
2002 Jul 142.3 164.8 148.9 160.4 139.4 155.4 
2002 Aug 141.3 165.3 152.1 166.2 141.9 160.8 
2002 Sep 142.9 161.8 152.5 165.1 143.1 158.1 
2002 Oct 148.9 153.1 152.9 162.8 148.2 160.7 
2002 Nov 142.1 156.1 156.3 168.9 150.1 157.7 
2002 Dec 13 6.9 149.7 153.2 164.9 144.9 152.8 
a Oklahoma d South Carolina 
b Penns ylvania e south Dakota 
c Rhode Island 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month TNa Texas Utah Vermont Virginia WAb 
1997 Jan 130.8 129.2 131.5 137.1 131.2 134.1 
1997 Feb 130.6 128.8 134.7 137.0 130.2 137.7 
1997 Mar 128.6 126.4 134.3 133.1 128.6 138.7 
1997 Apr 12 8.1 124.8 13 7.7 129.9 126.6 141.6 
1997 May 126.0 124.5 137.5 127.8 125.3 139.5 
1997 Jun 125.5 125.0 13 8.3 128.1 125.4 138.5 
1997 Jul 123.4 123.5 132.4 125.9 123.9 136.2 
1997 Aug 127.2 128.1 141.5 135.9 128.1 140.4 
1997 Sep 129.6 129.1 145.4 139.8 130.3 149.9 
1997 Oct 126.0 125.3 144.8 137.5 127.6 149.0 
1997 Nov 123.2 122.9 143.8 134.3 124.3 144.6 
1997 Dec 120.4 119.6 141.8 130.0 122.5 139.7 
1998 Jan 115.5 115.9 130.8 124.3 117.0 133.0 
1998 Feb 112.3 112.1 119.3 117.6 112.2 121.6 
1998 Mar 109.2 108.2 114.6 112.5 109.0 113.7 
1998 Apr 109.5 107.7 117.1 112.8 109.6 115.1 
1998 May 111.2 109.9 125.2 115.8 111.6 121.9 
1998 Jun 111.2 110.2 125.2 117.2 112.0 124.9 
1998 Jul 109.8 108.8 124.3 115.7 111.1 124.3 
1998 Aug 106.2 106.0 123.6 114.0 109.3 123.2 
1998 Sep 104.4 104.3 121.8 112.1 107.1 121.4 
1998 Oct 107.2 106.2 121.8 113.9 107.9 120.3 
1998 Nov 104.2 104.9 121.3 113.9 107.4 119.2 
1998 Dec 99.7 101.4 111.7 111.6 103.4 118.7 
1999 Jan 98.1 98.8 107.0 108.7 101.3 114.6 
1999 Feb 97.3 97.6 112.5 106.4 99.6 111.8 
1999 Mar 100.0 100.0 115.6 106.0 100.2 117.2 
1999 Apr 117.1 115.9 137.3 122.4 114.6 148.7 
1999 May 117.2 117.5 141.6 124.6 116.1 145.9 
1999 Jun 114.9 114.9 13 6.5 122.5 114.5 144.5 
1999 Jul 118.2 118.6 140.1 127.2 118.1 151.1 
1999 Aug 125.1 125.2 150.5 135.2 123.9 154.4 
1999 Sep 128.7 128.9 153.5 139.2 128.0 151.4 
1999 Oct 129.1 130.0 150.6 142.9 128.8 149.4 
1999 Nov 126.7 128.0 142.6 140.5 128.1 144.7 
1999 Dec 13 0.0 132.4 145.8 144.5 133.5 147.8 
2000 Jan 129.6 131.4 139.4 144.6 133.4 146.5 
2000 Feb 13 7.6 13 7.7 145.3 147.7 138.0 150.2 
2000 Mar 156.5 155.1 165.3 165.4 155.9 173.3 
2000 Apr 154.8 152.3 170.2 162.2 153.8 175.9 
2000 May 150.4 151.3 158.7 159.0 152.4 164.6 
2000 Jun 156.6 158.2 160.1 167.3 158.6 163.4 
2000 Jul 159.6 160.7 170.0 171.2 163.5 176.0 
2000 Aug 148.5 152.4 167.5 165.6 155.9 176.3 
2000 Sep 155.3 154.5 172.5 168.3 157.6 183.7 
2000 Oct 153.2 152.4 173.2 168.2 155.9 181.4 
2000 Nov 151.9 149.9 170.0 168.9 156.1 176.9 
2000 Dec 145.8 143.4 15 8.8 163.4 151.6 171.7 
a Tennessee 
b Washington 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month TN' Texas Utah Vermont Virginia WAb 
2001 Jan 146.9 144.9 147.3 158.0 150.8 161.2 
2001 Feb 148.7 147.2 150.2 159.5 153.6 162.3 
2001 Mar 144.9 143.5 15 3.4 155.9 149.1 164.6 
2001 Apr 157.0 157.2 156.7 160.5 159.8 161.4 
2001 May 170.0 173.0 174.8 177.6 173.7 172.3 
2001 Jun 165.9 166.2 177.6 172.6 169.6 178.8 
2001 Jul 148.2 149.7 174.4 162.1 155.7 173.0 
2001 Aug 140.9 141.7 15 5.6 152.2 143.0 160.5 
2001 Sep 151.9 149.0 166.6 157.0 147.2 179.9 
2001 Oct 139.9 137.2 168.4 153.9 136.6 176.8 
2001 Nov 126.0 124.4 152.8 143.6 125.7 162.0 
2001 Dec 116.6 114.2 130.6 129.6 116.2 135.5 
2002 Jan 119.3 116.0 127.3 129.8 117.9 130.8 
2002 Feb 117.0 115.8 124.3 129.7 116.3 127.9 
2002 Mar 126.4 129.4 133.1 136.5 126.7 136.7 
2002 Apr 144.7 147.5 152.8 152.8 148.4 155.5 
2002 May 144.8 148.3 153.6 155.6 150.0 158.9 
2002 Jun 142.6 144.1 153.9 152.3 146.1 161.6 
2002 Jul 143.8 143.2 15 8.1 153.2 145.1 160.5 
2002 Aug 144.4 144.5 162.6 157.1 146.1 161.3 
2002 Sep 145.3 145.4 160.9 157.5 146.0 157.4 
2002 Oct 151.4 149.5 160.3 158.6 149.7 149.7 
2002 Nov 150.8 148.0 162.6 163.4 149.9 
154.4 
2002 Dec 143.4 143.1 153.4 162.1 145.5 
147.9 
a Tennessee 
b Wash ington 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month WVa Wisconsin Wyoming USA 
1997 Jan 141.2 137.4 128.5 131.8 
1997 Feb 141.2 13 5.3 127.5 131.2 
1997 Mar 13 9.0 131.5 127.4 129.3 
1997 Apr 13 8.2 13 0.2 126.4 128.8 
1997 May 13 5.8 13 3.4 127.9 128.4 
1997 Jun 136.2 134.3 128.8 128.6 
1997 Jul 133.9 131.9 126.4 126.3 
1997 Aug 13 5.9 13 6.6 128.1 131.0 
1997 Sep 138.3 135.6 130.2 133.4 
1997 Oct 135.2 129.6 130.4 130.0 
1997 Nov 132.2 128.0 127.0 127.1 
1997 Dec 128.8 125.1 123.2 123.6 
1998 Jan 124.6 119.3 116.5 118.6 
1998 Feb 120.6 117.3 110.0 113.7 
1998 Mar 117.4 114.4 106.6 109.7 
1998 Apr 118.1 118.7 109.4 110.6 
1998 May 122.4 123.5 110.2 114.6 
1998 Jun 122.9 123.2 112.4 114.8 
1998 Jul 119.9 121.6 118.9 113.4 
1998 Aug 115.1 117.4 118.5 110.8 
1998 Sep 112.3 115.6 116.2 109.1 
1998 Oct 113.2 115.4 114.7 109.9 
1998 Nov 114.0 112.1 114.5 108.6 
1998 Dec 109.6 106.6 106.4 104.6 
1999 Jan 107.1 107.8 102.1 103.1 
1999 Feb 104.6 105.8 102.0 101.4 
1999 Mar 107.1 110.4 103.8 104.8 
1999 Apr 122.2 126.2 121.6 123.2 
1999 May 124.7 127.8 125.2 123.3 
1999 Jun 122.7 125.8 125.4 120.4 
1999 Jul 126.1 129.9 128.8 124.4 
1999 Aug 131.3 135.5 137.0 130.9 
1999 Sep 133.7 140.2 140.0 133.4 
1999 Oct 134.7 13 8.0 140.6 132.9 
1999 Nov 137.6 138.5 135.5 131.9 
1999 Dec 141.3 140.3 134.7 135.3 
2000 Jan 141.2 143.4 132.9 135.6 
2000 Feb 150.2 153.7 139.6 142.2 
2000 Mar 164.8 162.8 155.6 159.4 
2000 Apr 157.7 156.2 155.0 156.1 
2000 May 157.6 165.5 152.1 155.2 
2000 Jun 170.4 18 8.6 160.9 166.6 
2000 Jul 172.9 164.5 167.0 164.2 
2000 Aug 160.4 157.3 162.2 155.9 
2000 Sep 166.9 170.6 163.1 163.5 
2000 Oct 165.5 168.1 164.4 161.3 
2000 Nov 166.0 16 8.4 164.2 160.8 
2000 Dec 156.3 159.6 154.6 154.4 
a West Virginia 
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Table A (cont): State-wise nominal gasoline price matrix for different months 
Year Month WVa Wisconsin Wyoming USA 
2001 Jan 156.5 162.8 146.7 152.5 
2001 Feb 159.2 159.8 152.9 153.8 
2001 Mar 153.2 154.8 151.7 150.3 
2001 Apr 166.8 176.1 155.1 161.7 
2001 May 187.1 201.6 176.3 181.2 
2001 Jun 176.1 180.6 177.0 173.1 
2001 Jul 157.7 159.4 162.4 156.5 
2001 Aug 151.2 173.4 153.0 150,9 
2001 Sep 162.2 184.9 165.6 160.9 
2001 Oct 150.0 152.8 160.3 144.2 
2001 Nov 13 8.2 141.7 142.6 132.4 
2001 Dec 127.2 131.6 121.0 120.0 
2002 Jan 128.5 132.4 121.2 120.9 
2002 Feb 126.2 131.1 120.9 121.0 
2002 Mar 136.5 144.5 133.6 132.4 
2002 Apr 155.0 158.2 148.1 149.3 
2002 May 156.8 162.0 149.5 150.8 
2002 Jun 153.8 160.3 148.0 148.9 
2002 Jul 154.0 162.0 151.0 149.6 
2002 Aug 155.1 162.0 154.9 150.8 
2002 Sep 156.2 162.9 155.0 150.7 
2002 Oct 162.4 169.4 15 5.2 153.5 
2002 Nov 162.1 163.3 156.6 153.4 
2002 Dec 156.4 157.0 146.9 147.7 
a West Virginia 
xxxviii 
APPENDIX B 
Pair-wise Correlation between Highly Correlated 
Explanatory Variables 
XXXIX 
O 
E 
"d 
cd 
'O 
b! ) 
bA 
bA 
c 
cd 
cd 
O 
cd 
G) 
4) 
O 
U 
bp 
a) 
4) 
N 
C 
O 
10 
Q x 
ö 
O 
0 
E 
a Q 
x 
0 
O 
ö 
00 1 
Q - ö 
x 
ö ö 
Q - O O 
x 
O 
Ö 
00 
C 
00 
N 
\ýD 
t 
Q ý O O O 
2 
Q 
x 
Ö 
O 
O 
- 
00 
O 
O 
O 
C-- 
O 
0 
9 
m 
"D 
O 
O 
vii 
kf) 
O 
O 
M V) "0 C-q Ö 
5 
lý 
c, ' 
ý" 
O 
N 
x 
, -, p O O 
p p 
O Oý N Q M ý1 
CD CD 00 CI r- 
w O O O kr) 
O 
kr) "o 
O O O O O O 
u 
O 
Ö 
ct 
kr) 
It 
N 
C) 
oO 
O 
C7ý 
00 
M 
00 
N 
"O 
M 
- 
Ö Ö 
O O O I- Cl) ON 
-- O O O O O O O 
O 00 if) Cl O 00 -- M M 
Gl. 
x 
p 00 
O O 
M 
d 
M 
N 
O 
Zt 
O 
C) 
O 
- 
O 
x 
O 
p 
. - 
00 
a, 
O 
O\ 
m 
O 
- 
00 
O 
r 
- 
9 
00 
'-' 
O, 
N 
m 
O 
O 
O 
00 
M 
O 
00 
d 
O 
N 
a 
O 
O 
Ö 
O 
O 
N 
N 
Ö 
N 
Cý 
O 
O 
O 
N 
00 
N 
O 
O 
N 
O 
O, 
O 
N_ 
to 
O 
O 
O 
N 
O 
O 
[N 
M 
O 
O 
O 
O 
Ö 
O 
C 
O 
a, 
C\ 
O 
ý, D 
IC 
- 
"It 
O 
N 
00 
N 
Ö 
Cý 
O 
O 
Ö 
C 
r- 
N 
O 
O 
- 
kf) 
O 
O 
00 
kn 
O 
O 
- 
tr 
O 
O 
N 
M 
O 
O 
C 
M 
O 
O 
0 
O 
O 
O 
N ^ 
ý 
O 
O 
O 
O 
M 
Vn 
N 
O 
N 
tf1 
N 
O 
' 
"D 
M 
Qý 
M 
N 
00 
Oý 
O 
N 
O 
O 
ý 
O 
- 
oo 
O 
d' 
O 
00 
M 
- 
I 
N 
. -. 
. 
I 
M 
ýO 
d' 
O 
`O 
v) 
ý 
(6 
M 
O 
N 
llýt 
O 
= 
O 
O 
O 
[- 
00 
Cý 
C7, 
O 
O 
kn 
N 
c) 
O 
V-) 
kn 
N 
O 
Ö 
kr1 
N 
M 
O-, 
O 
(7ý, 
O 
00 
O 
N 
N 
O 
-; 
O 
O 
N 
- 
'T 
O 
pý, 
cr 
O 
[- 
O 
I 
M 
00 
- 
O 
M 
O 
dIn , 
O 
00 
Cl d' 
O 
kn 
ct 
O 
U rý ý 
X 
ý 
X 
i--ý r-"ý ý 
Q Q 
x 
C 
Q 
x 
C 
Q 
C 
Q 
C 
X 
APPENDIX C 
Semiparametric Model Estimations without Household Effects 
x1i 
- 
U 
2 
4-ý 
'. O 
cd 
O 
E 
CJ 
cd 
cd 
4-4 O 
cn 
cý 
. r. 
N 
C 
N 
s., 
b 
4-ý 
O 
O 
cd 
a 
0 
U 
U 
H 
0 
a) 
b 
U CD 
z ö 
CD 
0 2-0 
; zö 
a 
0 
73 
X 
IV 
C 
t:, 
b 
cC 
>z~ ýa N 
N 
a 
-d 
UU Sý 
bA "Ci r. 
ýýxW 
Cl)_ N_ 
N tr) 
00 
000 
kr) N "D N d' N ýo 
_ 
41 01 --ý 00 N 00 00 t 
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOMOO 
OOOO6O6OO6OO6OOOO 
00 
It 
kr) 00 00 mNM ýc 00 00 [- -N- 00 M "O 00 . --" ppOOOpp-OO O Cý 'ZI; NO OO666ppOpOOppOÖÖ 
O 
O 
O 
O 
, --" 
O 
k 
N 
O 
N 
O 
Itt 
O 
00 
"o 
O 
O 
O 
00 
O 
O 
kr) 
O', 
O 
O 
N 
41 
O 
O 
- 
O 
N 
00 
O 
O 
O 
00 
O 
O 
Itt 
00 
O 
O 
00 
00 
O 
M 
. --, 
N 
O 
N 
- 
O 
O O O 6 6 Ö O O O O O O O O O O O 
00 all \lo rn 00 C> CD C> CD 00 
N NM 'O 00 oo Np r- [- 
NpM 
OpOOOpO OdN 
pOOOppOp Oi c; OpOpp 
I kn mot 00 O kr) [-- ý, D N O "t O V- kn N N N v) 11C 00 C O) - 00 00 00 C O d O O '-+ -- - O O O O --ý O O O ýO N -- O O O O O O O O O O O O O O M O O 
O O O O O 6 6 6 6 6 6 O O O O O O 
* i ' * O, 00 pp 0-, N N Oý O f) O , O p 
`p M cý Cý \o M , , - "p N N - M 
M 
M N M `O 00 t 00 l- O l- -ý 00 M lý lý O O O O p p O O CD O d: N O p O p O O O p p p i O O p O p 
Oý Cl) d 00 O [- IC N O N N 
N N ý1 ýO 00 Oý - 00 00 00 
ý+ -- O O O O - O O O ýO N O O O O O O O O O O O O O O M O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
00 CD r- CD c> O* rn rr 
*(Z vý 
ff) 
oMO 
oho --- 
"C NM "0 MN 
MN en ýD pp p oo N OpOOOppOO CD O ýt NO 
pÖ9Opp9p9iOOpOp 
(. 4 4 Q 
ý" 
Q cVi Q Q 
Uý 
Q 
N 
Q 
N 
Q 
býA 
Q 
ýý 
rý 
Ü 
Q 
Ü 
Q Q Q 
3 
Q Q Q 
03 
Q 
0 
0 
cý 
U 
w 
,ý ý"r 
b1J 
. r., 
ý--ý cd 
U 
. r, r--ý 
.,. a--ý 
cci 
ý--+ N 
\° 0 kr) 
Cl) 
U 
G"r 
bA 
Ct 
cd 
U 
Ct 
I 
cd 
cd 
cd 
E 
N 
cn 
4-. 
O 
O 
cd 
O U 
i-ý 
O 
U 
U 
aý 
H 
ö z 
a a, 
0 
cd 
0 
>z 
cd 
cd 
v. 
b 
a) 
as 
03 a 
b 
o "° 
C) °ý' `ý 
00 O 
M [- ON 00 Flo 
N [ý MNN 
-_C 
CO OO_ 
N_ NNN ým 0 
N 
N_ 
OOOÖOÖO_OÖ_ OOOOOOOO 
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
rn 
00 N r', M (Z ri rq 
a', 
m 
r- 00 00 00 (Z) cý 00 M 
N Oý NNÖÖÖeN OM le NOOOOOOOOOOOOO ke) 
OOÖ9OÖOOOOOO2O 
00 
M 
r, O 
00 
N 
O 
O 
O 
N 
00 
O 
O 
ýp 
O 
N 
ýp 
N 
O 
(Z 
Oý 
. - O 
11- 
O 
. -- O 
- 
O 
O 
O 
vn 
N 
O 
1,0 
N 
-- O 
1,0 
N 
O 
v) 
N 
O 
p 
N 
O 
N 
.ý O 
ý, O 
N 
. - O 
O 
N 
- O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 00 to M -- O I ýO kf) kn N 00 O O 'D O In r- Ö C) C) Ö Ö Ö Ö 
Ö Ö p Ö Ö Ö Ö 
O O O O 0 O ý p O 
ý O O Ö O O Ö , O 
00 00 (11 -- N O - ýl "O "D V) "O \O \O \ID 
M l- O 
, -- 
00 
p - 
"O 
N 
Olý 
- 
O 
r. 
O 
p 
N N 
- 
N 
-- 
N 
- 
N 
r, 
N 
-ý 
N 
- 
N 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O O O O O C C O O 
O O O O O O O O .O O. O. . O O. .O . O O. . O 
* O * * * * * ÖO ý 
- - Ö1 N 01 - 1 kn v1 v) N 00 O p Ö ý' ýn N ýO ýn Ö O N 
- O 
Ö Ö O O Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö 
O Ö O p p O O O O Ö O 6 O O 
00 00 -- N - N Oý r "--- v') 
110 I'O kf) ýO I'D 110 110 
m [- O oo 'O ýlD oo O N N N N N N N N 
O O O O O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. 
O 
. . O . O . O . O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
rn d N Ö kr1 O - Ö 00 -t O O kr) W) Ö Ö O O Ö Ö Ö Ö N Ö Ö d m 
O ý O O ý O ý O O 
O O O O O O O O 
cad V 
rý 
Ü 
Q 
Ü 
0 
Q 
14 
Q 
p 
--ý 
03 
Q 
N 
E 
Q 
a) 
10 
+ý-+ 
Q 
m 
Q Q Q Q ' Q 
bD 
Cd 
Q 
$a" 
vD 
\° 
a 
cý U 
A 
bA 
cd 
U 
cý 
\° 0 
kn 
rn 
a 
b! J 
U 
cd a-+ 
. - . - . - r-, 
'. d 
.. C 
N 
cd 
42 
C) 
'C7 
U 
cd 
cd 
O 
. r. 
cd 
C 
4-ý 
. r, "C 
4-. 
O 
C 
O 
cd 
ýL 
O 
U 
C 
O 
U 
U 
aý 
m H 
a., 0t 
N N N r oN ý° 1- 00 
kr) 
v) 
-0 O O O 
Ilt 
- 
t- 
, - 
- Ö - O 
O 
V O O O M O O O O 
N 
C/D 
zö 
ýlo 
N 
N 
N 
Ö 
O Öý in 'r1 
ý 
lt 
O O O 
00 
CY) N O 0 N 
m 
M 
0 0 
O 
O O O O O O 
O ýO 
N 
vý 
N 
1,0 
N 
O 
N 
M O O O 
Ö 
((( 
O O O O 
; z-0 
X N C> CD 00 ' 
e 
N 
c> 
O 
CD 
N 
c O Ö 
0 \, O 
N 
vn 
N 
\D O 
V O O 
N 
Ö O 
O O O O 
Q) c .) M 
c- 
1-. 
Cli CZ > 
CD 
zE 
00 N O 
le 
N O 
CD CD CD 
a O 
O O vý 
O `p ýr ýD O y N 
- 110 
O O O 
Ö Ö O Ö 
00 O 
N [- 
N O 
CD CD CD 
O O O kn 
-r 
4- O 
ý bA ^d A 
'Cd O Zi ". 
Ü O N C 
ý' 
rý xW Q iý Q ý W ý 
C 
W 
Eý 
-s i- 
N - N 
d 
O 
p N Ö 
M 
o, a, 
0 o mot' . fl "o N 
i N `r' cr a, 
O 
p 
N 
00 M 
N 
r., ý Ö 
C7ý 00 "o 
O O 
1 ti 
c ö Ö 
I 
U 
ö 
; ^, an U U ý 
\° 
CD 
bA 
Cd 
cd 
cd 
cd 
U 
. r. 
bJJ 
. r. r 
cd 
U 
cd 
... 
APPENDIX D 
Semiparametric Model Estimates with Random Household Effects 
xlv 
'O 
O 
O 
3 
E 
a) 
O 
73 
O E 
U 
E 
cd 
Cd 
c O 
E 
O U 
7C 
C 
cd 
O 
E 
U 
a) 
E 
ct 
cä 
E 
4-ý 
cd 
E 
E 
Cd 
A-, 
cd 
H 
0 
0 c) 
b 
0" z 
0 
'd' 
I) 
o- 
j5 
cý b 
o 
o 
oc 
'C 4. 
cd Uý 
CJ 
ýO 
C 
Z 
cd 
0 
r+ V U .d Vr 
ý1 Cý, 
Cd ý 
cd 
Cd 
V. 
U- 
4- 
,4 
EI (ID 
Cd a 
ct U 
24 E 
Cd 
P-0 
b 
°' apd 
ö 
CA E -d o 
ýýxw 
NNN 00 ON 'C MdMN "--ý '-, O 00 00 
^" NNNNN ýO ýO [ý -- 00 M OOOOOOOOOOÖOOOÖN 
OOOOOOOOOÖOOOOO6O 
x * 
-- M M 00 ^" 
* * *w x * a 
00 CS ý N 00 N 
O 
Ö 
d M 
N 00 
p O O O O kr1 ct O 00 p O ý1 ýp O O O N - O p p O p O O p O O r, Ö 
i ' O O ý O ý O O p ý , -. O 
O O> tý N 00 N ýO o0 -e oo NO "O NCCONNOO1,0 Ö 
Q "-+ -- -- -- -O -- -- -- . -- . -ý -ý NC OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
N 
00 <D 00 N CD OM\, 0 t0NOOM r- O OOO- . --O OONMO 0OOOOcOOOOO 
Ö m (N 00 00 00 m 00 --. 4 rn 00 kdl) M 
l N 
N 
N N 
ýO N kr) 
N 
N N N N - --+ N - - N Cý N O O O O O O O O O O O O O v> O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
CIA 
kn 1- 
I'D 
m 00 ON 00 N kr) 
ÖÖ ÖN 
cq 
-p 
OO0OO kf) 
N CO Op [ý OMO 
OOOOOppýONO OiOO '"" Oi OOip66 
C\ M N M 00 O 00 00 M dt m 00 . - "--ý C\ N 00 
O (r) M e t N N e N N - \, D \, O N O 00 M 
N N N N - "--ý --ý N - - - (n O> N O O O O O O O O O O O O O O V') O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
00 00 
*w ***_* *x ** `p 
00 Ö C`1 M 
"o kr) N CIA Ö -' 
M 
ff) ý-+ 't O 00 
OOOOCCCN-OCO 
[ý p-O 
ÖOO Oi 
OOO0O -O 
O, \ N N M 00 O 00 00 M lt M 00 '--+ - - 00 00 
O Ul M e d' N N e N N - 1,0 1,0 N - 00 M 
r, - N N N N - , - , -ý N . - M N O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
00 00 
-pÖ d' 
NN- 
00 pNÖ 
ÖOOOÖÖN 00 OCppMO 
pOOO 
0i 
OOOOp -ý" pO 
a: 
Q 
c 
Q 
o 
C) 
Ca 
v 
° 
Q 
cý 
° 
Q Q 
N 
Q 
ö 
Q a 
ý" 
0 
L1 
ý" 
0 
Ca 
3 
E 
Q 
.ý 
° 
Q 
3 
Ca Q 
x 
Ca 
x 
Q 
0 
bA 
dD 
cd 
U 
fd 
1-0 
cd 
cd 
U 
b! J 
cd 
.ý 
k 
'CD 
0 
CD 
a) 
E 
Im- 
O 
O c 
E 
O U 
cd 
N 
O 
U 
cd 
cd 
N 
0 
CF A 
O 
0 
cd 
E 
N 
N 
0 
E 
cd 
0 U 
N 
cd 
H 
0 ý" 
t 
rn 
9LO 
C 
a) 
f 
IS 
oa 
a 
C (I. ) t. - 
4- 
"0 b 
-a VD 
cd ý 
c 
>V 
aý 
a) E 
iv 
0 
a) 
-d 
+' 
Cd 
ývýxw 
OHO ýp `O 
NM Vl NMN 00 le N 
-d 
00 [o 
NN-MN r- V) 
r'' 
Ö----"N ýO ýO 
CD C> <D OOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
OOOÖOOOOOÖÖÖOOOOO 
00 
_O 
O\, 
O 00 (f) 00 
ý ý1 O Oý 00 
_M 
le "O tN Mp pN 
- . -ý 
p 
zt 
MOpO CD CD OÖO 
<Z ý 110 
OÖ le 
QpppppOOpOOOO 
O 
M r- mot' cý MOM O> N lý oo ý, D t- oo N r- 00 MMO r-+ to v) MO 110 `p "0 ýlO "0 "0 Z \lo -- N , -" NMN-O -- - r. -O OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO 
00 
*lý *M N 
*pý 
ýO* 00 M 01 
00 ýO c1 NO 
00 
kn 
OýN r- --N 
tr) Ö-NM 
C> OOOOOOOOOO kr) 
O0OOOOO Oi Oi OOOOO 
O 
00 
N 
M 
00 
N 
O 
"0 
00 
110 
01 
N 
M 
M 
N 
ßf1 
N 
N 
N 
kf) 
M 
O 
O 
N 
110 
-- 
00 
"0 
M 
N 
N 
"0 
N 
"D 
- 
Imt 
N 
-- 
00 00 
110 
'-. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
c, e 0 00 oi-0 
pNM 
ýO O 
00 NýN V) O 
O 00 13,1 NNM 
c> 
OOÖ rq CD ON 
CD CD rn CD 
OOOOpp c> 
OOOOOOO 
O 00 M N M M N 00 M N N 00 00 
00 00 C ýO N N N kn O "0 "0 N \Z "0 N ýlO ýlO 
N N - M e N - O - 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
* * * * * * * * _ 00 Ul kf1 M 00 O 0 00 C> 00 - 00 
0 0 kn 
N 
00 O M 
0 
- - 
M N N Irl 
Ö 0 O O O O O 
O 
O O O N 
O 
M O 
O O O O O O O 
O O O Ö O O 
CD V-) . - 00 C M N M M N 00 N N "t 00 00 
00 00 110 110 N N N V) O 11O 110 N 110 \C N 110 \1O 
O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 
O O O O O O O O 6 O 6 O 
6 6 6 6 
* * * * * * * _ 00 kf) lO M M 00 
00 O cý N 00 r1  O O> 00 r 't "O [- 't 00 
00 kr) N 00 O (n M ý, p O . - -" , - N (Z N 
kn 
V') CD Ö Ö O O O O O O O O N Ö M 
2 2 O O O O Ö O CD 
O O O Ö O O O O 
ýýXX 
öü CL, 
cd e cct ZZ) .ý cd cd 
9 
QEQJJQQHQQQQýý Z$ Z Q) QQ 
U 
W 9b 
cý 
U 
cd 
Z. " 
U 
bA 
. r. 
cd 
U 
'Q 
0 
0 
0 
a E 
0 
0 
I) 
, j-- 
0 
j 
C1. o ý 
b 
;z 
I. 0 
ri. ) 
b 
-d 
-i vD 
`e 
u C) 
cä ý 
ý cd 
O 
C -ci 
E 
O 
vD U 
a) b 
ö 
E I' 
u -c 
Ö 
-0 c 
0 
> 
E 
Cn x 
cn 
W 
9 
N M 
N 
N rn M 
000 _ N O O O O p O O O O O - O O O 
00 \ 00 00 Z l- kf) M (Z p M 't 
r- 
M O d N 
p O N Ö O 
r-+ p 
1, D 
00 r- t- 
\, O ýD 
N 
OOO 
0000 
* CD 00 
°° 
ö 
0 
- C> o o 
o0 
- 
M l- [- l- 
N \Z INO 00 
OOO 
0000 
* 00 rn 
M 
O 
O 
ý 
ý `D 
ý 
N ýO oO 
OOO- 
C) 000 
00 O ýp O 00 ý' O 
0 
0 
0 
ö 
... 
ýn 
ö 
ö 00 ö 00 
o 
ýN 
r-, 0 
0 
C 
C 
N 
M 
M r-- r- 110 
N \Z 00 
O O O 
O Ö O O O O 
O 
O 
00 O v-i O le 00 - O kIr) M O ýD v' O Ö vi CD o 
"- cý 
0. 
di N N_ 
/Q'ý 
i--I F--i 
Q 
- 
_ 
ý/ `/ 
) 
lfý 
Ö 
C, p 
00 N Ö p p N vý M N ý ý 
00 N O 
- 
Ö 
O N 
M M M 
h 
0 
ö 
0 
"-- M C1 00 
00 
N k 
N d- ý 
01 
ý O Ö V' O 
O 
N V) `c m 
N -t "t 
00 ö 
o N V N "t -t 
O p 
O 
. ti 
^, bn U U 
\° 
cd 
bA 
r 
cd 
U 
y-+ 
cd 
cd 
U 
bA 
cd 
U 
r 
cd 
.ý .ý .ý 
APPENDIX E 
Coefficients of Variation and Standard Deviations of Relative Welfare 
Changes within Deciles 
xlix 
a) 
bA 
N 
cd 
O 
cd 
U 
O 
cd 
cd 
"CS 
O^ 
UU 
bA y C -O 
Ü 
UO 
O 
c 
O 
> 
cd 
M 
-C 
4-ý 
O .0 
c cn C 
.ý 
. r, UU 
U 
O 
U -0 
C r.. + cd U 
Oc 
N0 
r--+ U 
H cd 
m 
cd 
0 
C U 
m 
cd 
cd 
ce 
cd 
0 
u. ' 
a) 
*-4 
rA 
ch 
aý a 
kr) 
6 
lo 
C 
aý 
U 
N 
ý 
O 
110 
0 0 \O 00 r C 00 
op '. N N N '--+ N ' 
c4- 
O 
U 
v> O It C 00 00 N C 00 C C) It C) 00 110 00 j N 
- Ö 
0 0 
Ö Ö 
I' C/D 
v> 
00 
l- 
00 b 00 N 
110 
m 
O 
N 
N 
Ö 
0 O ý-- M 
- 'It M N N ý--ý 
U 
O O 00 '- O O1) N M d- Q 
v7 N O 00 N O "D 00 Oý 
110 N (( M N - O 00 N 
00 M , ', 
lý .. ýp O M 0 Cý I C) -- d1 Ö 
0 0 N h kr) 
r- 
\O 00 
r-+ M 00 N N N Ö 
U 
y 
N co '-" lý ýO Oý (V O O Q -ý "-ý [ý lý ý1 00 O Cý 00 
VD 
CD 
(11 M d V) \O [- 00 C '-' 
N 
Q 
N 
Q 
ý 
Q 
N 
Q 
ý 
Q 
N 
Q 
N 
Q 
N 
Q 
N 
Q 
N 
Q 
N 
N 
. fl cd 
H 
PUBLICATIONS 
Z Wadud, RB Noland and DJ Graham, `Equity analysis of tradable carbon permit in personal 
road transport sector', Journal of Environmental Management and Policy (under review) 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Modeling fuel demand for different socio-economic 
groups', International Journal of Sustainable Transportation (under review) 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Gasoline demand in the USA: A cointegration 
approach', Applied Economics (in press) 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Gasoline demand with heterogenity in household 
responses', 87th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research Board (TRB), Washington 
DC, Jan 2008 (accepted for presentation, under preparation for The Energy Journal) 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Semiparametric modelling of gasoline demand 
incorporating heterogenous responses ' (under preparation for Transportation Research Part D) 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Heterogeneity in demand responses in modelling the 
distributional consequences of tradable carbon permits in the road transport sector', 
Proceedings of the European Council for Energy Efficient Economy (ECEEE) Summer Study, 
Cote d'Azur, Jun 2007 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Modeling gasoline demand for different socio- 
economic groups', Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting of the Transportation Research 
Board (TRB), Washington DC, Jan 2007 
Z Wadud, DJ Graham and RB Noland, `Equity implications of tradable carbon permits for the 
personal transport sector', Proceedings of the 86th Annual Meeting of the TRB, Washington 
DC, Jan 2007 
Z Wadud, `The distributional consequences of tradable carbon permits in the road transport 
sector: heterogeneity of demand responses', Proceedings of the 3 9`h Annual Universities' 
Transport Studies Group Conference, Leeds, Jan 2007 
Others Publications while at CTS 
RB Noland and Z Wadud, `Review of oil demand restraint policies for heavy goods vehicles', 
Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy (in press) 
DJ Graham, S Glaister, MA Quddus, and Z Wadud, `The distributional consequences of 
national road user charging', International Journal of Sustainable Transportation 
(in press) 
Ii 
